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ABSTRACT
The Cartesian Circle

(December 1976)
P ® ter J Markie, B.A., New York
University
M.A., Ph.L., University of Massachusetts
*

Directed by:

Associate Professor Fred Feldman

In my dissertation,

I

am concerned with three

questions about an important line of reasoning that

Descartes pursues in the Meditations.

In the First

Meditation he argues that he is "metaphysically uncertain"
(as he puts it)
F

of many of his beliefs;

our th Medita bion

,

in the Third and

he attempts to resolve this uncertainty.

He introduces the notion of clear and distinct perception
and tries to become metaphysically certain that every pro-

position he clearly and distinctly perceives is true.

He

(3) once he is
claims that
metaphysically certain of that fact,

his clear and distinct perception of a belief will make it

metaphysically certain for him.
The three questions that concern me are:
(1)

What is Descartes' task?

(2)

How does Descartes attempt his task?
Does Descartes accomplish his task?
.

I

examine some recent attempts to answer these questions,

give answers of my own and defend my answers against some

objections

Vll
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INTRODUCTION
shall he principally concerned in this
dissertation
with three questions about an important line
of reasoning
I

that Descartes pursues in the Meditations

.

In the First

M editation he argues that he is "metaphysically
uncertain"
(as he puts it)

of many of his beliefs;

^ourth Meditation,

in the Third and

he attempts to resolve this uncertainty.

He introduces the notion of clear and distinct
perception

and tries to become metaphysically certain that every pro-

position he clearly and distinctly perceives is true.

He

claims that once he is metaphysically certain of that fact,
his clear and distinct perception of a belief will make it

metaphysically certain for him.
The first question that will concern me is:

What is Descartes' task?

(1)

His task seems to be that of going from one epistemic state
to another.

The major feature distinguishing these states

is that in the latter he can be metaphysically certain of

propositions of which he cannot
in the former.

be metaphysically certain

One might say that his task is to go from

his "initial epistemic position" to the position of "epistemic

enlightenment".

Yet,

it is not clear how we are to under-

stand Descartes' notion of metaphysical certainty.
also unclear what propositions are involved here.

It is

At some

IX

points, for example, Descartes claims
that until he attains
the position of epistemic enlightenment,
he cannot be meta-

physically certain that he exists. 1

At another point, he

claims that even in his initial position
he can be metaphysically certain of his existence.^
The second question

I

shall be concerned with is:

How does Descartes attempt his task?

(2)

Descartes' aim is to formulate an argument that
will make
him metaphysically certain of the truth of his
clear and

distinct perceptions.

But he does not clearly explain why

the argument he formulates places him in the
position he

desires
As might De expected, the third question

I

shall con-

sider is:
(

I

Does Descartes accomplish his task?

3)

am particularly interested in whether his attempt involves

a circular argument.

Some of Descartes' critics have sus-

pected that it does.

Arnauld, for one, wrote him that:

The only remaining scruple I have is an uncertainty as to how a circular reasoning is
to be avoided in saying:
The only secure
reason we have for believing that what we

The Philosophical Works of Descartes transl.
Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge
Cambridge University Press, 1931 ), I, 159 and I85.
,

2

Ibid

.

,

II,

38.

X

clearly and distinctly perceive is true,
is
the fact that God exists.
But we can say
that God exists, only because we clearly
and
evidently perceive that; therefore, prior to
being certain that God exists, we should be
certain that whatever we clearly and evidentlv
perceive is true.
In reply

,

Descartes claimed that Arnauld had misunderstood

him and that he had not presented a circular argument.

He

did not, however, clearly state how he had been
misunder-

stood

4

Answering these Questions does not promise to be easy.
I

must find responses to them that are provided by Descartes

*

epistemology when it is interpreted in the best possible
light.

My answers to (1) and (2) must have strong textual

support.

They must also interpret Descartes as setting an

interesting and realistic task for himself and as attempting it in a plausible manner.

cessfully evaluate his attempt.

My response to

must suc-

(3)

A good deal is to be gained

from correctly answering these questions, however.
so,

I

In doing

will lay bare a large portion of Descartes' epistem-

ology, and come to appreciate some of its strengths and

weaknesses

.

In what follows,

I

shall consider some recent attempts

to answer these questions and then give answers of my own.

By first considering these unsuccessful answers,

3 Ibid

4

.

,

II,

92.

Ibid.

,

II,

114.

I

hope to

XI

demonstrate the need for a new interpretation
and to narrow
down the range of alternatives to the
one

I

present.

The first two chapters are devoted to
a line of in-

terpretation that has been pursued at various
times by Willis
Doney, Harry Frankfurt and Anthony Kenny.
On this
line of

interpretation, Descartes is regarded as maintaining
that
his clear and distinct perception of a
proposition
always

implies his metaphysical certainty of it.

He is also in-

terpreted as having a motive other than that given
above
for attempting to become metaphysically certain that
all
his clear and distinct perceptions are true

Examination, however, will reveal a lack of strong
textual evidence for the claim that Descartes thinks his

clear and distinct perceptions are always metaphysically
certain.

It will also reveal that any interpretation con-

taining that claim can not correctly answer my questions.
In the third and fourth chapters,

I

will consider

interpretations presented by Alan Gewirth, Willis Doney
and Fred Feldman.

According to these commentators, Descartes

believes some propositions are such that his clear and distinct perception of them is insufficient to make them meta-

physically certain for him.

However, his clearly and dis-

tinctly perceiving them and his satisfying some further

condition are sufficient to do so.

Though they differ as

to the nature of this further condition, each of these

commentators takes Descartes' state of epistemic enlightenment

Xll

to be one in which he
satisfies it,

and presents a version

of the argument by which
he attempts to attain
that state
Each of them also interprets
Descartes as denying that he

becomes metaphysically certain
of some of his clear and
distinct perceptions in order to do
so.

My consideration of these
interpretations will reveal
that they come close to answering
my questions successfully.
Descartes does believe some propositions
are such that to be

metaphysically certain of them he must
clearly and distinctly
perceive them and satisfy some further
condition.

He also

believes he satisfies that condition
in his state of epistemic
enlightenment. However, contrary to these
interpretations,
he believes that to reach that state
he becomes metaphysically certain of some propositions he clearly
and distinctly
perceives
In chapter five,
I

I

shall present my own interpretation.

interpret Descartes as believing that some propositions
are

such that his clear and distinct perception of them
is in

sufficient to make them metaphysically certain for him.

I

take his task to be that of formulating a procedure by which
he can become metaphysically certain of those propositions
I

also interpret him as maintaining that some of his clear

and distinct perceptions are metaphysically certain for him
in his initial position and as employing those perceptions

in his attempt at his task.

On my interpretation, Descartes'

attempt is not circular, though it may contain other faults.

xiii

devote chapter six to answering some
objections to
my interpretation and to noting some of
the joints that remain
to be examined even if my answers
are accepted.
I

CHAPTER

I

In this chapter and the following one,

I

shall consider

three interpretations of Descartes' line of
reasoning, each
of which attributes the same claim to
him.

This claim is

that whenever an individual clearly and distinctly
perceives
a

proposition, it is metaphysically certain for him.

I

shall first show that each interpretation fails to answer
my questions correctly.

In doing so,

I

shall not consider

whether they are correct in ascribing this principle to
Descartes.

Once

I

have established that these interpreta-

tions are unsuccessful on other grounds,

I

will argue that

no interpretation that ascribes this principle to Descartes

can correctly answer my questions.
1.

The first interpretation has been given by Willis Doney. 1

Roughly stated, his answer to

(1)

is as follows.

Descartes'

task is to exchange his initial position for one in which he
can be metaphysically certain of any scientific truth.

He

believes that, in his initial position, he can be meta-

physically certain of all and only those propositions he can
clearly and distinctly perceive or deduce from his clear

^Willis Doney, "The Cartesian Circle," Journal of the
History of Ideas, 16, 2 (June 1955). 324-338.

2

and distinct perceptions.

He also believes some
scientific
2

truths do not belong to this category.

He thinks that those

truths cannot be metaphysically certain
for him so long as
he has doubts about the reliability
of his memory and, in
his initial position, he has such
doubts.

With regard to (2), Doney claims that
Descartes attempts to accomplish his task by becoming
metaphysically
certain of two propositions.
The second is that God

The first is that God exists.

"guarantees his use of memory.

According to Doney, Descartes believes that his
metaphysical
certainty of these two propositions will place him
in the

epistemic position he desires.

He also believes that they

are among the propositions of which he can be metaphysically

certain in his initial epistemic position.
In response to (3) Doney does not conduct a detailed

examination of Descartes' attempt to determine whether or
not it is successful.

He does, however,

claim that it

does not involve a circular argument.
2.

Doney'

s

answer to (1) consists of three claims:

(4)

Descartes maintains that his clear and distinct perception of a proposition or his deduction of it from his clear and distinct
perceptions is always sufficient to make it
metaphysically certain for him.

(5)

Descartes believes there are scientific truths

2

Ibid

.

,

328.

^ Ibid.

,

326 & 329.

,

325 & 326.

4

Ibid

.

he can never clearly and
distinctly perceive
r deduce from his clear and
distinct perceptions ana that in his initial
positio^
he cannot be metaphysically
certain of these
truths due to his metaphysical
regarding the reliability of hisuncertainty
memory.
.

(

6

Understanding his initial epistemic
stat*
m. this way, Descartes tries to attain
an
.epistemic state in which he can be
metaphysically certain of any scientific
truth.

)

To appreciate this answer fully, a number
of points

have to be clarified.

In presenting (4), Doney does not

fully explain the notions of clear and distinct
perception,
deduction from clear and distinct perceptions and
meta-

physical certainty.

While the first does not need to be

clarified for my purposes, the other two require some
con-

sideration

.

The notion of metaphysical certainty can be briefly

explained by reference to some of Descartes' own staxements
Doney, himself, seems to understand this notion on the basis
of those statements.

According to Descartes, a proposition

is metaphysically certain for a person at a time if and only

if no other proposition provides him with a reason to doubt
.

it at that time

c

A proposition can provide a person with

a reason to doubt another one without being metaphysically

certain for him, but it can not do so if its negation is

metaphysically certain for him.^

^Haldane and Ross, II, 266.
6

Ibid

.

,

277.

4

To define deduction from
clear and distinct perceptions, we first need to define
what it is to deduce a proposition.
It appears Doney would accept
the following defin
ition:
S deduces p at t-df

(7)

S apprehends p at t
as a result of apprehending the
premises
argument A which has p as its conclusion of an
and
apprehending that the conjunction of
the p
-premises of A entails p.

Apprehending a proposition

.

is a necessary,

hut not a suffici-

ent, condition of clearly and distinctly
perceiving it, and
and individual's apprehension of a
proposition does not imply
its truth or its metaphysical certainty
for him. Definition
(7)

should be acceptable to Doney on these terms.

He inter-

prets Descartes as maintaining that an individual's
deduction
of a proposition does not imply its truth
or its metaphysical

certainty

7

In writing of an individual's deduction of a proposition,

shall at times refer to the premises of his deduction.

I

These are the premises of the relevant argument A, their con-

junction and the proposition that the conjunction of the

premises of A entails its conclusion.
To deduce a proposition from clear and distinct per-

ceptions is to deduce it in a rather special way.

We begin

with premises we are clearly and distinctly perceiving and
construct from them an argument for the proposition that
interests us.

7

& 328

.

Doney states that in such a deduction "all

Doney, J ournal of the History of Ideas, 16

,

2

,

327

5

the steps in the proof should
be present to the mind,
thus
obviating the need for memory." 8
His point seems to be that
in performing such a deduction
we must apprehend every
one
of its premises simultaneously
with our deduction of its

conclusion
This suggests the definition:
(i;

(8y

(ii)

(

iii

)

If s is deducing p at t and S
is clearly
\
ana distinctly perceiving everv
premise
of his deduction of
p at t, S is dedicmg p from his clear and distinct perceptions at t.
If S is deducing p at t and every
premise
of S s deduction is either deduced
by S
from clear and distinct perceptions at
t or clearly and distinctly perceived
by
S at t, S is deducing
p from his clear
distinct perceptions at t.
S is deducing p
from his clear and disoinc t perceptions at t only if S satisfies the antecedent of (i) or of (ii)
with regard to p and t.
^

^

Clause (i) is the base case; it covers those instances where
S

deduces a proposition solely from premises he is clearly

and distinctly perceiving.

Clause (ii) is the inductive

case and covers those instances where S goes even further

and deduces a proposition from premises some of which he is

clearly and distinctly perceiving and the rest of which he
deduces from his clear and distinct perceptions.

Finally,

(iii) asserts that the only cases of deduction from clear

and distinct perceptions are those specified by (i) or (ii).

8

Ibid

.

,

328.

6

In (k), then, Doney makes
the following assertion:
Descartes maintains that his clear
and distinct perception
of a proposition or his
deduction of it in the way
defined
by (8) is always sufficient to
make him metaphysically certain of it.

Doney seems to think Descartes is
led to adopt this
position by his acceptance of two
epistemic principles.
Doney presents the first one in his
statement that according
to Descartes
"clear and distinct perceptions
were never

subject to

doubt." 9

He appears to attribute this
principle

to Descartes:
(

9

)

If S clearly and distinctly perceives
p at
p is metaphysically certain for S at

t,

t

The second principle is that "a demonstration
based on clear

and distinct perceptions could not be mistaken

.

.

.

This may be stated more exactly as
(

10 )

If S deduces p from his clear and distinct
perceptions at t, p is metaphysically certain for S at t.

Clearly, Descartes

acceptance of

(

9

)

and (10) would commit

him to the position ascribed to him in (4)

.

The next part of Doney' s answer is given by:
(

9

5

)

Ibid

1 °

Descartes believes there are scientific truths
he can never clearly and distinctly perceive
or deduce from his clear and distinct perceptions and that in his initial position he cannot

.

Ibid

325.

,

.

,

327.

7

be metaphysically certain of these
due to his metaphysical uncertainty truths
regarding the reliability of his memory.

Doney appears to understand the first part
of
lowing manner

11
.

(

5

)

in the fol-

Descartes limits the range of his clear

and distinct perception to some contingent
prepositions

about his existence or his intellectual state
and to some

very simple necessary truths.
that some sciences,

This leads him to believe

such as mathematics, contain truths

he can never clearly and distinctly perceive cr deduce
from

his clear and distinct perceptions.

Such truths are not

simple enough to be objects of his clear and distinct perception.

If he tried to deduce them from his clear and

distinct perceptions, his deduction would comain many premises he could not clearly and distinctly perceive
he would have to deduce each of those premises,

.

Since

the result-

ing deduction would be too long for him to apprehend all
of its premises at once

Doney understands the second part of

(

5

)

as follows.

1 "

Descartes believes there are only two ways of becoming meta-

physically certain of a proposition.

The first is by clearly

and distinctly perceiving it; the second is by deducing it

from metaphysically certain permises

.

He thinks his deduc-

tion of a proposition from his clear and distinct perceptions

makes him metaphysically certain of it in the second of these

1

1

Ibid
Ibid

.

.

,

,

326

,

327 &329.

327 & 329.

8

ways.

He also believes that in his initial
position he cannot perform either of these operations
with regard
to a

scientific truth that he can neither clearly
and distinctly
perceive nor deduce from his clear and distinct
perceptions.
It is obvious that he cannot clearly and
distinctly perceive
such a proposition. He maintains that his
metaphysical un-

certainty regarding the reliability of his memory
prevents
him from deducing such a proposition from metaphysically
certain premises.
To appreciate this last point, suppose
p is a scientific truth Descartes cannot deduce from his clear and
dis-

tinct perceptions.

Descartes believes that to deduce p from

metaphysically certain premises, he must begin with propositions he clearly and distinctly perceives and deduce
from them a deductive series that ends in p.

He believes

he can construct such a deductive series but that,

since he

cannot deduce p from his clear and distinct perceptions,
such a series is so long that by the time he apprehends p,
he no longer apprehends some of its initial premises.

When

he deduces p in this way, therefore, his evidence for each
of those initial premises is either that he recollects

clearly and distinctly perceiving it or that he recollects

deducing it from his clear and distinct perceptions.
Descartes realizes that in his initial epistemic state

neither the evidence that he recollects clearly and distinctly perceiving a particular premise nor the evidence that he

9

recollects deducing it from his clear and
distinct perceptions
is sufficient to make him metaphysically
certain of that premise.

When he

is in that position,

he is not metaphysically

certain that his recollection of such matters
is correct.
For this reason, he maintains that in his

initial state the

hypothesis that his memory is mistaken provides
him with a
reason to doubt some of the initial premises
cf his deduction 0 f p and,

so,

prevents him from deducing

p

from metaphys-

ically certain premises.

Claim
It says that,

described by

(6)

constitutes the last part of Doney's answer.

understanding his initial position in the way
(4)

and (5), Descartes tries to attain a state

in which he can be metaphysically certain of ary scientific

truth.

Doney's position seems to be this.

The state of

epistemic enlightenment Descartes desires is

a

state in which

he can be metaphysically certain of even those scientific

truths he cannot clearly and distinctly perceive or deduce

from his clear and distinct perceptions.

Descartes conceives

of this state as being one in which he can deduce such a

truth from metaphysically certain premises by beginning with
his clear and distinct perceptions and deriving from them a

deductive series that ends in the scientific truth.

The fact

that his deduction is too long for him to apprehend all of
its premises simultaneously does not present him with any

difficulties in this new epistemic state.

Unlike his initial

position, this new state in one in which his recollection of

10

clearly and distinctly perceiving
a proposition or of
deducing
it from his clear and distinct
perceptions suffices to make
him metaphysically certain of
it.
Let us now see whether this
answer to (1) is correct,
Although Doney does not cite them,
three passages can easily
be read in a way that supports
his answer.
One is:

For first, we are sure that God
exists because
a
tt ndeG ^° the proofs that
established
thi^
fL+ but
h
this fact;
afterwards it is enough for us
o remember that we have
perceived something
ciearly
order to be sure that it is true?
but this would not suffice unless we
knew that
God existed and that He did not deceive
us.

m

13

Descartes appears to claim that once he
has become metaphysically certain God exists and does not
deceive him, the

evidence that he recollects clearly and
distinctly perceiving a particular proposition is sufficient
to make him metaphysically certain of it. Since he regards himself
as be-

coming metaphysically certain that God exists and
does not
deceive him in the process of accomplishing his task,
this

first passage suggests Doney' s answer.

Another passage

is:

But after I have recognized that there is a God
because at the same time I have also recognized
that all things depend upon Him and that he
is not a deceiver, and from that have inferred that
what I clearly and distinctly perceive cannot
fail to be true--although I no longer pay any
attention to the reasons for which I have judged
this [that the angles of a triangle equal two
right angles] to be true, provided that I recollect having clearly and distinctly perceived it

1

%aldane and Ross,

II,

115

11

n rary reason can be brought
on,nrt I
could
ever cause me to doubt its forward which
truth
.14
.

.

Descartes regards his deduction
that God exists and that
all
his clear and distinct perceptions
are true as a necessary
part of his attempt to accomplish
his task.

This second
passage suggests, then, that he
regards the accomplishment
of his task as placing him
in a position where his memory
of having clearly and distinctly
perceived that the angles
of a triangle equal two right
angles is sufficient
to make

him metaphysically certain of that
fact.
In a third passage, Descartes states:

the question is raised whether we can
entertain
the same firm and immutable certainty
as to these
conclusions, during the time that we recollect
that they have been deduced from first
principles
that are evident for this remembrance must
be
assumed in order that they may be called conclusions. My answer is that those possess it
who, in virtue of their knowledge of God,
are
aware that the faculty of understanding given
by Him must tend towards the truth; but that
this certainty is not shared by others 15
.

;

.

.

.

Descartes

'

position seems to be that the accomplishment of

his task places him in an episteroic state in which the evi-

dence

that he recollects deducing a particular proposition

from his clear and distinct perceptions is sufficient to
make him metaphysically certain of it.

Despite the support provided by these three passages,

Doney's answer is incorrect.

While (4) may be granted to

him pending a discussion of whether Descartes accepts
1
1

Dbid

.

,

1

Ibid

.

,

II,

,

184.

42 & 43.

(

9 ),

12

there are serious difficulties
with (5) and (6).

According to (5), Descartes claims
there are scientific truths he can never clearly
and distinctly perceive
in
.

fact, as it has been explained
here,

(5)

interprets Descartes

as believing he can clearly and
distinctly perceive only a
small number of scientific truths.
But, there do not appear

to be any passages in which Descartes
limits the range of
his clear and distinct perception
this severely. Also, there
is textual evidence that strongly
suggests that he does not.
In both the Principles and the
Meditations once he has com,

pleted his task, Descartes adopts the policy
of assenting to
a proposition only if he clearly and
distinctly perceives it.
The relevant passage from

"the

Meditations is:

But,

if I abstain from giving my judgement on
anything when I do not perceive it with sufficient clearness and distinctness, it is plain
that I act rightly and am not deceived.

The one from the Principles is:
But,

it is certain that we shall never take the
false as the true if we only give our assent to
things we perceive clearly and distinctly .1?

Given that he adopts this policy, it is very doubtful that

Descartes limits the range of his clear and distinct perception
to a few true propositions.

When taken with such a limitation,

this policy would be extremely restrictive and unreasonable.
In fact,

1

on Doney's own interpretation,

Ibid

.

,

I,

17 Ibid

.

,

236.

117.

it would prohibit

13

Descartes from accepting some
propositions that are metaphysically certain for him.
Claim

(6)

also contains a serious difficulty.

We are

seeking an answer on which Descartes
sets a realistic task
for himself. But. on (6). Descartes
adopts a very unrealistic one.
There is also, as I shall show,
a passage in which
he acknowledges that he cannot
accomplish the task
(6)

as-

signs to him.
The unrealistic nature of the task
Doney sets for

Descartes may be seen by considering what
he has to do to
accomplish it. Descartes must attain an
epistemic state in
which he can be metaphysically certain of
a proposition for
which his only evidence is either that he
recollects clearly
and distinctly perceiving it or that he
recollects deducing
it from his clear and distinct perceptions.

that he cannot attain such a state.

It is obvious

He does not have any

way of becoming metaphysically certain that his memory of

clearly and distinctly perceiving a particular proposition
is correct.

So long as he is metaphysically uncertain re-

garding this point, the evidence that he recollects clearly
and distinctly perceiving a particular proposition is in-

sufficient to make him metaphysically certain of it.
Moreover, when he is questioned about it, Descartes
seems to deny that he can accomplish this task.

Conversation with Burman

.

In the

Burman points out that:

But someone will declare: after I have demonstrated the existence of God and of a God who is

14
* that my intellect
y
deceives me’ wi+h
th +w
the rectltude God has
given
it hnt +h=i
hat my memor y deceives me,
J
because
I
elieve 1 remember something
which in reality
?§* rememl:>eri itemory itself has its failings
’

Burman's point is that even after
a person has followed the
line of reasoning by which
Descartes attempts
his task, he

is still

metaphysically uncertain of those
propositions that

are evidenced solely by his memory.

It is reasonable to as-

sume that these propositions include
those for which his

evidence is either that he recollects
clearly and distinctly
perceiving them or that he recollects
deducing them from
clear and distinct perceptions

Descartes replies:

Concerning memory I can say nothing:
it is up
to each man to determine by his own
personal
experience, whether or not he has a good memory.
And if he has doubts about it, he ought to make
use of notes or some other aid 19
.

Descartes acknowledges Burman's point.

In admitting that he

is unable to say anything concerning memory,

he is acknowledg

ing that he cannot attain a state in which he is
metaphysical
ly certain of propositions that are evidenced either solely
by

his memory of clearly and distinctly perceiving them

or solely by his memory of deducing Ihem from clear and

1

Oeuvres de Descartes ed. Charles Adam and Paul
Tannery (Paris: Leopold Cerf, 1847-1913), V, 148. This is
my translation of the passage in Adam and Tannery.
,

19

.

Ibid
148.
in Adam and Tannery.
.

,

This is my translation of the passage
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distinct perceptions.

Since the task Doney sets for
him is
extremely unrealistic and Descartes
himself admits he cannot

accomplish it, it is doubtful that he
attempts it in the
Third and Fourth Meditation
.

3-

Doney

's

answer to my second question is initially
given

by:

(11)

Descartes maintains that by becoming
metaphysically certain that God exists and
guarantees the reliability of his memory,
he attains the epistemic state he
desires.

Other than asserting that Descartes attempts
to become metaphysically certain of the proposition that God
exists by

deducing it from his clear and distinct perceptions,
Doney
does not provide any explanation of (11).
Nor does

he cite

any passages which might support it.
It seems likely, however, that Doney intends to
give

the following answer to (2).

Descartes tries to accomplish

his task by becoming metaphysically certain of two propositions.

The first is that all his clear and distinct per-

ceptions are true

.

The second is that his memory is correct

whenever he recollects clearly and distinctly perceiving a
particular proposition or deducing one from his clear and
distinct perceptions.

He believes he can deduce these two

propositions from his clear and distinct perceptions and,
in accordance with his acceptance of (10), he believes

his doing so will make them metaphysically certain for him.

To appreciate Descartes’ claim that his metaphysical

certainty of these two propositions places him in the

16

epistemic state he desires, consider
the following example.
Descartes is metaphysically certain
of these two proposition
and p is a scientific truth he
can neither clearly
and dis-

tinctly perceive nor deduce from
his clear and distinct
perceptions. Also Decartes is deducing
p by clearly and
distinctly perceiving some propositions
and deducing from
them a deductive series that ends
in p.
Since he cannot
deduce p from his clear and distinct
perceptions, his deduction of it is very long and he no longer
apprehends
.

some of

its initial premises.

His evidence for each of these prem-

ises is either that he recollects clearly
and distinctly

perceiving it or that he recollects deducing it
from his
clear and distinct perceptions.
Descartes believes that, given his evidence for
these
premises, there are only two hypotheses that could
provide

him with a reason to doubt them.

The first is that he some-

times clearly and distinctly perceives a false proposition.
The second is that he is sometimes mistaken when he recol-

lects clearly and distinctly perceiving a particular prop-

osition or deducing one from his clear and distinct perceptions.

In this example Descartes is metaphysically certain

of the negations of these hypotheses

.

Hence

,

neither of

them is able to cast metaphysical doubt on the initial

premises of his deduction.

For this reason, Descartes

claims that those premises are metaphysically certain for

him and that, as a result, p is also.

17

This seems to be the most plausible
version of Doney's
answer.
Nevertheless, it is incorrect. We
are looking for
an answer that ascribes a plausible
position to Descartes
and is supported by strong textual
evidence.

On this answer,

Descartes is interpreted as maintaining
that his memory is
correct whenever he recollects clearly
and distinctly perceiving a proposition or deducing one from
his clear and
distinct perceptions. This claim is very
implausible.
It
invites the embarassing question of why
Descartes' memory
is always correct with regard to these
matters, when it
is obviously inaccurate with regard to
other ones.

Descartes never makes this implausible claim, and
once he completes his task in the Principles

.

he denies it.

frequently our memory deceives us by leading us
to believe tha u certain things have been satisfactorily established by us. 20
For the sake of argument, we may assume with Doney that

Descartes believes he can establish a proposition by clearly
and distinctly perceiving it or deducing it from his clear

and distinct perceptions.

He thus acknowledges here that

he is sometimes mistaken in his memory of having clearly

and distinctly perceived a particular proposition and in
his memory of having deduced one from his clear and distinct

perceptions
There does not appear to be any other way of inter-

preting Descartes' argument so that it constitutes a plaus-

20

Haldane and Ross,

I,

236.
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lble attempt at the task Doney
sets for him.
Descartes
does not draw any conclusions in
his argument regarding the
reliability of memory. The major
conclusions he presents
are that God exists and does not
deceive him and that all
his clear and distinct perceptions
are true.
There does

not seem to be any way in which his
becoming metaphysically
certain of these conclusions can be plausibly
regarded as
placing him in the epistemic state he desires
on Doney's
?i
interpretation
•

4.

ed.

Doney's answer to my third question must now
be considerHe does not give a detailed evaluation
of Descartes'

argument, and since his answer to (2) is incorrect,
he does
not provide the basis for such an evaluation.

However, he

claims that Descartes' attempt is not open to Arnauld's
charge of circularity, and it is worth considering his
posi-

tion on that point.

According to Doney, critics such as Arnauld have interpreted Descartes in the following manner

They have

ascribed to him the claims:
(12)

Until he accomplishes his task, Descartes
cannot be metaphysically certain of any
proposition he clearly and distinctly
perceives

(13)

To accomplish his task, Descartes becomes
metaphysically certain of some of his clear
and distinct perceptions.

21

Doney's answer to (2) is not open to one objection
that has been made against it. For a discussion of this
objection see the appendix.
22

Doney, J ournal of the History of Ideas

,

16,

2,

325*

19

Understanding Descartes in this way, they
have objected
that his attempt is circular. Their
objection

is not that

his attempt contains an argument
that has its conclusion as
one of its premises.
It is that, on Descartes' own
position,
his attempt is successful only if he
has already accomplished
his task when he makes it.
By 13 ), his attempt is successful only if he makes it in an epistemic
state in which some
(

of his clear and distinct perceptions
are metaphysically

certain for him.

However, by (12), he is in such a state

only if he has already accomplished his task.

According to Doney

,

this objection is based on a mis-

understanding of Descartes' position.
adopt (12).

Descartes does not

He adopts (9) with its claim that his clear

distinct perceptions are always metaphysically certain
for him.

Although the rest of Doney

'

s

interpretation contains

serious difficulties, this way of understanding Arnauld's

objection and of responding to it has seemed promising to
some philosophers.

It is successful,

however, only if we

can attribute (9) to Descartes and still answer my questions

correctly.
5.

Let us now consider another attempt to do so.

This attempt has been made by Harry Frankfurt. 2

-^

With

23
^Harry Frankfurt, "Descartes' Validation of Reason,"
Descartes
A Collection of Critical Essays ed. Willis
Doney (New York: Doubleday, 1967)> 208-226
Harry Frankfurt,
Demons Dreamers and Madmen
The Defense of Reason in
Descartes Meditations (Indianapolis & New York: BobbsMerrill 1970Ti
;

,

.

:

,

*

,

2C

regard to question (1), Frankfurt
state S
Once Descartes has formulated
clarity and distinctness, his the prinoinTe „-r
task
mine whether or not it is
^acceptable rule
P? rceiving clearl y and distinctly
IS an activity
?? of reason.
It is what the facultv
Of reason does when it is
at its best.
The problem of deciding whether clear
and distinct pe?
ceptions can be trusted, therefore,
is the
ne pr0
problem of validating reason. 2?
:

r^tiv

Frankfurt claims Descartes' task is
to determine whether or
not the principle of clarity and
distinctness is an acceptable rule of evidence. He also states
that Descartes' task
is that of validating reason.
This suggests that
he takes

Descartes' task to be that of demonstrating
in some way
that the principle of clarity and
distinctness

is an ac-

ceptable rule of evidence

Frankfurt's response

to' (2)

is:

Descartes' way of dealing with this problem is well
known. He demonstrates that there is a being-God who is both omnipotent and benign. And then
from the fact that God is benevolent and hence not
a deceiver, he infers that the truth of what
is
clearly and distinctly perceived has a divine
guarantee 25

—

.

According to Frankfurt, Descartes attempts to demonstrate
that the principle of clarity and distinctness is an ac-

ceptable rule of evidence by demonstrating that all his clear
and distinct perceptions are true

.

He attempts to demon-

strate that all his clear and distinct perceptions are true
by demonstrating that God exists and is not a deceiver.
24

Frankfurt, Demons
23 Ibid.

,

156.

I
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In response to

Frankfurt does not present a detailed evaluation of Descartes'
argument. However,
(

3 ),

he as-

cribes

(

9

)

to Descartes and gives a
response to Arnauld

objection that is very similar to Doney's.
step further and presents an objection

'

He also goes one

of his own to Descartes.

It is that Descartes*

"procedure does seem to beg the ques-

tion, although it does so in a rather
different way than
^
2
has been generally thought."

Let us take a closer look at Frankfurt's
answer to 1 ).
He interprets Descartes as wanting to
demonstrate that the
principle of clarity and distinctness is an
acceptable rule
of evidence.
To appreciate this response, we have to
deter6

.

(

mine what the principle of clarity and distinctness
is, what
it is for that principle to be an acceptable
rule of evidence,

and what it is to demonstrate that fact.

With regard to the first point, Frankfurt refers us
to Descartes'

statement of one of his rules of method:

The first of these [rules] was to accept nothing as
true which I did not clearly recognize to be so:
that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitation
and prejudice and to include in my judgements
nothing more that what was presented to my mind
so clearly and distinctly that I could have no
occasion to doubt it. 27

Frankfurt claims Descartes is presenting

26
27

Ibid

.

,

177.

Adam and Tannery, VI, 18.

a criterion or rule
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of evidence,

and he terms this rule "the
principle of clar-

ity and distinctness”.

2^

However, at least two different rules
are suggested by
this passage.
One is:
(14)

Accept p at t only if you are clearly
and
distinctly perceiving p in such a way
that
you are metaphysically certain of
p att.

A second rule is suggested by Descartes'
resolution to adopt
"nothing more than what was presented byQiii]
mind so clearly
and distinctly that QigJ could have no occasion
to doubt it."
(my italics.)
(15)

This is the rule:
If you are clearly and distinctly perceiving p in such a way that it is metaphysically certain for you at t, accept
p at t

Frankfurt does not state which, if either, of these rules
is the principle of clarity and distinctness.

His statements suggest, however, that he takes
to be that principle.

(

15

)

He states the principle of clarity

and distinctness directs him to accept propositions under

certain conditions. 29
ion, but rule

(14)

Rule

does not.

(1 5

)

satisfies this descript-

Frankfurt also claims that

Descartes is concerned with whether the principle of clarity
and distinctness might lead him to accept mutually incon-

sistent propositions.

30

This is implausible if (14) is

pO

Frankfurt, Demons, 125*
2

Ibid

.

,

30 Ibid.,

33 & 34

170.

.
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that principle.

Descartes has no reason to be
concerned
with whether his following
(14) might lead him to adopt
mutually inconsistent propositions;
(14) states a necessary
condition for accepting propositions,
not a sufficient one.
Frankfurt s claim is plausible,
however,
if

principle of clarity and distinctness.

(

15 ) is the

In so far as

Descartes follows (15), he accepts
any proposition he clear
ly and distinctly perceives
in such a way that it is
metaphysically certain for him. If his
clearly and
distinctly-

perceiving propositions in this way does
not imply their
mutual consistency, his following
15 ) might lead him to
adopt mutually inconsistent propositions.
(

In accepting (15) as the principle
of clarity and

distinctness, though, Frankfurt might have
us revise it
to avoid what he considers a redundancy.
He

states that

for Descartes:
To perceive something clearly and distinctly,
however, is to be aware of grounds for believes lt oiS0 com Plete that no basis for doubt reHe interprets Descartes as maintaining

(

9

)

with its claim

that an individual's clear and distinct perceptions are

always metaphysically certain for him.
31

Ibid

.

,

3^

Presumably, he

164.

32

While Frankfurt follows Doney in ascribing 9 to
Descartes, he does not appear to limit the objects of clear
and distinct perception to some proper subset of the set
of true propositions.
(

)

24

would have us restate the principle
of clarity and distinctness more simply as:
(16)

If you are clearly and
distinctly perceiving p at t, accept p at t

We still have to discover what
it is for (16) to be
an acceptable rule of evidence.
In this regard, Frankfurt
tells US:
In seeking. to understand what Descartes
is after
his validation of reason, and to
evaluate the
cogency o± his argument, it is useful
to recall
his procedure
determining the reliability of
his senses in the F irst Meditation
The trouble
he found there with sensory evidence
was that
he senses, might for all he knew,
provide
flicting testimony: his basis for rejecting conthe
rules of sensory evidence was essentially
that
someone following. these rules might conceivably
be led to accept inconsistent evidence
Now it
is reasonable to suppose that when he
considers
reason Descartes wishes to discover whether the
rule of reason the principle of clear and distinct perception- -passes the test that the rules
of sensory evidence failed.
The presumption
that his attempt to validate reason parallels
his at tempt to validate the senses suggests that
what he. wants to know about clear and distinct
perceptions is whether they are consistent with
one another

m

m

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

According to Frankfurt, Descartes tries to demonstrate that
(16)

is an acceptable rule of evidence in that he tries

to demonstrate that it meets one requirement for being such
a rule

.

This is the requirement that each proposition it

directs him to accept is consistent with every other one it
directs him to accept.
A more developed version of Frankfurt's position seems

33 Ibid.

,

170.
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to be this

A rule of evidence is a
sentence that has the
conditional form exemplified by
(15) an d (l6)
direots
us to accept particular
propositions under certain circumstances 34 There are a number
of requirements that a
rule

^

.

of evidence must satisfy to
be acceptable

especially important to Descartes.

.

One of these is

It is the requirement

that each proposition the rule
directs us to accept must
be consistent with every other
one it directs us to accept 35
Descartes wants to demonstrate that the
principle of clarity
and distinctness meets this requirement.
More exactly, he
wants to demonstrate:
.

(17)

If (16) directs S.to accept
p at t, then
p is consistent with the conjunction of
every other proposition that 16 directs
(
)
S to accept at t.
^

Two of Frankfurt's statements help clarify
what it is
for Descartes to demonstrate 1 ?).
(

He (DescartesJ establishes truths by removing the
grounds for doubting them rather than proving
them in a direct way 36
.

Descartes' argument, then, is an attempt to
show that there are no good reasons for believing that reason is unreliable 37
.

These passages suggest that Frankfurt understands the notion
of a demonstration in such a way that an individual demonstrates

^ Ibid

.

3 ^ Ibid

.

,

33 & 34

,

34

.

,

174.

37 Ibid.

,

175.

36

Ibid

.

26
a proposition if and only
if he follows an
argument that
leads him to be metaphysically
certain of it. His answer
to
1 ), therefore, may
be given in a sentence.
Descartes’
(

task is to attain an epistemic
state in which he is metaphysically certain of 17 ).
(

There are, however, two serious
difficulties with this
answer.
It lacks strong textual support,
and it does not

adequately explain some of Descartes'
most important statements about his task.
Frankfurt does not make any straightforward
attempts
to summon textual support for his
answer. However,

in pre-

senting it he writes:
The presumption that his (Descartes
H attempt to
validate reason parallels his attempt to validate the senses suggests that what he wants
know about clear and distinct perceptions is to
whether they are consistent with one another.
The conception of truth involved in his queson about the truth of what is clearly and
distinctly perceived is, in other words, a
conception of coherence rather than of cor.

respondence

.

This passage suggests that he believes there are two
sources
oT textual support for his answer.

The first is Descartes'

examination of the reliability of his senses in the First

Meditation

.

According to Frankfurt, Descartes is concerned

there with whether some rules of sensory evidence might
lead him to accept mutually inconsistent propositions, and
the fact that Descartes has this concern supports his answer
38 Ibid.

,

170.

2?
to (1).

The second is Descartes'
assertion that in accomplishing his task he demonstrates
that all his clear and

distinct perceptions are true.

Frankfurt maintains that in

making this claim Descartes has a
coherence theory of truth

m

mind, and that, once it is understood
in

this light,

Descartes' assertion supports his answer.
The first source, however, provides
Frankfurt with
very little, if any, textual support.
Even if Descartes
were concerned in the First Meditation
with whether some

rules of sensory evidence might lead him
to adopt mutually
inconsistent propositions, his having this
concern would
not provide any substantial support for
Frankfurt’s answer.
The question that concerns Descartes in
the Third and Fourth
Meditation might be entirely different from the
ones that

concern him in the Lirst Meditation regarding his
senses.
Moreover, Frankfurt does not cite any passages from the

Meditation in which Descartes presents a rule of evidence and considers whether it might lead him to adopt

mutually inconsistent propositions.

Nor do there appear to

be any such passages

The second source also fails to provide Frankfurt with
the textual support he needs.

There are passages in which

Descartes claims that in accomplishing his task he becomes

metaphysically certain that all his clear and distinct perceptions are true.^ 7

But, Frankfurt fails to show that

^Haldane and Ross,

I,

178 & 184.
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Descartes has a coherence
theory of truth in mind
when he
makes this claim. Also,
even if we allow that
Descartes
does have such a theory
of truth in mind,
his claim does
not provide any substantial
support for Frankfurt's
answer.
To show that Descartes
has a coherence theory
of truth
mind when he makes this
claim. Frankfurt cites
his statement that:

m

To begin with, directly we
think that we riehtlv
1"
S
h
^aneously
Persuaff
ourselves that
°h"^ it
it^iis true.
Further, if this
n 1C 0n 1S S0 stron that we
e
have no reason
i°
Ji concerning
to X
doubt
that of the truth of whi?h
we have persuaded ourselves
there is
6
to enquire about; we havl
lil the certaintv fhaf
can reasonably be desired.
What is it tS us^?
n Sh Ula P erhaps imagine
that the very
thina
hlpg of whose
h
truth we have been so firmly"
persuaded appears false to God or to
an angel a^d
C
is falEe spring Tsr!^d ence
y
° W ® care about this
a sity, since
falsnv
since" we by no means believe absolute
in it or
have the least suspicion of it?
For we are PurP
posing a persuasion so firm that
it can in no
De
removed-- a persuasion, therefore,
V*y
that
ls exactl y -he same as the most
perfect certitude. 40

“

'

Frankfurt claims that in this passage
Descartes evidently recognizes that his
entails that from our knowing something positionwith perfect certitude it does not follow that
it is,
speaking aosolutely", true. He explicitly
concedes, in other words, that he has not
proven
that whatever is clearly and distinctly
perceived is "absolutely true". What he suggests
is that if something that is perfectly
certain
may be absolutely false, then the notions of
absolute truth and absolute falsity are irrelevant to the purposes of inquiry. His

40

Adam and Tannery, VII, 145
This is Frankfurt's
translation of the passage in Adam and Tannery.
.
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account makes it clear that the
that i_s relevant is a notion of notion of truth
coherence ,4l
He also states that in this
passage Descartes
"denies that
the truth he seeks consists in
the correspondence of a bej

lief to a reality."^

Frankfurt's interpretation of this
passage seems to
be this.
Descartes is considering a situation
in which he
is metaphysically certain of a
proposition as
a result of

clearly and distinctly perceiving it.
of the passage,

In the third sentence

Descartes acknowledges that that proposition

might appear false to God or to an angel
and so be false
absolutely'
despite his clear and distinct perception of
,

it.

In doing so, he is acknowledging that it
might be

false in the sense of failing to correspond to
reality.
On the basis of his interpretation, Frankfurt
reasons
as follows.

Given that this interpretation is correct,

Descartes cannot regard himself as metaphysically certain
that all his clear and distinct perceptions are true in
the sense of corresponding with reality.

He here admits

that some of his clear and distinct perceptions may not be
true in that sense.

It is reasonable to assume,

therefore,

that when he claims to be metaphysically certain of the

truth of his clear and distinct perceptions, he understands
the notion of truth in terms of a coherence, rather than

41

42

Frankfurt, Demons
Ibid

.

,

25.

.
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a correspondence,

theory.

Frankfurt's interpretation of this
passage is unsatisfactory. While Descartes is considering
a situation in
which he is metaphysically certain of
a proposition as a
result of clearly and distinctly perceiving
it,

he is not

acknowledging the possibility that the
proposition appears
false to God or to an angel. He later
states
that:

Again there is no difficulty though someone
that the truth. appears false to God or to an feign
angel
because the evidence of our perceptions does
not
allow us to pay any attention to such a fiction. ^3
Descartes characterizes the claim that the proposition
he
clearly and distinctly perceives appears false to
God
or

to an angel as a fiction that someone might feign.

not,

He does

then, think that that claim might be true.
A correct interpretation of the passage is this.

In

the first tw© sentences, Descartes introduces a situation

in which he is metaphysically certain of a proposition he

clearly and distinctly perceives.

In the next three, he

considers whether in this situation he should be concerned
by the fact that someone else thinks the object of his

clear and distinct perception appears false to God or to an
angel.
it.

His position is that he should not be concerned by

Since he is metaphysically certain of the object of

his clear and distinct perception, his evidence for it is

^%aldane and Ross,

II, 42.
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strong enough to resist any reason for
doubt, including any
that might arise from someone's believing
it appears false
to God or to an angel.

Furthermore, even if Descartes has a
coherence theory
in mind when he claims that the
accomplishment
of his task

makes him metaphysically certain of the truth
of his clear
and distinct perceptions, his doing so does
not provide
any direct support for Frankfurt's answer.
Unless
we at-

tribute a very implausible coherence theory to
Descartes,
his claim is not equivalent to the one that the
accomplish-

ment of his task makes him metaphysically certain
all his

clear and distinct perceptions are mutually consistent.

Nor does it imply that claim.
As already noted, Frankfurt's answer has another

drawback besides its lack of textual support.

adequately explain three of Descartes

'

interesting statements about his task.
his attempt,

It does not

most important and

Having completed

Descartes writes:

And so I clearly recognize that the certainty
and truth of all knowledge depends alone on
the knowledge of the true God, in so much that,
before I knew Him I could not have a perfect
knowledge of any other thing. ^4
Descartes claims his knowing that God exists and is not a
deceiver is a necessary condition of his having perfect
knowledge of any other proposition.

44

Ibid.

,

I,

185*
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He later modifies this claim.

When I said that we could know nothing
tainty unless we were first aware that with cerGod existed
I announced
express terms that I referred only
to the science apprehending such
conclusions as
c^r. recur in memory without
attendinr further
to
—3- proofs which led me to make them 4"3 "

m

.

Descartes' position is that his knowing God
exists and is not
a deceiver is a necessary condition of
his having perfect
knowledge of those propositions that can recur
in his

memory without his attending to his proofs of
them.
He gives an example of the sort of propositions
he
has in mind.

He considers whether an atheist can have per-

fect knowledge that the angles of a triangle equal two
right

angles and writes:

That an atheist can know clearly that the angles
tr i angle are equal to two right angle
I
do not deny.
I merely affirm that, on the other
hand, such knowledge on his part cannot constitute true science, because no knowledge that
can be rendered doubtful should be called science.
Since he is as supposed, an Atheist, he cannot
be sure that he is not deceived in the things
that seem most evident to him.
.46
,

.

.

To Descartes, then, an atheist cannot have perfect knowledge
of the theorem that the angles of a triangle equal two right

angles.

He cannot have such knowledge of this theorem be-

cause he does not know God exists and is not a deceiver.
In these passages, then, Descartes adopts the follow-

ing position.

43 Ibid
46

The accomplishment of his task causes him to

.

,

II,

.

,

39.
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satisfy a necessary condition of having
perfect knowledge
of propositions of a particular
sort.
This condition is
that he know that God exists and is not
a deceiver.
An
example of the sort of proposition he
has in mind is
the

theorem that the angles of a triangle equal
two right angles.
Several aspects of Descartes' position need
to be

explained.

It is not clear how we are to understand
the

notions of knowledge and perfect knowledge that
are involved in it.
It is also unclear what sort of proposition
is

exemplified in this instance by the theorem that the

angles of a triangle equal two right angles.

Finally, it

is not clear why Descartes thinks his knowledge of
God's

existence and nondeceptive nature is a necessary condition
of his perfect knowledge of propositions of that sort.
is

reasonable to expect that any successful answer to

It
(1)

will provide adequate explanations of these points.

Frankfurt does not provide such explanations, however.

With regard to Descartes' position, he writes:
Now at a time when we are having no clear and
distinct perceptions, we may recall having once
perceived something clearly and distinctly.
Descartes maintains that if we know that God
exists we are entitled to accept the fact that
something was once clearly and distinctly
perceived as conclusively establishing its
truth.
The recollection then suffices to establish the truth of what we remember perceiving. But, if God's existence is not known,
he claims, we must suspect that what we remember
perceiving clearly and distinctly may be false
even though we once clearly and distinctly perceived it and were at that time incapable of
doubting it. For without the knowledge of God,
'I can persuade myself that nature has made me

34
t at 1
f ?° m time t0 time deceived
in things
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th»t ?
I suppose I perceive in
thee most
los °
evident way possible 4 ?
.

This is a very incomplete explanation
of Descartes' position
Frankfurt states that, according to
Descartes, knowing that
God exists is a necessary condition
of being metaphysically
certain of a proposition on the basis of
the fact that it
has been clearly and distinctly perceived
earlier. He
does not, however, explain in what way we
have to know

that God exists or what it is for an individual
to be meta-

physically certain of a proposition on the basis
of the
fact that he has previously clearly and distinctly
perceived
it.

He also does not state how any of this relates
to an

individual's ability to have perfect knowledge of such
propositions as the theorem that the angles of a triangle equal
two right angles.

Nor does there seem to be a way of interpreting

Frankfurt's statement so that it provides an adequate ex-

planation of Descartes' position.
tempt to do so seems to be this

.

The most plausible at-

For an individual to be

metaphysically certain of a proposition on the basis of
the fact that he has clearly and distinctly perceived it
is for him to be metaphysically certain of it on the meta-

physically certain evidence that he has clearly and distinctly perceived it.

In claiming that he has perfect

knowledge of the theorem that the angles of a triangle
j—
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equal two right angles only if he
knows God exists and is
not a deceiver, Descartes intends
to claim that he is metaphysically certain of this theorem
only if he is metaphysically certain of God's existence
and nondeceptive nature.
He
is led to make this claim by
two of his beliefs.
The first
is that he is metaphysically
certain of this theorem
only

if he is metaphysically certain
of some propositions on

the metaphysically certain evidence
that he has clearly
and distinctly perceived them.
The second is that he is

metaphysically certain of propositions in this
way only if
he is metaphysically certain of God's
existence and
non-

deceptive nature.

His reason for maintaining this second

belief is that unless he is metaphysically
certain of the
existence and nondeceptive nature of God, the
hypothesis thax
God is a deceiver provides him with a reason to
doubt any

proposition evidenced solely by his metaphysical certainty
of having clearly and distinctly perceived it.

This attempt to explain Descartes' position is un-

successful.

There do not appear to be any passages in which

Descartes claims he is not metaphysically certain that the
angles of a triangle equal two right angles unless he is

metaphysically certain of some propositions on the metaphysically certain evidence that he has clearly and distinctly perceived them.

On Frankfurt's own interpretation,

Descartes is committed to the claim that he can be meta-

physically certain of that theorem without being metaphysic-
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ally certain of God's existence and
nondeceptive nature.
Frankfurt attributes (9) to Descartes, and
Descartes himself acknowledges that he can clearly
and distinctly perceive this theorem without being
metaphysically certain that
God exists and is not a deceiver. He
writes that
"I who
have some little knowledge of the principles
of geometry

recognize quite clearly that the angles of a
triangle equal
two right angles.
and he claims he clearly
.

.

and dis-

,

tinctly perceives this theorem even though he is
of there being a

"ignorant

God."^

In all, Frankfurt's answer to (1) is open to two

fatal objections.

It lacks textual support,

and it does

not adequately explain three of Descartes' most important

statements regarding his task.
7.

Stated briefly, Frankfurt's answer to

(2)

is

Descartes' way of dealing with this problem is
well known. He demonstrates that there is a
being--God--who is both omnipotent and benign.
And then from the fact that God is benevolent
and hence not a deceiver, he infers that the
truth of what is clearly and distinctly perceived has a divine guarantee .^9
His answer seems to be the following.

To accomplish his

task, Descartes follows an argument for (17) that he thinks

will make him metaphysically certain of it.

In that argu-

ment, he first derives the premise that God exists and is

^Haldane and Ross,
^Frankfurt, Demons

I,

,

184.

156

.

3?

not a deceiver from some other premises;
then he employs
that premise to derive (17).

Two points need to he clarified here.

Descartes maintains

(9)

First,

if

as Frankfurt claims, why does he

not try to become metaphysically certain of
and distinctly perceiving it?

believe his argument for

(

17

(

17

)

by clearly

Second, why does Descartes

will lead him to be metaphysic-

)

ally certain of it?

Frankfurt does not consider these questions directly,
but his statements suggest answers to them.

He claims that

in following his argument Descartes attempts to clearly and

distinctly perceive each one of its premises simultaneously
with his clear and distinct perception of its conclusion.-^ 0
He also suggests that for Descartes some but not all true

propositions are such that to clearly and distinctly perceive them he must follow arguments for them.^ 1

These statements by Frankfurt suggest the following

answer to the first question.

metaphysically certain of

(

1

Descartes does try to become
)

by clearly and distinctly

perceiving it; his argument for (17) is an attempt to do so.
In this regard we can define the notion of a deduction.
(18)

deduces p at t=df. S clearly and disS
tinctly perceives p at t as a result of
clearly and distinctly perceiving the

5 ° Ibid

51
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premises of an argument A having
p as its conclusion at t and clearly and distinctly
perceiving that the premises of A entail
at t
p

Descartes constructs an argument for (17) in
an attempt to
deduce it. With regard to the second question,
Descartes
believes his argument will make him metaphysically
certain
of

(17) because he accepts

will lead him to deduce

(

(9)

17

and believes his argument

).

There is textual support for some parts of this
answer
to (2).

Descartes does present an argument for the claim

that God exists and is not a deceiver, and he claims to

clearly and distinctly perceive every premise of that argument.

Having presented its premises, he writes:
To speak the truth, I see nothing in all that I
have just said which by the light of nature is
not manifest to anyone who desires to think
attentively on the subject.
.52
.

.

.

In writing of the light of nature, Descartes seems to have

his faculty of clear and distinct perception in mind. -5-'
The most important part of Frankfurt's answer is

nevertheless without textual support.
in which Descartes attempts to deduce

There are no passages
(17) by inferring the

mutual consistency of his clear and distinct perceptions
from God's existence and nondeceptive nature.

-^Haldane and Ross,

I,

1

67

•

"-^For a passage in which Descartes appears to identify the light of nature and clear and distinct perception
see Haldane and Ross, I, 231*
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.

In response to

(

3 ),

Frankfurt rejects Arnauld

jection and presents one of his own.

Arnauld

's

*

s

ob

His response to

objection is rather confusing,
however.

snffw

d

^
f]
f

0In

that Descartes argument does
not
L
the commonly charged circularity
’

tv
Metaphysical
doubt concerns the truth of
what
clearly and distinctly perceived,
and
the
removal of this doubt is effected
without
assuming that what is clearly and
distinctly perceived is true.
It is removed simply by the
knowledge that a certain demonstration
has been
accomplished. This knowledge is, of
course,
that certain things have been clearly
and distinctiy perceived. But, that the truth
things be supposed is not required, and of these
so the
question is not begged. 5A

In writing of Descartes'

attempt to remove his metaphysical

doubt, Frankfurt seems to have in mind
Descartes' attempt
to become metaphysically certain of

(

17

).

Yet, he claims

Descartes attempts to accomplish his task by coming
to
know that he clearly and distinctly perceives some
propositions.

On his own response to (2), this is incorrect.

On that response, Descartes' attempt involves his clearly

and distinctly perceiving some propositions, but it does

not involve his knowing that he does so.
It is likely that Frankfurt intends to present the

following response to Arnauld.

Arnauld and his fellow

critics have understood Descartes to be claiming that

until he accomplishes his task none of his clear and

54

Frankfurt, Demons

.

177.

40

distinct perceptions are metaphysically
certain, and that
to accomplish his task he
becomes metaphysically certain
of some of his clear and
distinct perceptions. Understanding him
this way, they have charged that,

m

on his own

position, Descartes' attempt can be
successful only if he
has already accomplished his task
when he makes it. They
have, however, misunderstood Descartes'
position. He
does not maintain that until he
accomplishes his task none
of his clear and distinct perceptions
are metaphysically

certain for him.

He accepts (9) with its claim that his

clear and distinct perceptions are always
metaphysically

certain
As

I

noted with regard to Doney

'

s

interpretation, this

response to Amauld's objection is successful only if
we
can attribute (9) to Descartes and correctly answer
our

questions.

But Frankfurt has not provided us with any

reason to think we can do so.

Frankfurt's own objection is this:
Descartes seems to have overlooked the following embarassing question:
Given that reason
leads to the conclusion that reason is reliable
because a varacious God exists, may it not also
lead to the conclusion that there is an omnipotent demon whose existence renders reason unreliable? These two conclusions are incompatible, to be sure, and if the proper use of
reason established both of them, this would
mean that reason is not reliable. But Descartes
cannot simply take it for granted that this is
not the case
His procedure does seem to beg
the question, therefore, although it does so
.

4l

in a rather different way than
has generally
y
been thought. 55

Frankfurt's objection seems to be as follows.

We may grant

Descartes that by following his argument
he is able to deduce (17).

However, his deduction of

(

17

)

is

insufficient

to make him metaphysically certain
of it.- At the time of

his deduction, he is not metaphysically
certain that he

could never deduce both (1?) and its negation.

The hypothe

sis that he might someday do so provides him
with a reason
to doubt

(

17

)

despite his deduction of it.

Even if Frankfurt has correctly interpreted Descartes
argument, this objection is at best inconclusive.
an attempt to present a counter-example to (9).

It is

Yet,

Frankfurt does not sufficiently clarify that principle
for us to be able to evaluate his objection.

He does not

consider what arguments Descartes might present for

(

9 ),

and he does not sufficiently clarify the notions of meta-

physical certainty and clear and distinct perception
that are essential to our understanding of it.
In conclusion, Frankfurt, like Doney, attributes
(9)

to Descartes and fails to answer my questions correctly

In the next chapter,

I

shall consider one more attempt to

combine the ascription of this principle to Descartes with

successful answers to my questions.

53 Ibid.
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CHAPTER

II

Anthony Kenny also interprets Descartes
as accepting
with its claim that clear and distinct

(9)

perceptions are

always metaphysically certain.

In this chapter,

I

will

show that his interpretation fails to answer
my questions
correctly, even on the assumption that Descartes
accepts

will also argue that no interpretation that
as-

(9)*

cribes (9) to Descartes can successfully answer my
questions

.

Kenny’s answers are exceedingly vague and undeveloped

1.

In considering ques oion

(1

1
.

he introduces a kind of cer-

/

tainty he terms 'Cartesian certainty' and claims that

Descartes' task is to attain an epistemic state in which
he can elevate some true propositions to the status of

Cartesian certainties.

Kenny does not, however, present

a straightforward definition of Cartesian certainty.

Nor

does he explain whether Descartes is interested in every
true proposition or only in some of them.

1

Anthony Kenny, Descartes A Study of His Philosophy
(New York: Random Housed 1 968 )
Anthony Kenny, "The Cartesian Circle and the Eternal Truths, " Journal of Philoso phy 67, 19 (1970), 685 - 699
Anthony Kenny, "A Reply,"
Journal of the History of Philosophy 9. 4 (1971), 497-498.
:

.

.

,

,

2

Kenny, Descartes

,

190.

43

With regard to question

Kenny fails to give a

(2),

detailed statement of Descartes' attempt.

With regard to

he follows Doney and Frankfurt
in attributing (9) to
Descartes, but it is not clear whether
he adopts
(3),

their

response to Arnauld.
Furthermore, the two most plausible ways of
clarifying and developing his interpretation fail
to yield correct
answers to these questions. One way of clarifying
his

answer to (1) is suggested by his statement:
It is not enough for Cartesian certainty
that
should here and now unhesitatingly make a
true judgement on the best possible grounds.
It is .necessary also that I should be in such
a position that I will never hereafter have
reason to withdraw that judgement.
I

This suggests that Kenny understands the notion of Cartesian

certainty in terms of metaphysical certainty.
is a

A proposition

Cartesian certainty for an individual just and only in

case he does not have a reason to doubt it and he never will.

Kenny might, then, accept:
(19)

p is a Cartesian certainty for S at t =df.
p is a metaphysical certainty for S at t
and there is no time t later than t such
that p is metaphysically uncertain for S
at t
'

'

.

Further light is shed upon his answer by his claim
that, according to Descartes:

Whenever

^Ibid.

I

clearly and distinctly perceive some-

44

thing I cannot help judging that it
this will be a true judgement made is so, and
on the best
possible grounds.
.4
_

.

.

In attributing to Descartes the claim
that whenever an

individual clearly and distinctly perceives
a proposition
he has the best possible grounds for
believing it,

appears to be ascribing

(

9

)

Kenny

to him.

Assuming Kenny attributes

(9)

and

(

we can fill out the rest of his answer to

19 ) to Descartes,
(

1 ).

Descartes

wants to attain an epistemic state in which his
clear and

distinct perception of a proposition suffices to
make it
a Cartesian certainty for him.

He believes that while his

clear and distinct perception of a proposition in his initial position makes it a metaphysical certainty for him,
it does not make it a Cartesian one.

At some later time,

he will cease to perceive the proposition clearly and

distinctly

,

and when he does so it will no longer be meta-

physically certain for him.
This way of understanding Kenny's answer is suggested
by some of his other statements.

Placing himself in

Descartes' initial position, he writes:

Whenever I clearly and distinctly perceive something I cannot help judging that it is so, and
this will be a true judgement made on the best
possible grounds. But, until I have proved the

4
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C
1 cannot be sure I shall
y
hP^
hereafter withdraw this judgement under not
influence of the metaphysical suspicion the
of an
omnipotent deceiver.

^

Putting himself in Descartes' position,
Kenny sees himself
as being metaphysically certain of
his clear and distinct
perceptions, but as not having Cartesian
certainty

of them.

Once he ceases clearly and distinctly
perceiving a proposition, the hypothesis that God deceives him
provides him

with a reason to doubt it.
This way of understanding Kenny is also suggested
by
his statement that,

"What Descartes seeks,

then,

is a state

of mind that is in a certain sense immutable."^

Apparently,

Descartes seeks such a state in that he seeks one in which
his clear and distinct perception of a proposition makes

him metaphysically certain of it for the rest of his life.

Kenny refers us to two passages in support of this
answer to (1).

The first is Descartes' statement that un-

til he accomplishes his task he has "no true and certain
7

science but only vague and changeable opinions.""'

Kenny

appears to interpret Descartes as claiming that until he

accomplishes his task no proposition is a Cartesian certainty for him, although some are metaphysically certain
for him for brief periods of time.

^ Ibid.
6

Ibid.

^Haldane and Ross,

I,

184.

This interpretation
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reads a good deal into Descartes'
statement.
The second passage provides more
definite support for
his answer.

That gn. atheist can know clearly that
the angles
lan iT-L - are equal _to two righ t
—
angles.
I
do not deny.
I merely affirm that, on
the other
hana, such knowledge on his part
cannot
tute true science, because no knowledge constithat can
be rendered doubtful should be called
science.
Since he is, as is supposed, an atheist,
he
cannot know that he is not deceived in
the things
that seem most evident to him.
he cannot be
safe from this doubt unless he first
recognizes
the existence of God.°

— ^

.

.

;

Kenny does not state exactly how this passage supports
his

position
However, it is reasonable to suppose he understands
it
in the following way.

Descartes is contrasting his ability

to become certain of the theorem that the angles of
a

triangle equal two right angles once he accomplishes his
task with an atheist's inability to do so.

Since he

adopts (9), Descartes is not contrasting his ability to

become metaphysically certain of this theorem with an atheist's inability to do so.

He acknowledges in the first

sentence that an atheist can clearly and distinctly perceive it.

He must, therefore, be concerned with some other

kind of certainty.

His statement that an atheist's know-

ledge of the theorem can be rendered doubtful suggests that
he has Cartesian certainty in mind.
g

He appears to be

Adam and Tannery, VII, 14. This is Kenny's translation of the passage in Adam and Tannery.
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asserting that while an atheist may be
metaphysically
certain of that theorem at a time due to
his

clear and dis-

tinct perception of it, he will be
metaphysically uncertain
of it at a later one
On the assumption that Descartes accepts
(9), then,
this passage can be plausibly interpreted so
that it sup-

ports Kenny's answer.
is

As already noted, this assumption

granted to him for the sake of argument.

Upon close examination, however, it is clear that
Kenny's answer is incorrect.

His answer interprets Descartes

as setting a very unrealistic task for himself.

to it,

According

Descartes attempts to attain an epistemic state in

which his clear and distinct perception of a proposition
p will make him metaphysically certain of p for the rest
of his life

.

It is highly doubtful that Descartes can

attain such a state short of ending his life.^
A state of this sort is one in which his clear and

distinct perception of p is sufficient to preclude his ever
again having a reason to doubt p.

For example, Descartes'

clear and distinct perception of p while he is in it precludes his later having as his evidence for p the fact that

9

'Descartes might, of course, attain such an epistemic
state by placing himself on his death bed. At the moment
of his death, his clear and distinct perception of any proposition will suffice to make it a Cartesian Certainty for
him.
If this is the only way in which he can accomplish
this task, it is hardly a realistic one.
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he recollects clearly and distinctly
perceiving it.

If

this is Descartes' evidence for
p at some time, the hypothesis that his memory is mistaken provides
him with a reason
to doutt it.
Descartes' clear and distinct perception
of
while
he is in such a state also precludes
p
his later

forgetting that he has done so and having as
his evidence
for p the fact that some stranger asserts
that it is true
If this is Descartes'

.

evidence for p, the hypothesis that

the stranger deceives him provides him with
a reason to

doubt it.

Hie

,

It is unlikely, however, that,

short of ending

Descartes can attain a state in which his clear

and distinct perception of p precludes his ever again
being
in such situations as these.

Moreover
(1)

is

,

even if we grant Kenny that his answer to

correct, he is still unable to answer (2) success-

fully in terms of it.

Descartes' argument is devoted to

establishing two propositions, A and B.

The former is the

proposition that God exists and is not a deceiver; the latter is the principle that all Descartes' clear and distinct

perceptions are true.

Given his answer to (1), Kenny cannot

plausibly interpret Descartes as attempting to make A and
B

Cartesian certainties for himself.

On his answer to (1),

Descartes is unable to make any proposition a Cartesian
certainty until he has completed his argument.

However,

Kenny might interpret Descartes as attempting to become meta-

physically certain of A and B by clearly and distinctly
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perceiving them.

He might then regard Descartes
as claim-

ing that his metaphysical certainty
of them places him in
the epistemic state he desires.
It is very implausible,

though,

that Descartes' becom-

ing metaphysically certain of A and B
places him in the position he supposedly desires. Suppose
Descartes becomes

metaphysically certain of these propositions and
also clearly and distinctly perceives p.
That he is metaphysically
certain of A and

E and

clearly and distinctly perceiving

p does not imply that p is a Cartesian certainty for him.
It does not imply that he is never again in a
situation in

which he has a reason to doubt

p.

It does not preclude his

later forgetting having clearly and distinctly perceived
p
and having as his evidence for p the fact that some stranger
claims it is true.

In such a situation,

the hypothesis

that the stranger deceives him provides Descartes with a

reason to doubt p.

When understood in this manner, then, Kenny's interpretation fails to answer

(2)

and (2) correctly.

Given

it is clear that it also fails to answer (3) success-

this,

fully

(1)

.

There is, however, another way in which Kenny might

define Cartesian certainty and answer my questions.

At one

point, he introduces a kind of certainty he terms 'psycho-

logical certainty' and attributes a number of principles

regarding it to Descartes.

He employs his notion of
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psychological certainty to distinguish between
what he calls
first-order doubt’ and 'second-order doubt
’

,

and states that

in attempting to establish the existence
of God, Descartes
is trying to free himself from
second-order doubt

.'*'

0

This

suggests that he intends to define Cartesian
certainty in
terms of second-order doubt and to answer my
questions

accordingly
shall begin clarifying Kenny's position along these

I

lines by examining his notion of psychological certainty.

Kenny considers this passage from the Third Meditation

:

And,

on the other hand, always when I direct my
attention to things which I believe myself to
perceive very clearly, I am so persuaded of
their truth that I let myself break into words
such as these:
Let who will deceive me, He can
never cause me to be nothing while I think I ami,
or someday cause it to be true to say that I
have never been, it being true now to say that
I am, or that two and three make more or less
than five, or any such things in which I see a
manifest contradiction .11

He claims Descartes is here "expressing his psychological

certainty of such propositions as that

2 +

3 =

While he does not define psychological certainty,

Kenny claims that whenever an individual is psychologically

*

°Kenny

,

Descartes

,

Haldane and Ross,
12

184.
I,

158*
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certain of a proposition, he cannot
help affirming its
1 3
truth.
It is reasonable to suppose he
accepts the following definition.
(20)

p is psychologically certain for S at
? believes p at t and S is unable
i
to refrain from doing so at t.
*

Psychological certainty is very different from
what I have
been calling 'metaphysical certainty'. An
individual may
be psychologically certain of a proposition
even though

he has a reason to doubt it.

He might be unaware of his

reason for doubting a proposition and sufficiently
convinced of it to affirm
from doing so.

it and to be unable to refrain

He might also be psychologically uncertain

of a proposition even though he does not have any
reason

to doubt it.

Even in the absence of a reason for doubting

a proposition,

he might refrain from affirming it.

Kenny attributes two principles concerning psychological certainty to Descartes.

The first is that "anyone

whose ideas are clear and distinct cannot help but affirm
the truth of what those ideas represent."

More exactly,

he regards Descartes as accepting:

(21)

If S clearly and distinctly perceives p
at t, then S is psychologically certain
of p at t.

As evidence for ascribing this principle to Descartes,

Kenny refers us to his statement that,
3

4

Ibid
Ibid

"

.

.

.

I

am of such
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a nature that as long as I
understand anything very clearly

and distinctly,
be true

am naturally impelled to
believe it to

I

....

He appears to be correct
in his view

that Descartes maintains (21).
The second principle is:
(22)

Some true propositions are such
that if
S apprehends them at t,
S is psychologically certain of them at t.

Apprehending a proposition is a necessary,
but not
ficient condition of clearly and distinctly

a suf-

perceiving it

The fact that someone apprehends a
proposition does not

imply its truth or its metaphysical certainty.

Kenny has adequate evidence for ascribing
(22) to
Descartes. He refers us to Descartes' statement

that some

true propositions are "so evident and at the
same time so
simple, that we cannot think of them without
believing

them to be true.

.

.

.•'

lc

He also notes that Descartes

provides the proposition that what is done cannot be undone
as an example of one that satisfies

(

22

).

With definition (20) and principles (21) and (22)
before us, we can examine Kenny's distinction between first
and second-order doubt.

He considers Descartes' statement:

When I was considering some very simple and easy
point in arithmetic or geometry, e.g. that two
and three together make five, did I perceive
this clearly enough to assert its truth? My

^Haldane and Ross,
l 6

Ibid

.

,

II,

42.

I,

I
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only reason for judging afterwards that it
was
possible for me to doubt these things was that
it occurred to me that perhaps some God could
have given me such a nature that I was deceived
even about what seemed most obvious. Now whenever the preconceived view that there is a
supremely powerful God occurs to me I am forced
to admit that He could easily, if He wishes,
make me go wrong even in the things which I believe I know most clearly
But whenever I turn
to the things themselves which I think I perceive
very clearly, I am so convinced by them that I
cannot help exclaiming, "Let who can deceive me,
he can never bring it about that I am nothing
while I think I am something, nor that it should
ever be true that I have never existed, since it
is now true that I exist, nor even that two and
three together should make more or less than
five, or other such things in which I see a
manifest contradiction."
.The argument from
the possibility of a divine deceiver (is) a very
slight--so to say metaphysical--reason for doubting 1 <
,

.

.

.

.

.

As its contents suggest, this passage occurs at the begin-

ning of the Third Meditation

With regard to

it,

.

Kenny writes:

The passage suggests a distinction between a
first-order and a second-order doubt. Take the
proposition, "What's done cannot be undone."
If I explicitly think of this proposition,
Descartes says, I cannot at that moment doubt
it, that is, I cannot help judging that it
However, though I cannot doubt this
is true.
proposition while my mind's eye is on it, I can,
as it were turn away from it and doubt it in a
round about manner. I can refer to it under some
general heading, such as "What seems to me most
obvious"; and I can raise the whole question
whether everything that seems to me most obvious
The axioms are
may not in fact be false
severally
thus generically doubtful while

....

17

Adam and Tannery, VII, 36. This is Kenny's translation of the passage in Adam and Tannery.

54

indubitable
While in doubt about the author
my nature
I do not know whether
the light
of nature is a true or a false
light.
second-order doubt is the metaphysical This
doubt
tnat cannot be removed except by
provine thp
existence of a veracious God. 18
.

,

Roughly stated, Kenny's point appears to
be this.
fourth sentence of this passage, Descartes

In the

states he cannot

refrain from affirming such propositions as
that two and
three equal five, whenever he apprehends them.
We
can

capture his claim by saying he cannot doubt such
propositions
in a first-order way.

In the first three sentences, how-

ever, he claims he can doubt such propositions
indirectly,

despite his apprehension of them.

He can refer to them

by some description and abstain from affirming the
claim

that everything satisfying that description is true.

We

can capture this by saying that he can doubt these prop-

ositions in a second-order way.
The following definition appears to capture Kenny's

concept of first-order doubt.
(23)

p is doubtful for S in a first-order way
at t =df.
S apprehends p at t and S is
psychologically uncertain of p at t.

In the presence of (22) with its claim that some true propo-

sitions are psychologically certain for Descartes whenever
he apprehends them,

(

23 ) implies that some truths are never

doubtful for Descartes in a first-order way.
It is not clear how we are to define the concept of

lE
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second-order doubt.
(24)

Initially, we might try:

p is doubtful for S in a second-order
way at t -df. there is a description
Q such that S refers to
p by Q at t
and the proposition expressed by
'every
Q is true
is psychologically uncertain
i

or S at t.

This might seem to capture Kenny's idea.

He states that

Descartes doubts the proposition that what is
done cannot
be undone in a second-order way by referring
to
it by the

description 'what seems most obvious to Descartes'
and
being psychologically uncertain of the proposition

that

what seems most obvious to Descartes is true.
However,

(24)

cannot be what Kenny has in mind.

He

states that for Descartes an individual can only resolve
his second-order doubt of a proposition by proving that
God exists.

On (24), an individual can resolve his second-

order doubt of a proposition simply by not referring to it
It appears that Kenny would accept the definition:
(25)

p is doubtful for S in a second-order way
at t =df there is a description Q such
that p satisfies Q at t and the proposition expressed by 'every Q is true' is
psychologically uncertain for p at t

This appears to capture his notion.

It is in accord with

his claim that the proposition that what is done cannot be

undone is doubtful for Descartes in a second-order way in
his initial position.

At that point, that proposition

satisfies the description,

'what seems most obvious to

Descartes', and Descartes is psychologically uncertain of
the proposition that everything that seems most obvious
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to him is true

It should be noted that when a proposition
is doubt-

ful in a second-order way, a relevant description,

Q,

be either a definite or an indefinite
description.

may

Kenny

only writes of definite descriptions here, but
he else-

where allows for cases of second-order doubt involving

definite ones. 1

Q
7

The passage under consideration from the Third and

Fourth Meditation

,

however, does not contain this distinc-

tion between first and second— order doubt.

Descartes ac-

cepts (22) and it implies that some propositions are never

doubtful for him in a first-order way.

Yet, Descartes does

not claim in this passage that there are such propositions

Kenny sees him as doing so in his statement:
But whenever I turn to the things themselves
which I think I perceive very clearly, I am
so convinced by them that I cannot help exclaiming "Let who can deceive me, he can never
bring it about that I am nothing while I think
I am something, or that it should ever be true
that I have never existed, since it is now true
that I exist, nor even that two and three together should make more or less than five, or
other such things in which I see a manifest
contradiction
.

Yet,

instead of claiming that he is psychologically certain

of the propositions he mentions whenever he apprehends them,

Descartes states that he is psychologically certain of them

1 9
7
<*

97

.
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whenever he clearly perceives them.

This suggests that

he intends to assert (21) with its claim
that his clear and

distinct perceptions are always psychologically
certain.

Kenny regards Descartes as introducing the notion
of
a proposition's being doubtful in a second-order
way in his

statement

When

I was considering some very simple and easy
point in arithmetic or geometry, e.g. that two
and three together make five did I perceive this
clearly enough to assert its truth? My only
reason for judging afterwards that it was possible for me to doubt these things was that it
occurred to me that perhaps some God could have
given me such a nature that I was deceived even
about what seemed most obvious
Now whenever the
preconceived view that there is a supremely powerful God occurs to me I am forced to admit that
He could easily, if He wishes, make me go wrong
even in the things which I believe I know most
clearly
,

.

,

According to Kenny, Descartes is claiming that the proposition that two and three equal five is doubtful for him in a

second-order way.

He is asserting that he is psychologically

uncertain of the proposition that what seemed most obvious
to him is true and that the proposition that two and three

equal five was most obvious to him.
If we consider the rest of this passage, we can see

that Kenny's interpretation of Descartes' statement is in-

correct.

Descartes is instead considering a situation in

which he clearly and distinctly perceived the proposition
that two and three equal five, and stating that the hypothesis that God deceives him provided him with a reason for

doubting that proposition despite his clear and distinct
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perception of it.

This is supported by his
statement at
the end of the passage:
The argument from the possibility
deceiver (is) a very slight— so to of a divine
say metaphysical-reason for doubting.

Descartes regards the hypothesis that
God deceives him as
providing him with a reason to doubt
the proposition that
two and three equal five.
He is concerned, then, with
whether that proposition is metaphysically
certain for him,
rather than with whether it is doubtful for

him in a second

order way.

Assuming, however, that Descartes does
introduce the

notion of second-order doubt here, it appears
Kenny would
have us define Cartesian certainty in terms
of it.

He

claims that according to Descartes "second-order
doubt is
the doubt that cannot be removed except by proving
the

existence of a veracious God."^

We have seen that he re-

gards the epistemic state in which Descartes can have Carte-

sian certainty of his clear and distinct perceptions as one
he can attain only by establishing the existence of a vera-

cious God.

Kenny might, therefore, define Cartesian certain-

ty as:
(

26 )

20

p is a Cartesian certainty for S at t =df.
p is not doubtful for S in a second-order
way at t.
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His answer to my first question,
then, might be that
Descartes
task is to attain an epistemic
state in which all his clear
and distinct perceptions are
Cartesian, certainties for him,
where the notion of such a certainty
is defined by (26).

This answer to (1) is incorrect,
though.
It does not
provide an adequate explanation of
one of Descartes' most
important claims regarding his task.
According to Descartes,
an atheist who has not accomplished
his task cannot have
perfect knowledge of some true propositions
such as the

theorem that the angles of a triangle equal
two right angles.
I have already considered the
passage in which Descartes makes
this claim.
Jnderstood in terms of Kenny's answer to
(1), his point
seems to be the following.

An individual does not have per-

fect knowledge of the theorem that the angles of
a triangle

equal two right angles unless it is a Cartesian certainty
for him.

Until he accomplishes Descartes' task, and in do-

ing so ceases to be an atheist, an individual cannot make
this theorem a Cartesian certainty for himself.
Yet, while it is not clear exactly how we are to

understand Descartes' notion of perfect knowledge, the
claim that a proposition's being a Cartesian certainty for
an individual is a necessary condition of his having per-

fect knowledge of it is very implausible.

It implies that

an individual's perfect knowledge of a proposition is con-

tingent upon facts that are clearly irrelevant to the
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question of whether or not he
has perfect knowledge of
it

Suppose at some time the theorem
that the angles of
a triangle equal two right
ic Q
6 ^ aneleq^ ls
a Cartesian certainty
for Descartes and he has perfect
knowledge of it. At that
time, he is psychologically
uncertain that Arnauld

favorite proposition is true.

’s

Shortly thereafter, Arnauld

becomes aware of this theorem and
it becomes his favorite
proposition. This theorem, then, is no
longer a Cartesian
certainty for Descartes. Moreover, on
the view we are considering, Descartes no longer has perfect
knowledge of it.
It is very implausible, however,
that Descartes’
epistemic
state should change from one in which he
has perfect knowledge of this theorem to one in which he
does not simply
because Arnauld has taken a liking to it.

Furthermore, even if we grant Kenny that this
answer
to

(l)

is correct,

he is still unable to answer (2) suc-

cessfully in terms of it.

There does not appear to be any

way of interpreting Descartes' argument so that it constitutes a plausible attempt at the task this answer sets
for him.
To appreciate this, consider what Descartes must do
to accomplish that task with regard to a particular prop-

osition.

Suppose p is a proposition Descartes clearly

and distinctly perceives in his initial position,

not a Cartesian certainty for him at that point.

p is

This is
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because he is not psychologically
certain of every proposition expressed by a sentence
of the form 'every
Q is true'
where Q refers to p. it is
reasonable to assume that he
is not psychologically
certain of these propositions
for at
least one of two reasons.
Either he has not discovered
all
of them, or he is unable to
apprehend all of them simultaneously in such a way that he is
unable to refrain from
affirming them.

We cannot interpret Descartes*
argument in the Third
and Fourth Me ditation so that it
constitutes a plausible
attempt to rectify this situation.
His argument is devoted
to establishing two claims.
The first one, A, is that God
exists and does not deceive Descartes.
The second one, B,
is that all Descartes'

clear and distinct perceptions are

true.

There does not appear to be any way in
which Descartes'
establishment of A and B could be plausibly
taken to increase
hit awareness of the propositions of which
he must become

psychologically certain.

Nor does there appear to be any

way in which his establishment of A and B could be
plausibly

regarded as affecting his psychological ability to affirm
them simultaneously in such a way that he is unable
to refrain from doing so.

When understood in this way, therefore, Kenny's discussion again fails to answer (1) and (2) correctly.
a result,

it also fails to answer (3)

successfully.

As
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have considered three
interpretations that regard
Descartes as accepting ( 9 with
)
its claim that an individual's clear and distinct
perceptions are always metaphysically certain. I have shown
that each of them fails
to answer my questions
correctly. I shall now consider
whether my questions can be correctly
answered by an interpretation that ascribes 9 ) to
Descartes.
3.

I

(

They cannot.

Any interpretation that ascribes

to Descartes is open to two
fatal objections.

(

9

)

First, there

IS very little textual evidence
for the claim that Descartes

accepts (9) and there is textual evidence
against it.
attributing 9 ) to Descartes an interpretation

m

(

Second,

loses its

ability to account adequately for one
of his most interesting and important claims regarding his
task.

Let us consider what textual evidence,
if any, there
is for ascribing (9)
I

to Descartes.

None of the commentators

have considered provides a detailed discussion
of this

point, but some of their statements suggest two
arguments

they might present.

Doney and Frankfurt claim Descartes identifies his
concept of clear and distinct perception with another one
he presents,

that of intuition.

Doney cites passages

21

Doney, J ournal of the History of Ideas 16 2, 327.
Frankfurt, ’’Descartes' Validation of Reason," Descartes:
A Collection of Critical Essays, 210.
.

,
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m

the Rules as being ones in which
Descartes claims his
intuitions are always metaphysically
certain for him 22
.

This suggests the following argument.

There is strong

textual evidence for ascribing this
principle to Descartes:
(27)

If S intuits p at t,
p is metaphysically
y
certain for S at t
.

Since Descartes identifies intuition and
clear and distinct
perception, his acceptance of 27 ) commits
him to 9 ). We
are justified, therefore, in attributing
to
(

(

(

9

him.

)

One premise of this argument is correct;
Descartes

does adopt (2?).

At one point in the Rules

,

he claims any

proposition he intuits is "as sure as it can be.

.

."^3

It is reasonable to suppose he takes any
proposition that
is as sure as it can be to be metaphysically
certain for him.

Yet, there is no evidence to suggest that Descartes

identifies clear and distinct perception and intuition and
so commits himself to (9)>

Neither Doney nor Frankfurt

cites any textual evidence for their view.

One passage

they might regard as supporting their position fails to do
so

That passage is Descartes' definition of intuition
in the Rules.

22

Doney, Journal of the History of Ideas

^Haldane and Ross,

I,

20.

,

16,

2,

327.
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By intuition

I understand, not the
fluctuating
testimony of the senses, nor the
misleading
judgement that proceeds from blundering
constructions of imagination, but the
conception
which an unclouded and attentive mind
gives so
readily ana distinctly that we are wholly
from doubx about that which we understand freed
24
.

Doney and Frankfurt might wish to claim
Descartes' use of
'the phrase 'readily and distinctly'
here suggests
that he

identifies intuition and clear and distinct
perception.

Even if we take the phrase 'readily and distinctly'
in it to be synonymous with the phrase

'clearly and dis-

tinctly', this passage at best suggests that
Descartes takes

clear and distinct perception to be a necessary
condition
of intuition.

His definition becomes that to intuit a

proposition is to perceive it clearly and distinctly in
such a way that we are wholly freed from doubt about it.

Moreover, Descartes claims clear and distinct per-

ception is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of
intuition.

Elsewhere in the Rules

,

he writes:

two things are requisite for mental intuition.
Firstly, the proposition intuited must be
clear and distinct; secondly, it must be grasped in its totality at the same time and not
successively

Descartes presents two necessary conditions for his intuition of a proposition.

To intuit a proposition he must

clearly and distinctly perceive it and he must grasp all

24
^

Ibid

.

,

?.

25 Ibid.

,

33

.
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its parts at once.

It is admittedly unclear how we
are

to understand this second condition.

Nonetheless, Descartes'

statement strongly suggests he does not identify
intuition
and clear and distinct perception.
A second argument can be drawn from statements
by

Frankfurt and Kenny.

They regard Descartes as identifying

his clear and distinct perception of a proposition
with

his perception of it by the natural light. 26

They also

present textual evidence to show that Descartes believes
his perception of a proposition by the natural light im-

plies his metaphysical certainty of it. 22

present the following argument.

They might then

There is textual evidence

for attributing to Descartes*.
(28)

If S perceives p by the natural light at
p is metaphysically certain for S at t.

t,

Since Descartes identifies his perception of a proposition
by the natural light with his clear and distinct perception
of it,

his acceptance of (28) commits him to (9).

We are

justified, therefore, in attributing (9) to him.

Descartes does identify his clear and distinct perception of a proposition with his perception of it by the

26

Frankfurt, "Descartes' Validation of Reason,”
Descartes
A Collection of Critical Essays 212. Kenny,
Descartes 178.
:

,

,

27

Frankfurt, "Descartes' Validation of Reason,"
212.
Kenny,
Descartes
A Collection of Critical Essays
Descartes 1 77-1 7$
;

,

.
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natural light.

In Part

of the Principles

I

,

he restates

his argument from the Third and
Fourth Meditation

.

in

doing so he presents his conclusion
that all his clear and
distinct perceptions are true, hut he
rephrases it as the

conclusion that:
the light of nature
or the faculty of knowledge which God has given to us, can
never disclose any object which is not true,
inasmuch as
it comprehends it, that is, inasmuch
as it apprehends it clearly and distinctly 28
,

.

By stating his conclusion in this way, Descartes
seems to

identify his clear and distinct perception of a
proposition

with his perception of it by the natural light.
Descartes does not accept (28), however.

To show that

he does so, Frankfurt and Kenny cite the passage:

When I say that I am so instructed by nature, I
merely mean a certain spontaneous inclination
which impels me to believe in this connection, and
not a natural light which makes me recognize that
.

it is true.
But, these two things are very different; for I cannot doubt that which the natural
light causes me to believe to be true, as for
example it has shown me that I am from the fact
that I doubt, or other facts of the same kind.
And I possess no other faculty whereby to distinguish truth from falsehood, which can teach
me that what this light shows me to be true
really is not true, and no other faculty that
is equally trustworthy .29
,

Descartes states here that he cannot doubt propositions that
the natural light causes him to believe.

po

Haldane and Ross,

29 Ibid.

,

160-161.

I,

231.
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Kenny, he is claiming to be metaphysically
certain of any
proposition he perceives by the natural
light.

However, on at least one plausible
interpretation of
this passage, Descartes does not
assert (28). i n stating
that he cannot doubt propositions
that the natural light
causes him to believe, Descartes is
not claiming
to be

metaphysically certain of any proposition
he perceives by
that faculty.
Instead, he is claiming to be metaphysically
certain of some of the propositions he
perceives by it.
The ones he has in mind are the propositions
he perceives
in such a way that he intuits them.

We have seen Descartes regards his intuition
of a

proposition as involving his clear and distinct
perception
of it and,

so,

his perception of it by the natural light.

As examples of the propositions that interest him here,

Descartes presents the one that his doubting implies his
existence and refers us to other ones "of the same kind."
In the Principles

,

he states that the proposition that his

doubting implies his existence is a common notion and in
the Rules he claims to be able to intuit common notions. 3G

Finally

,

in the first sentence of this passage Descartes

writes of his recognizing propositions to be true by the

natural light rather than of his perceiving them by that
faculty

.

He elsewhere characterizes intuition by saying

3 ° Ibid

.

,

239, 41 & 42.

68

that to intuit a proposition is to recognize
its truth

31
.

Furthermore, another passage strongly
suggests that
Descartes rejects 9 ).
(

But when I took anything very simple and
easy in
the sphere of arithmetic or geometry
into consideration, e.g. that two and three together
made
five, and other things of the sort, were
not these
present to my mind so clearly as to enable me
to
that they were true? Certainly, if I
judged that since such matters could be doubted,
this would not have been for any other reason
than that it came into my mind that perhaps a
God might have endowed me with such a nature
that I may be deceived even concerning things
which seemed to me most manifest. But every
time that this preconceived opinion of the sovereign power of a God presents itself to my
thought, I am constrained to confess that it is
easy to Him, if He wishes it, to cause me to
err, even in matters in which I believe myself
to have the best evidence. 32
_

Descartes considers an earlier situation in which he clearly
and distinctly perceived the proposition that two and three

equal five.

He claims he was not metaphysically certain

of that proposition despite his clear and distinct per-

ception of it.

The hypothesis that God is a deceiver pro-

vided him with a reason to doubt it.

Any interpretation that attributes

(9)

to Descartes,

therefore, is open to the objection that there is no strong

textual evidence for doing so, but there is textual evidence
against doing so.

31

Ibid

.

,

II,

32 Ibid

.

,

I,

38

.

158.
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(

9)

Now let us consider the objection
that in attributing
to Descartes, an interpretation
loses its
ability to

explain adequately one of his most
important claims. This
claim has already been considered with
regard to the theories
of Frankfurt and Kenny.
At the risk of being redundant,
it

is best to present it here by again
extracting it from

Descartes’ statements.
In the T hird Meditation

.

Descartes considers the prop-

osition that God exists and the one that God
is not a dece iver

without a knowledge of these two truths I do not
see that I can ever be certain of anything. 33
He believes that until he knows that God exists
and is not
a deceiver,

he cannot be certain of any other propositions.

In the Fifth Meditation

,

he writes:

And so I clearly recognize that the certainty
and truth of all knowledge depends alone on the
knowledge of the true God, in so much that,
before I knew Him, I could not have a perfect
knowledge of any other thing. 3 ^
His position gets a little more involved with this passage.
He claims that until he knows God exists and is not a de-

ceiver, he cannot be certain of any other proposition in a

way that is required for perfect knowledge.

Descartes also has this claim in mind in the Principles

33 Ibid

.

,

159-

34 Ibid

.

,

I85.

.
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He writes there that the mind "can have no
certain knowledge
until it is acquainted with its creator ." 33

He modifies his position, however,
in his reply to the

~eCOnd

——

O bjections

.

He responds to the objection that

his position contradicts his claim to
have perfect knowledge
of his existence in the Second Meditation.

when I said that we could know nothing with
certainty unless we were first aware that God
existed,
announced in express terms that I referred only
to the science apprehending such conclusions
as
£^n recur in memory without attend ing further~to
the proofs which led me to make them
Further,
knowledge of first principles is not usually
called science by dialecticians. But, when we
become aware that we are thinking beings, this
is a primitive act of knowledge derived from
no. syllogistic reasoning.
He who says, 'I
think hence I
or exist
does not deduce
existence from thought by a syllogism, but by
a simple act of. mental vision, recognizes it as
if it were a thing that is known per se 3 b
.

m

,

.

Descartes changes his position.

'

He claims he can have per-

fect knowledge of some propositions without knowing that
God exists and is not a deceiver.

Some commentators have argued that we should disregard
this change in Descartes' position 33
.

so,

Whether or not we do

the other passages show Descartes accepts:
(29)

Some true propositions are such that until

33 Ibid

.

,

224.

36 Ibid

.

,

II,

38

.
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^'For example, see Alan Gewirth's, "The Cartesian
Circle," Philosophical Review 50, 4 (July 1941), 370-395,
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knows that God exists and is not a
deceiver
is not certain of them in a way that
is
quired if S is to have perfect knowledge reof
them

S
S

Whether or not Descartes believes some true
propositions
fail to satisfy (29) is not important at this
point.
What is important is that (29) plays an important
role
in his understanding of his task.

He believes that in ac-

complishing his task he comes to know that God exists and
is not a deceiver.

Given this and his belief in

(

29 ), he

claims the accomplishment of his task leads him to satisfy
a necessary condition for having perfect knowledge of prop-

ositions of a particular sort.
Yet, we cannot adequately explain (29) if we ascribe
(9)

to Descartes.

There are only two ways to explaining

the notion of certainty involved in it, and if we ascribe
(9)

to Descartes, neither of these is successful.

The first is to take the notion of certainty involved
in (29) to be that of metaphysical certainty.

this suggestion is very promising.

On its own,

It is plausible that

metaphysical certainty is a necessary condition of perfect
knowledge

.

It is also plausible that there are true prop-

ositions of which an individual cannot be metaphysically

certain until he knows God exists and is not a deceiver.
It may be that until he has this knowledge, the hypothesis
of a deceptive god provides him with a reason to doubt them.

We encounter a serious difficulty if we explain (29)
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in this way and attribute
(29)

(9)

to Descartes.

In explaining

in this way, we commit Descartes to the claim that
he

is metaphysically uncertain of the propositions that
satisfy

(29) until he knows that God exists and is not a deceiver.

In attributing (9) to Descartes, we commit him to the claim

that prior to knowing that God exists and is not a deceiver,
he is metaphysically certain of any proposition he clearly

and distinctly perceives.

Descartes maintains a claim

that is inconsistent with these.

This is that he clearly

and distinctly perceives propositions that satisfy

(

29 )

before he knows that God exists and is not a deceiver.
He makes this last claim in a number of places.

Thus, for example, when I consider the nature of
of a (rectilinear) triangle, I who have some
little knowledge of the principles of geometry
recognize quite clearly that the three angles
are equal to two right angles, and it is not
possible for me not to believe this so long as
I apply my mind to its demonstration; but so
soon as I abstain from attending to the proof,
although I still recollect having clearly comprehended it, it may easily occur that I come
to doubt its truth, if I am ignorant of there
being a God
But after I have recognized that there
although I no longer pay any atis a God
tention to the reasons for which I have judged
this [that the angles of a triangle equal two
right angles] to be true, provided that I recollect having clearly and distinctly perceived it
no contrary reason can be brought forward which
could ever cause me to doubt of its truth; and
thus I have a true and certain knowledge of it.-

....

.

.

.

5

-^Haldane and Ross,

I,

184.
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In these two paragraphs, Descartes contrasts
an epistemic

state in which he lacks perfect knowledge of
the theorem

that the angles of a triangle equal two right
angles due
to his ignorance of God with one in which
he knows God and

has perfect knowledge of that theorem.

theorem as satisfying (29).

He thus regards the

In the first paragraph, he

claims he clearly and distinctly perceives it even though
he is ignorant of God's existence and nondeceptive nature.

Further textual evidence is provided by Doscartes'

discussion of an atheist's epistemic abilities.

He considers

Mersenne's statement that:
while an Atheist knows clearly and distinctly
that the three angles of a triangle are equal to
two right angles, yet he is far from believing
in the existence of God.
.39
.

.

He replies:

That an atheist can know clearly that the three
angles of a triangle are equal to two right
angles I do not deny, I merely affirm that, on
the other hand, such knowledge on his part cannot
constitute true science, because no knowledge that
can be rendered doubtful should be called science.
Since he is, as supposed, an Atheist, he cannot
be sure that he is not deceived in the things
that seem most evident to him, as has been sufficiently shown; and though perchance the doubt
does not occur to him, nevertheless, it may come
up if he examines the matter, or if another suggest it; he can never be safe from it unless he
first recognizes the existence of a God.40
,

39 Ibid

.

,

II,

40 x
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,
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,
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,
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Descartes claims that an atheist lacks
perfect knowledge of
the theorem at hand because his ignorance
of God keeps him
from being certain of it in a way required
for perfect knowledge.
He therefore believes the theorem
satisfies
(29).

He admits, though, that the atheist clearly
and distinctly

perceives the theorem.
There is, of course, another way of explaining
the

notion of certainty involved in

(

29 ).

We can take it to

be some notion other than that of metaphysical
certainty

which allows for a philosophically plausible reading of
(

29 )

.

It is doubtful,

however, that such a notion can be

extracted from Descartes' writings.

Of the commentators

we have considered, only Kenny has attempted to do so, and
he has failed.

Moreover, on this alternative, we again

encounter a serious difficulty if we ascribe (9) to
Descartes
Suppose we take the notion of certainty involved in
(

29 ) to be other than that of metaphysical certainty and

call this new sort of certainty

'

C

-certainty

'

.

However

else Descartes understands C-certainty, he takes it to be
a necessary condition of perfect knowledge.

For this reason,

he regards it as being implied by metaphysical certainty.

He writes:

To begin with, directly we think we rightly perceive something, we spontaneously persuade ourselves that it is true. Further, if this conviction is so strong that we have no reason to
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doubt concerning that of the truth of
which we
have persuaded ourselves, there is
nothing more
to inquire about; we have here all
the
*
that can be reasonably desired. ... Wecertainty
have
assumed a conviction so strong that nothing
can
remove it, and this persuasion is clear
lv the
same as perfect certitude. 4l
.

Descartes asserts that if an individual does not
have any
reason to doubt a proposition, he has all the

certainty re

garding

i

o

he can reasonably desire.

He states that such

an individual has perfect certainty of the
proposition.

According to Descartes, then, once an individual

is meta-

physically certain of a proposition he has all the certainty
he requires for perfect knowledge of it.

He thus regards

metaphysical certainty as implying C-certainty.
Given this, the ascription of (9) to him commits

Descartes to the claim that his clear and distinct perceptions are always C-certain.

Our explanation of

(

29

)

commits him to the claim that he is not C-certain of the

propositions that satisfy it until he knows that God exists
and is not a deceiver.

These two claims are inconsistent

with his already well-documented view that he clearly and
distinctly perceives some of the propositions that satisfy
(29) before knowing of God's existence and nondeceptive

nature
If we attribute (9) to Descartes, then, we cannot

41

Ibid.

,
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adequately explain

(

29 ).

If we do not attribute

(9)

to him,

however, there is a good chance we can do so
on the first
alternative. We can take the notion of certainty
involved
in it to be that of metaphysical certainty
and interpret
it as asserting that until an individual knows
God exists

and is not a deceiver, he is metaphysically uncertain
of
some true propositions.

He is metaphysically uncertain of

them, because the hypothesis that God is a deceiver provides

him with a reason to doubt them despite his clear and dis-

tinct perception of them.
Due to these objections, it is highly doubtful that

my questions can be correctly answered by an interpretation
that attributes (9) to Descartes.

In the next chapter,

I

shall begin considering interpretations that do not do so.
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CHAPTER III
Having rejected the view that Descartes accepts
a new line

of interpretation is open to us

(9),

According to

this one, Descartes believes some propositions are such that
his clear and distinct perception of them is insufficient
to make them metaphysically certain for him. However, his

clearly and distinctly perceiving them and his satisfying
some further condition are sufficient to do so.

His task

is to attain a state in which he satisfies that further

condition, and he believes that once he does so, he is

metaphysically certain of any proposition he clearly and
distinctly perceives.

He denies though that he becomes

metaphysically certain of some of his clear and distinct
perceptions in order to accomplish his task.
In the next two chapters,

shall consider three ver-

I

sions of this line of interpretation.

I

shall show that

each of them fails to answer my questions correctly.
I

Then

will argue that no version of this line of interpretation

can correctly answer those questions.
The first interpretation is Alan Gewirth's.

1.

1

He gives

"The Cartesian Circle," Philosophical
Review, 50 4, (July 1941), 370-395* Alan Gewirth, "The
Cartesian Circle Reconsidered," Journal of Philosophy 67,
1

Alan Gewirth,
,

,

1970 ), 668-684. Alan Gewirth, "Descartes: Two Disputed
Questions," Journal of Philosophy 68, 18 (1971), 288-296.
19

(

,
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the following response to (1).

Descartes believes his clear

and distinct perceptions are always
psychologically certain,
but that some propositions are
such that his clear and distinct perception of them is insufficient
to make them metaphysically certain. However, his clearly
and distinctly per
ceiving these propositions and its being
impossible
that the

hypothesis that God is a deceiver is clear
and distinct are
su ^^ c t en t to make them metaphysically
certain.
His task

is to attain a state in which the latter
condition holds.

With regard to (2), Gewirth claims Descartes
attempts
to accomplish his task by clearly and
distinctly

perceiving

that the hypothesis that God is a deceiver is
not clear
and distinct.

Descartes

In response to (3), he claims that, while

attempt may be open to other objections, it is

not open to Arnauld's.
2.

Gewirth's answer to
(

30

(1)

consists of the claim:

Descartes believes his clear and distinct
perceptions are always psychologically
certain for him. 2

)

(31)

Descartes believes that in his initial position some propositions are metaphysically
uncertain for him despite his clear and
distinct perception of them. 3

(32)

Descartes takes on the task of attaining
a state in which it is impossible that
the hypothesis that God is a deceiver is
clear and distinct.

2

Gewirth, Philosophical Review

^ Ibid

.

,

386.

,

50,

4

,

390.
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is straightf orward and correct.

(3°)

We have seen that

Descartes accepts (21), and his doing so commits
him to the
position ascribed to him by 30 ).
(

is also correct.

(31)

Descartes believes some of his

clear and distinct perceptions are metaphysically
uncertain
for him in his initial position. Upon completing
his task
in the Principles

.

he writes:

And this should deliver us from that supreme
doubt
which encompassed us when we did not know
)
whether or not our nature had been such that
we had been deceived in things that seemed most
clear.
It should also protect us against all the
other reasons already mentioned which we had for
doubting. The truths of mathematics should now
be above suspicion, for they are of the clearest.
And if we perceive anything by our senses, either
waking or sleeping, if it is clear and distinct,
and if we separate it from what is obscure and
confused, we shall easily assure ourselves of
what is the truth.
_

.

According to Descartes, the accomplishment of his task places
him in an epistemic state in which all his clear and distinct

perceptions are metaphysically certain.

This suggests he

believes his initial position is not such a state.
(

32

,

however, needs to be clarified, and once clarified,

it is clearly incorrect.
(

32

),

Gewirth does not explicitly state

but it can be extracted from some of his statements.

He claims Descartes thinks his metaphysical uncertainty of
his clear and distinct perceptions in his initial position

stems from the fact that he has a reason to doubt them, and

4
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,
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that
The content of this reason is, of course, the
"opinion" that there may be an omnipotent God
who is a deceiver .5

Gewirth interprets Descartes as believing the hypothesis
that God is a deceiver is the only one that casts doubt
on
his clear and distinct perceptions in his initial position.

Gewirth also claims that in regarding that hypothesis
as casting doubt on his clear and distinct perceptions,

Descartes regards it, not as being,
metaphysically certain or true, but as psychologically cogent because possibly clear and distinct

6
.

He amplifies this point elsewhere.

Nonetheless, however paradoxical it may appear,
the rationality and cogency of the "reason" on
which the doubt is based can consist only in
its purported clearness and distinctness.
This
does not mean that the reason of the doubt is
in fact clear and distinct (the refutation of
it will consist in showing that it is not) but
simply that its cogency and its ability to
function in the argument derive to it from the
fact that it is thought to be at least pos7
sibly possessed of these qualities .'

Stated roughly, his position seems to be this.

Descartes

thinks the hypothesis that God is a deceiver provides him

with a reason for doubting only so long as it is possibly
clear and distinct.
ciple

More generally, he accepts the prin-

:

^Gewirth, Philosophical Review
6
7

Ibid

.

,

392.

Ibid

.

,
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,
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,

4,
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.
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(33)

P is a reason for S to doubt q at t only
if p is possibly clear and distinct at t.

this principle and his belief that the hypothesis
that God is a deceiver is the only one that casts doubt
on his clear and distinct perceptions, Descartes decides

two conditions are jointly sufficient for his metaphysical

certainty of a proposition.

They are that he clearly and

distinctly perceive the proposition and that it be impossible that the
and distinct.

hypothesis that God is a deceiver is clear
He takes on the task of attaining a state

in which the latter condition holds, believing that once
he does so,

all his clear and distinct perceptions will

be metaphysically certain for him.

In effect, this is the position asserted by (32), and
it needs to be clarified further.

It is not clear how we

are to understand the notion of possibility involved in (33)

Nor is it clear how we are to understand the notion of a

proposition's being clear and distinct.

Up to now, we have

only been concerned with clarity and distinctness as prop-

erties of perceptual acts.

Gewirth provides three candidates for the notion of

possibility involved in (32)
ity

The first is logical possibil

The second and third are definable in terms of meta-

physical and psychological certainty.

With regard to meta-

physical certainty we can define:
(34)

p is metaphysically possible for S at t =df.
-p is not metaphysically certain for S at t
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(35)

P is metaphysically impossible for S at t =df
-p is metaphysically certain for S at t

A proposition is metaphysically possible just in
case we

have a reason to doubt its negation.

It is metaphysically

impossible just in case we do not have such a reason.
In terms of psychological certainty we can define:
(35)

p is psychologically possible for S at t =df.
-p is not psychologically certain for S at t

(37)

p is psychologically impossible for S at t =df.
-p is psychologically certain for S at t

A proposition is psychologically possible if and only if we
are able to refrain from affirming its negation.

It is

psychologically impossible if and only if we cannot refrain
from doing so.

Gewirth has psychological, rather than logical or
metaphysical, possibility in mind when he presents

(

33 ).

Logical possibility is ruled out because he regards Descartes
as trying to go from a state in which it is possible that

the hypothesis that God is a deceiver is clear and distinct
to one in which it is not.

Descartes does not have any way

of altering the fact that it is logically possible that the

hypothesis that God is a deceiver is clear and distinct.

Metaphysical possibility is ruled out by Gewirth' s claim
that Descartes wants to satisfy a condition that does not

involve his being metaphysically certain of a proposition he

clearly and distinctly perceives.

8

Ibid

.

,
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The condition that it be
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metaphysically impossible for him that the hypothesis
that
God is a deceiver is clear and distinct involves
his being
metaphysically certain of such a proposition.

It involves

his being metaphysically certain that the
hypothesis that
God is a deceiver is not clear and distinct,
and Gewirth
claims Descartes clearly and distinctly perceives
that fact.

Only psychological possibility is left.

Descartes has

a way of altering the fact that it is psychologically
pos-

sible for him that the hypothesis is clear and distinct.

His

clear and distinct perception that it is not clear and distinct will do the trick.

The condition that it be psycho-

logically impossible for him that the hypothesis is clear
and distinct does not involve his being metaphysically cer-

tain of any proposition he clearly and distinctly perceives.
We still have to see what it is for a proposition to
be clear and distinct.

Some, though not too much, light is

shed upon this point by Gewirth

's

statement:

The most general level at which ideas and perceptive acts are clear and distinct is that at
which the idea, directly and explicitly present
to a mind which is explicitly "attending" to it,
is "open" to the mind in the sense that the mind
fully recognizes the meaning contained in the idea,
and does not attribute any other meaning to the
idea.
Since a mind which has full insight into
the contents of its ideas will have removed whatever
inconsistencies such insight might have revealed,
clearness and distinctness as logical qualities
mean complete consistence and coherence within
and among ideas.

9

Ibid

.

,
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According to Gewirth, when an individual clearly and distinctly perceives a proposition, he apprehends it in a particular way.

To be a potential object of such apprehension,

a proposition must meet certain requirements.

It is clear

and distinct just in case it meets those requirements

Principle (3*0. therefore, can be restated more clearly as:

p is a reason for S to doubt q at t only if
it is psychologically possible for S at t
that p is clear and distinct.

38 )

(

Gewirth

's

claim in (32) is that Descartes wants to make it

psychologically impossible for himself that the hypothesis
that God is a deceiver is clear and distinct.

Understood in this way, however,
Principle

(

38 )

is very implausible,

(32)

is incorrect.

and Gewirth fails to

provide any textual evidence to support his ascription of it
to Descartes.

consider this.

To appreciate the implausibility of

(

38

),

Suppose Descartes clearly and distinctly

perceives that the angles of a triangle equal two right
angles, but he is metaphysically uncertain of that theorem.
The hypothesis that God is a deceiver provides him with his

only reason to doubt it, and it is psychologically possible
for him that that hypothesis is clear and distinct.

More-

over, the only thing preventing Descartes from having per-

fect knowledge of the theorem is his metaphysical uncertainty of it.
A few moments later, Descartes' psychological state
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changes

.

He still clearly and distinctly
perceives the

theorem, but, by clear and distinct perception,
he is psychologically certain the hypothesis that God
is a deceiver
is not clear and distinct.

Assuming (38) is true, Descartes

is now

metaphysically certain of the theorem and has perfect
knowledge of it.
If (38) is true, then, Descartes' becoming psycholog-

ically certain that the hypothesis that God deceives him
is not clear and distinct takes him from a state in
which

he does not have perfect knowledge of the theorem to one

in which he does.

This is very implausible.

In becoming

psychologically certain that the hypothesis is not clear
and distinct, Descartes does not acquire any new evidence

for the theorem.
out

Nor does he obtain any evidence ruling

the possibility that God deceives him by having him

clearly and distinctly perceive the theorem and the proposition that the hypothesis is not clear and distinct, although
they are both false.

Descartes simply becomes very con-

vinced that the hypothesis is not clear and distinct.

It

is very doubtful that this change in his psychological state

takes him from the position in which he lacks perfect knowledge of the theorem to one in which he has it.

Furthermore, Gewirth fails to present any textual

evidence that supports his ascription of (38) to Descartes.
He claims that:

This point (that Descartes accepts( 38 )) is confirmed not only by the many passages in which
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Descartes says that his metaphysical doubt rests
on reasons, but also by the passages where
he
characterizes his method of doubt, including his
hypothesis that God is a deceiver, in terms of
clearness and distinctness .! 0
There are passages in which Descartes claims he is
meta-

physically certain of a proposition only if he does not have
a reason to doubt it.

(38)

in them.

However, Descartes does not present

While Gewirth cites two passages in which

Descartes considers the role of clarity and distinctness
in his method of doubt, neither of them supports his as-

cription of

(

38

to Descartes.

)

The first is Descartes' statement that:
one may pretend that God is a deceiver--even
the true God, but such that he is not known
sufficiently clearly either to oneself or to
the persons for whose sake one forms this

hypothesis

.

According to Gewirth:
Here, in saying that the true God, who of course
is not a deceiver, was "not known sufficiently
clearly" when the hypothesis of a deceiving God
was set up, Descartes is obviously suggesting
that the proposition that God is a deceiver was
thought to be possibly clear and distinct at
that point in the argument 12
.

Gewirth is reading a lot into Descartes' statement.

Descartes

seems to assert that when the hypothesis that God is a de-

ceiver provides him with a reason for doubting, he does not
10

Gewirth, Journal of Philosophy

,

68

,

18,

291.

^Adam

This is Gewirth's transand Tannery, IV, 64.
Tannery.
and
in
Adam
passage
of
the
lation
1

^Gewirth, Journal of Philosophy

,

68

,

18,

292.
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know God clearly.
at such

ct

However, his point may simply be that

time he does not clearly end distinctly perceive

some propositions that correctly characterize God's nature.

Nothing in his statement suggests he maintains that at such
a time he is psychologically uncertain of whether the hypoth-

esis that God is a deceiver is clear and distinct.
The second passage is Descartes' statement:
I
[oried t 0 discover the falsity or uncertainty
of the propositions which I examined, not by
feeble conjectures but by clear and assured

reasonings

A3

Gewirth claims that:
Since the hypothesis that God is a deceiver is
one of the "reasonings" by which Descartes tries
tc test the certainty of his propositions, it
fellows that he regards that hypothesis as at
least tentatively or possibly clear and distinct.
Once again, he reads a great deal into Descartes' statement.
In writing of clear and assured reasonings, Descartes may
be thinking of the arguments he presents to show that a

particular hypothesis provides him with a reason for doubting,

and be claiming that he clearly and distinctly perceives

the premises of those arguments.

ting himself to

(

38 ).

If he is, he is not commit-

Even if we join Gewirth in interpret-

ing Descartes as referring to his reasons for doubting when

This is Gewirth' s transand Tannery, IV, 29.
Tannery.
and
Adam
in
passage
the
of
lation

^Adam
liT

Gewirth, Journal of Philosophy

,

68

,

18,

292.
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he writes of clear and assured
reasonings,

serting

(

38 ).

he is not as-

He is claiming that a proposition
must be

clear and distinct to provide him with
a reason for doubting.
Gewirth, himself, denies Descartes makes
that claim.

Gewirth's answer to

(

1 ),

therefore, is incorrect.

It

attributes a very implausible principle to
Descartes when
there is no textual evidence for doing so
2.

Gewirth also fails to answer

correctly.

(2)

He states

that to accomplish his task, Descartes tries to
show,

by means of clear and distinct perception, not
that the proposition "a veracious God exists"
is t r ue in the metaphysical sense or that the
ratio of there being an omnipotent God who
falsifies all clear and distinct perception is
metaphysically false, but that the former is
clear and distinct, while the latter is confused or contradictory, and hence irrational in
the very respect in which it had previously been
regarded as valid. And this in fact is what is
accomplished in the first instance by Descartes'
demonstration of the existence and veracity of God.

Gewirth's answer seems to be this.

^

Descartes tries to ac-

complish his task by clearly and distinctly perceiving
that the hypothesis that God is a deceiver is not clear
and distinct.

He believes his clear and distinct perception

of that fact will make him psychologically certain of it,

placing him in the epistemic state he desires.
There is no textual evidence for this interpretation
of Descartes' argument.

Gewirth does not cite any passages

15 Gewirth, Philosophical Review

,

50,

4,

393

.

89

in which Descartes concludes that the
hypothesis is not

clear and distinct, and there do not appear
to be any.
The relevant part of Descartes' argument
is:

And the whole strength of the argument
which I have
made use of to prove the existence of God
consists
in this, that I recognize that it is not
possible"
that my nature should be what it is, and indeed
that I should have in myself the idea of God,
if
God did not veritably exist— a God, I say,
whose
idea is in me i.e. who possesses all those supreme perfections of which our mind may indeed
have some idea but without understanding them all,
who is liable to no error or defect (and who has
none of all those marks which denote imperfection)
From this it is manifest that he cannot be a deceiver, since the light of nature teaches us that
fraud an£ deception necessarily proceed from some
defect lc
,

.

/

Descartes claims the conclusion that God is not a deceiver
is made manifest by the natural light;

he clearly and distinctly perceives it.

©ver

,

so,

he may believe

He does not, how-

claim that the hypothesis that God is a deceiver is

not clear and distinct, or that he clearly and distinctly

perceives that it is not clear and distinct.
3.

With regard to

(

3 ),

Gewirth gives an interesting response

to Arnauld's objection.

Descartes' argument is not circular, for
while it is by the psychological certainty of
clear and distinct perceptions that God's
existence is proved, what God guarantees is the
metaphysical certainty of such perceptions 1 ^
.

1

1

.

.

^Haldane and Ross,

I,

171.

"^Gewirth, Philosophical Review,

5°»

^ 386.
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A more detailed version of his response seems
to be the fol-

lowing.

Some of Descartes' critics have understood him
to

claim that until he accomplishes his task he is
metaphysically uncertain of any proposition he clearly and
distinctly

perceives.

They have also attributed to him the claim that

to accomplish his task, he becomes metaphysically
certain

of some of those propositions

Interpreting Descartes in

.

this way, they have objected that his attempt is successful

only if he has already accomplished his task when he makes
it.

They have misinterpreted Descartes, however.

He does

not claim that to accomplish his task he becomes metaphysi-

cally certain of some propositions he clearly and distinctly

perceives.

He claims that to do so, he need only become

psychologically certain the hypothesis that God is a deceiver is not clear and distinct.

He is able to do this

without having accomplished his task.
This response to Arnauld is unsuccessful, of course.

Descartes does not attempt to accomplish his task by becoming psychologically certain the hypothesis that God is a

deceiver is not clear and distinct.
idea that we can meet Arnauld

's

However, Gewirth's

objection by claiming

Descartes' attempt does not involve his becoming meta-

physically certain of some of his clear and distinct perceptions has seemed promising to some philosophers.

They

have tried to construct interpretations that will allow

them to give this response and correctly answer my
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questions.
Gewir th
4.

'

s

Let us consider one such attempt to improve
upon
the ory

This attempt is Willis Doney's. 16

pretation considered in Chapter

I,

Forsaking the inter-

he has formulated one

in which Descartes does not accept (9).

With regard to

question (1), he interprets Descartes as believing that some
propositions are such that his clearly and distinctly perceiving them is insufficient to make them metaphysically
certain.

However, his clearly and distinctly perceiving

them and his being able to correctly reject as question

begging any plausible argument for the conclusion that he
has a reason to doubt his clear and distinct perceptions are

sufficient to make him metaphysically certain of them.

Ac-

cording to Doney, Descartes' task is to attain a state in

which he satisfies the latter condition.
In response to (2), Doney claims that Descartes at-

tempts to accomplish his task by clearly and distinctly

perceiving he is a creation of God who is not a deceiver.

With regard to (3), Doney claims that Descartes' attempt
is not open to
5.

Doney'
(39)

s

Amauld's charge of circularity.

answer to (1) is given by:

Descartes believes some of his clear and
distinct perceptions are metaphysically
uncertain for him in his initial position.

1

^Willis Doney, "Descartes' Conception of Perfect
Knowledge," Journal of the History of Philosophy 8, 4
(1970), 387-403.
,
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(40)

Descartes .wants to attain a state
in which
an y p l au s ible argument for the
conclusion'
that he has a reason to doubt some
of his
clear and distinct perceptions begs
the
question against him.
.

While Doney does not explicitly present

(

39 ),

able interpretation of some of his
statements.

it is a reason

He tells us

R is a proposition Descartes clearly
and distinctly per-

ceives but of which he does not have perfect
knowledge in
his initial position.
it is clear what conditions must be
satisfied
if a person is to have perfect knowledge of
propositions like R.
(1) He must at some time,
pas l or present, attend to a demonstration and
have a clear and distinct perception.
(2) If
his clear and distinct perception is in the
Past, he must remember having had such a perception. Finally,
when he remembers hav3
ing had a clear and distinct perception, there
can be no reason for doubting that the proposition in question is true.
His (Descartes')
contention in terms of this analysis is that the
third condition cannot be satisfied. *9
(

)

.

.

.

According to Doney, Descartes adopts three necessary conditions for perfect knowledge and claims that in his initial

position some of his clear and distinct perceptions fail to
satisfy the last one.
Doney' s statement of these conditions is very unclear,

however; particularly his statement of the last one.

The

first condition is that the individual must clearly and dis-

tinctly perceive the proposition or have done so in the
past.

The second is that if the individual does not clearly

and distinctly perceive the proposition, he must remember

19 Ibid

.

,

390
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having done so.

The third condition seems
to be that the
proposition must be metaphysically
certain for the individual when he remembers clearly
and

distinctly perceiving it.

However, this seems to assume
that the individual remembers
clearly and distinctly perceiving
the proposition.
The
other conditions do not imply that
he does sos he satisfies
them if he simply clearly and distinctly
perceives the proposition
We might take Doney's third condition
to be that the
individual must be metaphysically certain
of the proposition
if he remembers clearly and distinctly
perceiving
it;

this cannot be correct.

but

Descartes can satisfy this require-

ment in his initial position with regard
to any proposition
he clearly and distinctly perceives.
All he
has to do is

refrain from remembering that he has clearly and
distinctly
perceived it.

Doney

,

however, attributes to Descartes the

claim that in his initial position he is unable to satisfy
the third condition with regard to some of his clear
and

distinct perceptions

.

He surely wants us to understand

this condition so that that claim is plausible

Another way of understanding this condition is as the
requirement that at some later time the individual must

remember clearly and distinctly perceiving the proposition
and be metaphysically certain of it.

However, this require-

ment is too implausible to be the one Doney wants to ascribe
to Descartes.

An individual's having perfect knowledge of
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a proposition is obviously not contingent
upon his later

remembering having clearly and distinctly
perceived it.
The most plausible way of understanding
this condition
is as the requirement that the proposition
must be metaphysically certain for the individual.

The first two

conditions then insure that the individual either
clearly
and distinctly perceives the proposition or correctly
re-

members having done so.

The third one insures that in

either case the proposition is metaphysically certain for
him.

When the third condition is understood in this way,

Doney

s

claim that Descartes believes he does not satisfy

it with regard to some of his clear and distinct perceptions

amounts to (39).

We have seen that

But what about (40)

(

39 ) is correct.

the other part of Doney' s answer?

Upon examination it is clear that (40) is incorrect.
(39),

it can be extracted from some of Doney

'

s

Like

statements.

Doney says V is the proposition that Descartes is a creation
of God who is not a deceiver, and states that according to

Descartes
His (Descartes') clear and distinct perception of
V provides him with what he lacked before, that
is, a way of rejecting the only arguments that
can be proposed to show that his faculty of reasoning may not be reliable.
Mot only does
he clearly and distinctly perceive V, but he is
in a position to reject the only arguments that
a sceptic can produce to question his certainty,
and there can be no reason for doubt 20
.

.

.

.
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Doney's position seems to be this.

Descartes believes some

of his clear and distinct perceptions are
metaphysically

uncertain for him in his initial position.

He thinks he

metaphysically certain of them, however, if he
clearly and distinctly perceives them and is able correctly
to reject any plausible argument for the conclusion
that

some of his clear and distinct perceptions are metaphysically

uncertain for him.

Descartes tries to satisfy the latter

condition by clearly and distinctly perceiving V.
Doney's position is clarified further by his statement
that "on the interpretation proposed, the theist rejects
the sceptic's arguments on the grounds that, presenting

arguments of this sort, he necessarily begs the question."^ 1
He,

thus,
(41)

attributes to Descartes:
If S clearly and distinctly perceives p
at t and any plausible argument for the
conclusion that S has a reason to doubt
some of his clear and distinct perceptions
at t begs the question against S at t,
then S is metaphysically certain of p at t

According to Doney, Descartes wants to exchange his initial
position for one in which he satisfies the second condition
in the antecedent of (4l) and, so,

is metaphysically certain

of all his clear and distinct perceptions.

In effect,

this is what (40) asserts.

However, Doney does not cite any passages in which

Descartes presents (4l), and there do not appear to be any.
21

md.
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(4l)

is too implausible to be correctly
attributed to Descartes
in the absence of such evidence
Doney admits that some of
.

Descartes

1

clear and distinct perceptions are
metaphysically

uncertain for him in his initial position.

Descartes'

attaining a state in which every plausible argument
for the
conclusion that he has a reason to doubt some of
his clear
and distinct perceptions begs the question
against him

obviously does not change this.

The fact that an individual

can reject an argument as question begging does not imply
that its conclusion is false.

Descartes might very well be

able to correctly reject every plausible argument for the

conclusion that he has a reason to doubt some

of

his clear

and distinct perceptions on the grounds that it begs the

question, and still have a reason to doubt some of his clear
and distinct perceptions.

Doney'

s

answer to (1), then, at-

tributes a very implausible position to Descartes when
there is no textual evidence for doing so.
6.

His answer to our second question is also unsatisfactory.

He states that Descartes attempts to accomplish his task

by clearly and distinctly perceiving V, that he is a crea-

tion of God who is not a deceiver.

Supposedly, Descartes

believes his clear and distinct perception of V places him
in a position in which every plausible argument for the

conclusion that he has a reason to doubt some of his clear
and distinct perceptions begs the question against him.
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To clarify this, Doney attributes to Descartes
the

principle that "someone who clearly and distinctly
perceives
R thinks that he does have a conclusive
reason for believing R

"

22

This is the principle

.

)

(

•

If S clearly and distinctly perceives
p
at t, S believes he is metaphysically
certain of p at t

He also ascribes to him:
(43)

:

2

-'

If S believes he is metaphysically certain
of V at t, any plausible argument for the
conclusion that S has a reason to doubt
some of his clear and distinct perceptions
begs the question against S at t

Doney does not claim Descartes ever states (42) or (43),
and there do not appear to be any passages in which he
does so.

He presents them as plausible principles Descartes

would be willing to accept.

They do imply that Descartes'

clear and distinct perception of V places him in the position
he supposedly desires.
It is clear, however, that Descartes would not accept
(43)

Doney explains this principle in an attempt to dis-

play its plausibility.

Any plausible argument for the con-

clusion that Descartes has a reason to doubt some of his
clear and distinct perceptions presents an hypothesis, H,

which purports to be such a reason and also contains a premise claiming H is metaphysically possible for Descartes.

Since it is plausible, such an argument presents only

22
2
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hypotheses that are inconsistent with

V,

such as the one

that Descartes is a creation of a deceptive
god and the
one that Descartes has come about by
chance.
Once Descartes
believes he is metaphysically certain of V,
any such argument begs the question against him. Since
H is inconsistent
with V and Descartes believes he is metaphysically
certain
of V, he will reject the premise that H is
metaphysically

possible
On this explanation, however,
to be acceptable to Descartes.

(43)

is too implausible

Even if H is inconsistent

with V, the premise that H is metaphysically possible for
him will not beg the question against Descartes simply

because he believes he is metaphysically certain of V

.

He

may believe this, but be completely unaware of H and the
fact that H is inconsistent with V.

If this is the case,

H is metaphysically possible for him and the premise stat-

ing that fact does not beg the question against him.
7.

Like the other commentators we have considered, Doney

takes Arnauld's objection to be the following.

Descartes

maintains that until he accomplishes his task none of his
clear and distinct perceptions are metaphysically certain
and that to accomplish the task he becomes metaphysically

certain of some of them.

On his own position, therefore,

his attempt is successful only if he has accomplished his

task when he makes his attempt.
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Doneys response

is that Descartes does
not claim

that to accomplish his task he
becomes metaphysically cer
tain cf some of his clear and
distinct perceptions. He
claims that he accomplishes his task
by clearly and

distinctly perceiving V and coming to
believe that he is
metaphysically certain of it. Given the
failure of Doney
answers to (1) and (2), however, it is
clear that this re
sponse to Arnauld is unsuccessful.
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CHAPTER
In this chapter,

I

IV

shall consider another attempt to

answer my questions correctly by following
the line of interpretation initiated by Gewirth. Then, I shall
argue that
that line of interpretation cannot provide us
with correct
answers
1.

The interpretation

I

shall consider is Fred Feldman's. 1

In response to (1), Feldman interprets Descartes as
believ-

ing some propositions are such that his clearly and distinctly

perce i\- ing them is insufficient to make them meta-

physically certain.

However, his clearly and distinctly

perceiving them and it being the case that every hypothesis
that would otherwise cast doubt on them is practically im-

possible for him are jointly sufficient to do so.

According

to Feldman, Descartes takes on the task of satisfying the

latter condition, believing that once he does so all his
clear and distinct perceptions will be metaphysically cer-

tain

.

With regard to (2), Feldman interprets Descartes as
attempting his task by following arguments designed to make
every hypothesis that casts doubt on his clear and distinct

1
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perceptions in his initial position a practical
impossibility for himself.
In response to (3), he argues that

Descartes'

attempt is not open to Arnauld's objection.
2.

On the surface, Feldman's answer to
(1) is very similar

to those considered in the last chapter.

Like Gewirth and

Doney, he interprets Descartes as believing his
clear and

distinct perception of some propositions is insufficient
to
make them metaphysically certain.

He also interprets Descartes

as trying to satisfy a further condition which together
with

his clear and distinct perception implies his metaphysical

certainty of those propositions.
However, Feldman also ventures beyond the answers given
by Gewith and Doney.

To explain the condition he thinks

Descartes wants to satisfy, he presents a number of new
notions and principles.
careful attention.

This part of his answer merits

It is very interesting and plays an

important role in his attempt to answer my questions correctly-

The first concept Feldman introduces is that of practi-

cal certainty.

He regards Descartes as presenting this con-

cept and distinguishing it from that of metaphysical cer-

tainty in the passage:
But we must note the distinction emphasized by
me in various passages, between the practical
activities of our life and an inquiry into truth;
for when it is a case of regulating our life, it
would assuredly be stupid not to trust the senses,
and those sceptics were quite ridiculous who so
neglected human affairs that they had to be
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preserved by their friends from tumbling
down
precipices.
It was for this reason that somewhere I announced that no one in his
sound
seriously douoted about such matters; but mind
when
we raise an inquiry into what is the
surest knowledge which the human mind can obtain,
it is
le
y Unreasonable t0 refuse to treat them as
Ki
^
doubtful,
nay even to reject them as false, so
as to allow us to become aware that
certain other
things which cannot be thus neglected are for
this very reason more certain, and in actual
truth better known by us/
-,

,

Descartes claims that while some propositions are
sufficiently certain to be accepted for the practical
activities of

life, they are not sufficiently certain to be accepted
for

what he calls "an inquiry into truth".
It is reasonable to suppose Descartes has metaphysical

certainty in mind in writing of the certainty that is required
for an inquiry into truth.

Making this assumption, Feldman

claims Descartes is drawing a distinction between meta-

physical certainty and another kind of certainty.

Terming

this other kind of certainty 'practical certainty', he re-

states Descartes' position as being that some propositions
are practically, but not metaphysically, certain for him and

that while such propositions are acceptable under ordinary

circumstances, they are not acceptable for an inquiry into

truth

.

To clarify this, Feldman explains the notion of pract-

ical certainty.

^Haldane and Ross, II, 206.
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tainty fSfa^rson?^^^ a'time?
roughly, that S is justified in
beli^iL n It t
on that S has "the epistemic
right" to bflieve
p at t, or that p is either self-evident
or adequately evidenced for S at t
There are
tS
notlce about practical certainty.
?°ip
Foremost
among them is that this is a
purely
nCept and not a Psychological
5°
T^ltTthhat P ls a practical certainty of one.
S at t
+
is not jto
say anything about how S feels
about

Cis^s^"
’

.

.

’

For an individual to be practically
certain of a proposition
at a time is for him to be epistemically
justified in believing it at that time
He may be practically certain of
a
.

proposition with or without feeling convinced
of its truth.
With regard to metaphysical certainty,
Feldman states:
Roughly, to say that a proposition is a
metaphys!cal certainty for a person is to say that it
is
absolutely certain for him--beyond even the most
hyperbolic doubt
Not even "the very least ground
of suspicion" can be found against it. A proposition is a metaphysical certainty for a person
at a time only if he is then "maximally justified"
in believing it.
The requirements for metaphysical certainty are thus of the same kind as, but
considerably more stringent than, the requirements
for practical certainty. As in the case of practical certainty, it should perhaps be mentioned that
the concept of metaphysical certainty is an epistemic
concept, and not a psychological one. When we say
that a proposition is a metaphysical certainty for
a person, we are not saying how firmly convinced
.

he is of it.-

5

According to Feldman, for an individual to be metaphysically
certain of a proposition is for him to be maximally justified in believing it.
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Not only is he justified in believing
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it,

but he could not be more justified
in believing anything

than he is

m

believing it.

He may be metaphysically cer-

tain of a proposition with or without
feeling convinced of
its truth.

Clarified in this way, Feldman's interpretation
of
the passage before us is very plausible.
It is reasonable
to take Descartes to be claiming some
propositions are justi-

fied, but not maximally justified, for him,
and that as a

result they are acceptable under ordinary circumstances,
but not for an inquiry into truth.

Moreover, Feldman's clarification of Descartes' notions
of practical and metaphysical certainty is correct.

It en-

ables us to give a very plausible interpretation, not only
ot the passage before us,

but also of Descartes' description

of his epistemic state in the First Meditation

.

Descartes

considers what his epistemic state is like at that point

with regard to propositions that are evidenced for him by
his senses, such as the one that he is sitting in front of
a fire

For although we have a moral assurance of these
things which is such that it seems that it would
be extravagent in us to doubt them, at the same
time no one, unless he is devoid of reason can
deny, when a metaphysical certainty is in question,
that there is sufficient cause for our not having
complete assurance, by observing the fact that
when asleep we may similarly imagine that we have
another body, and that we see other stars and
another earth, without there being anything of
the kind.

fc
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This suggests he regards the proposition
that he is sitting
front of a fire as being practically,
but not metaphysically, certain for him in the First
Meditation

m

.

However, he regards the proposition
that he seems to
see light, hear noise and feel heat
as being metaphysically
certain for him at that point.
But, it will be said that these phenomena
are
false and that I am dreaming. Let it be so;
still it is at least quite certain that it
seems to me that I see light, that I hear
noise, that I feel heat.?

Feldman

s

clarification of practical and metaphysical

certainty enables us to understand Descartes' description
in
a very plausible fashion.

Me di mat ion

,

At the beginning of the First

Descartes has some sense perceptions of a fire.

He seems to see light, hear noise and feel heat.

As a result

of these perceptions, he is maximally justified in believing

that he seems to see light, hear noise and feel heat.

He

could not be more justified in believing anything than he is
in believing that proposition about what he is experiencing,

and hence he is metaphysically certain of it.

His perceptions

also make him practically certain he is sitting in front of
a fire.

They provide him with sufficient evidence to justi-

fy his belief he is doing so, but they do not maximally

justify that belief.

He is more justified in believing the

proposition about what he is experiencing than he is in

7
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believing the one about the source of those
experiences.
Having successfully clarified the concepts

of practical

and metaphysical certainty, Feldman
defines some other ones.
Employing the concept of practical certainty,
he presents:
(44)

p is a practical possibility for S at t =df.
-p is not a practical certainty for S at
t.'

(45)

p is a practical impossibility for S at t =df.
-p is a practical certainty for S at t

(46;

p is a practical uncertainty for S at t =df.
p is not a practical certainty for S at t.

These concepts fall into a square of opposition along
with
that of practical certainty.
In terms of metaphysical certainty, he defines:
(4?)

p is a metaphysical possibility for S at t =df.
-p is not a metaphysical certainty for S at t

(48)

p is a metaphysical impossibility for S at
t =df. -p is a metaphysical certainty for S
at t

(49)

p is a metaphysical uncertainty for S at
t =df.
p is not a metaphysical certainty
for S at t.

Like the concept of practical certainty and the ones defined
in terms of it, these concepts and that of metaphysical

certainty fall into a square of opposition.
Feldman's next step is to use these concepts to clarify Descartes' statement of necessary and sufficient conditions

for metaphysical uncertainty.

As we have seen, Descartes

states that a proposition is metaphysically uncertain for

him just in case he has a reason to doubt it.

However, he

does not explain what it is for one proposition to provide
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him with a reason for doubting another
one.

Feldman thinks Descartes' idea is captured
by:
p is metaphysically uncertain for S at t
if and only if there is a proposition,
q,
such that (i) q is a practical possibility
lor Sat t; and (ii) if
q were a practical
certainty for S at t that would defeat the
practical certainty of p for S at t, thus
making p a practical uncertainty for S at

(50)

,

t

•

According to (50), a proposition,

p,

is metaphysically un-

certain for an individual just in case some other
proposition, q,

is such that he is not justified in believing
that

it is false,

and if he were justified in believing
q, that

would epistemically defeat his justification for believing
P-

While the first clause of (50) does not require any

explanation

,

the second one does.

That clause requires that

q be such that if S were practically certain of it at t,

he

would not be practically certain of p at that time, because
his practical certainty of q would epistemically defeat
his practical certainty of p.

Feldman does not define the

notion of epistemic defeat, but he briefly explains it. 6
To say that if q were a practical certainty for S, that

would defeat the practical certainty of p for

S

is,

roughly,

to say that if q were practically certain for S, any evidence

8
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that S

him

m

m

fact has for p would be insufficient
to justify

adopting

S's practical certainty of
q would
defeat” or “neutralize ” his justification
for p.
p.

To further clarify

(

50 ),

Feldman has us consider

Descartes' example of an atheistic geometer

9
.

Consider an

atheistic geometer whose only evidence for the
theorem that
the angles of a triangle equal two right angles
is

the fact

that he clearly and distinctly perceives it.
to Descartes,

this geometer.

According

this theorem is metaphysically uncertain for
The hypothesis that God deceives him pro-

vides him with a reason for doubting it.
In terms of clause (1) of (50), the hypothesis that God

deceives him is practically possible for the atheist.
not justified in believing that God does not do so.

He is

With

regard to clause (ii), if the atheist were to become practically certain that God deceives him, that would epistemically defeat his practical certainty of the theorem.

In the

face of his practical certainty that God is willing and
able to deceive him by having him clearly and distinctly

perceive false propositions, the fact that he clearly and

distinctly perceives the theorem would be insufficient to
justify him in adopting it.

Having presented (50), Feldman uses it in an attempt

9
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to explain Descartes’ understanding
of his initial position

He regards Descartes' as describing his
initial state in the

passage
But when I took anything very simple
and easy in the
sphere of arithmetic or geometry into
consideration,
e.g., that two and three together made
five, and
other things of the sort, were not these
present
to my mind so clearly as to enable me to
affirm that
they were true? Certainly, if I judged that
since
such matters could be doubted, this would not
have
been. so for any other reason than that it
came into
my mind that perhaps a God might have endowed me
with such a nature that I may have been deceived
even concerning things which seemed to me most
manifest. But every time that this preconceived
opinion of the sovereign power of a God presents
itself to my thought, I am constrained to confess
that it is easy to Him, if He wishes it, to cause
me to err, even in matters in which I believe myself to have the best evidence. 10

With regard to this passage, Feldman writes:
As

I understand him, what Descartes is suggesting
is that prior to the time at which he comes to know
of God's existence and nature, there is just one
main reason to doubt his clear and distinct perceptions. This is the hypothesis that God is a

deceiver
Since Descartes' understanding of God's nature is,
at the time in question, still somewhat rudimentary,
he is not yet certain that God is not a deceiver.
Hence, the proposition that God is a deceiver is
then a practical possibility for Descartes. Furthermore, if it were a practical certainty for
Descartes that God is a deceiver, then it would
not be a practical certainty for him that two
plus three is five. For no matter how clearly
and distinctly one may see this latter proposition to be true, such evidence is surely worthless
if he also has good reason to believe that there
is an omnipotent and deceptive God.H
10
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Feldman's explanation seems to be this.

Descartes believes

that when he is in his initial position
some hypotheses cast
doubt on some of his clear and distinct
perceptions. The

main example of such an hypothesis is the
proposition that
God is a deceiver.
In terms of (50), Descartes believes

that

hypothesis is practically possible for him and such
that his
practical certainty of it would defeat his practical
certainty o^ any proposition that is evidenced solely
by his clear

and distinct perception of it.

Furthermore, according to Feldman, Descartes realizes
Fhe following fact.

His clearly and distinctly perceiving

some propositions is insufficient to make them metaphysically

certain, but, given

(

50 ),

his clearly and distinctly per-

ceiving them and satisfying a further condition is sufficient
to do so.

The further condition is that every hypothesis

that would cast doubt on his clear and distinct perceptions,
if it were practically possible for him, be practically im-

possible for him.

(

50 ) implies that if every such hypothesis

is practically impossible for Descartes,

he does not have a

reason to doubt his clear and distinct perceptions and so is

metaphysically certain of all of them.

Feldman claims

Descartes realizes this and takes on the task of exchanging
his initial position for one in which every such hypothesis
is practically impossible for him.

This answer to (1) contains a serious flaw, however.

Descartes does not maintain (50).

That principle asserts

Ill

that to provide an individual with a reason for
doubting
an hypothesis must be practically possible for
him.

When

we carefully consider some of Descartes'
statements,

it is

clear that he does not believe this.

Feldman defends his claim that Descartes limits his
reasons for metaphysical doubt to hypotheses that are
practi
cally possible

.

Why not allow that a proposition that is merely a
metaphysical possibility can suffice to put another into doubt? There are several reasons for
framing the principle as I have and requiring
that a proposition can cast metaphysical doubt
only if it is a practical possibility.
In the first
place, Descartes says that reasons for doubt must
be 'powerful and maturely considered' and that
doubt must be based upon 'clear and assured rea,

sonings'.
It seems unlikely that something that
is practically impossible could count as a powerful and maturely considered reason for doubt, or
that one could legitimately call it a clear and
assured reason for doubt. Further textual support can be derived from the passage at the end
of the Fifth Meditation in which Descartes suggests that when a proposition is no longer a
practical possibility, it is no longer able to
cast metaphysical doubt. 12

Feldman cites two sources of textual support for his view.
The first is Descartes' statement that reasons for meta-

physical doubt must be powerful and maturely considered
and his statement that such doubt must be based upon clear
and assured reasonings.
of the Fifth Meditation

12
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The second is a passage at the end

112

Feldman's first source of textual support
is weak.
Descartes' statements that reasons for doubt
must be powerful
and maturely considered and that doubt
must be based on clear
and assured reasonings are extremely
vague.
They
suggest

that reasons for doubt must meet some
requirement regarding

their plausibility, but it is not clear that
this requirement
is that they be practically possible.
As his second source of support, Feldman seems
to have
the following passage in mind.

And so I very clearly recognize that the certainty
and truth of all knowledge depends alone on the
knowledge of the true God, in so much that, before
I knew Him, I could not have perfect knowledge
of any other things. And now that I know Him, I
have the means of acquiring a perfect knowledge of
infinitude of things, not only of those which
relate to God Himself and other intellectual matters, but also of those which pertain to corporeal
nature in so far as it is the object of pure mathematics (which have no concern with whether it
exists or not) .3

According to Feldman, in this passage Descartes "suggests
that when a proposition is no longer a practical possibility,
•

•

it is no longer able to cast metaphysical doubt."

to find this suggestion in Descartes'

1 /i

He seems

statement that once he

knows God, he has the means of acquiring a perfect knowledge
of an infinitude of other propositions.

Feldman seems to

interpret Descartes as claiming that once he becomes practically certain that God does not deceive him, and thereby makes

1
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the hypothesis that God does so
practically impossible for
himself, that hypothesis no longer
provides him with a reason for doubting his clear and
distinct perceptions. This

interpretation clearly reads a great deal
into Descartes'
statement
Moreover, some passages strongly suggest
Descartes
does not limit his reasons for
metaphysical doubt to practically possible hypotheses.
In writing of metaphysical doubt,

Descartes states:
It was of this doubt that I said that even
the
very least grounds of suspicion was a sufficient
reason for causing it. 1-5

Descartes maintains that a proposition can be rendered
meta-

physically uncertain by an hypothesis that provides the very
least ground for suspecting that it is false.

The very least

ground for such suspicion is not provided by hypotheses that
are practically possible

.

It is provided by ones that are

practically impossible, but metaphysically possible.
In the First Meditation

,

Descartes presents an example

of an instance in which a practically impossible, but meta-

physically possible, hypothesis provides him with a reason
for metaphysical doubt.

At the same time I must remember that I am a man,
and that consequently I am in the habit of sleeping, and in my dreams representing to myself the
same things or sometimes even less probable things,
than do those who are insane in their waking
1
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moments

How often has it happened to me that
night I dreamt that I found myself in this
particular. place that I was dressed and seated
near the fire, whilst in reality, I was laying
undressed in bed.! At this moment it does indeed
seem. to me that it is with eyes awake that
I am
looking at this paper; that this head which I
move is not asleep, that it is deliberately and
of set purpose that I extend my hand and perceive
it, what happens in sleep does not appear
so clear
and distinct as does all this
But in thinking
over this I remind myself that on many occasions
I have in sleep been deceived by similar
illusions,
and in dwelling carefully on this reflection I
see so manifestly that there are no certain indications by which we may clearly distinguish
wakefulness from sleep that I am lost in astonishment. And my astonishment is such that it is
almost capable of persuading me that I now dream.

m

.

.

"the

,

.

.

Descartes regards the hypothesis that he is in bed dreaming
as casting metaphysical doubt for him on the proposition

that he is sitting in front of a fire.
is not practically possible for him,

cally possible.

But,

that hypothesis

though it is metaphysi-

His senses provide him with sufficient

evidence to justify him in believing that he is not in bed
dreaming, though they do not maximally justify him in that
belief.

Descartes himself seems to note this fact in the

third and fourth sentences of this passage.

Feldman's answer to (1), therefore, is incorrect.

Descartes does not maintain (50), but instead maintains that

practically impossible hypotheses can cast metaphysical doubt.

16
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3.

Feldman's answer to

(2)

is also incorrect.

He claims

Descartes attempts to accomplish his task by following arguments that will make every hypothesis that would otherwise
cast doubt on his clear and distinct perceptions practically

impossible for him.

Descartes' attempt involves more

than,

this, however.

Descartes believes that the success of his attempt
places him in a position in which he is metaphysically cer-

tain of any proposition he clearly and distinctly perceives.
On his epistemology, to exchange his initial position for

such a state, he must do more than make every hypothesis that
casts doubt on his clear and distinct perceptions in his

initial position a practical impossibility for him.

As we

have seen, he believes that those hypotheses continue to

cast metaphysical doubt on his clear and distinct perceptions

even when they are practically impossible for him.
4.

ful,

Although Feldman's answers to

(1)

and (2) are unsuccess-

it is worth noting how they are designed to provide an

adequate response to Arnauld's objection.

As that objection

has been presented here, it rests on the assumption that

Descartes makes two claims.

The first is that until he

accomplishes his task he is metaphysically uncertain of any

proposition he clearly and distinctly perceives.

The second

is that to accomplish his task he becomes metaphysically

certain of some of his clear and distinct perceptions.

Adopting the same line of interpretation as Gewirth and
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Doney

,

Feldman allows for the possibility that
Descartes

makes the first claim.

He denies, though, that Descartes

makes the second one.
As Feldman interprets him, Descartes does not
maintain
that to accomplish his task he becomes metaphysically
certain
of some of his clear and distinct perceptions.

He maintains

that he accomplishes his task by becoming practically
certain of some propositions.

metaphysically

,

He becomes practically, but not

certain of the negation of every hypothesis

that casts doubt on his clear and distinct perceptions in
his initial position.

Arnauld

'

s

The difficulty with this answer to

objection is that it does not correctly represent

Descartes' attempt.

Feldman also considers another way of understanding
Arnauld

'

s

objection and argues that his interpretation pro-

vides a way of answering it.

Arnauld states his objection

as follows.

The only remaining scruple I have is an uncertainty
as to how a circular reasoning is to be avoided
in saying:
The only secure reason we have for believing that what we clearly and distinctly perceive is true, is the fact that God exists. But
we can say that God exists, only because we clearly and distinctly perceive that; therefore, prior
to being certain that God exists, we should be
certain that whatever we clearly and evidently
perceive is true. 17

Feldman suggests that we take Arnauld to be claiming that, in
the process of attempting his task, Descartes makes use of
17

Ibid.

,

II,

92.
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the arguments

Argument A
(1)
(

2

)

(3)

Whatever I clearly and distinctly
perceive is true,
I clearly and distinctly
perceive that God exists
Therefore, God exists.

Argument B
(

1

)

(2)
(3)

God exists
If God exists, then whatever I clearly
and distinctly perceive is true.
Therefore, whatever I clearly and distinctly
perceive is true

Understanding Arnauld in this way, we can take his
objection
to be that Descartes employs the circular line
of reasoning
that consists of argument A followed by argument B.

That line

of reasoning is circular because its conclusion
is one of its

premises

Feldman argues that, on his interpretation, Descartes
is not open to this objection.

Descartes does not follow

the line of reasoning that consists of arguments A and B.

He follows a line of reasoning that can be represented by
the arguments

Argument
(1)
(2)

(3)

(4)

C_

There exists an idea with infinite objective
reality
The cause of an existing idea must exist and
have at least as much formal reality as the
idea has objective reality.
God, by definition, is the being with infinite
formal reality.
Therefore, God exists.
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Argument D
(1)
(2)
(3)

Whatever deceives is defective.
God is not defective.
Therefore, God does not deceive.

To Feldman, Descartes follows

C

and D in an attempt to become

practically certain that God is not a deceiver
and, so, remove the hypothesis that God is one from its
position as a
reason for doubt.
C

The line of reasoning that consists of

followed by D does not have its conclusion as one
of its

premises

.

Feldman goes on to claim that it is not until Descartes
has completed argument D, and supposedly attained the
epistemic

state he desires, that he attempts to become metaphysically

certain that all his clear and distinct perceptions are true.

According to Feldman, Descartes attempts to do so by an
argument like the following.

Argument E
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Every clear and distinct perception is something.
Whatever is something is caused by God.
Whatever is caused by God is true.
Therefore, every clear and distinct perception
is true

Feldman interprets Descartes as claiming that he is metaphysically certain of the premises of E because he clearly and

distinctly perceives them and that he is metaphysically certain of the proposition that those premises entail E's con-

clusion for the same reason.

His metaphysical certainty of

these points is sufficient to make him metaphysically certain
of E's conclusion.
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This is a plausible way of interpreting
Arnauld's
objection. Feldman seems to be correct
in his claim that
arguments C, D and E correctly represent
Descartes’
line

of reasoning as opposed to arguments
A and B.

He is also

correct in his claim that the line of reasoning
represented
by C* D and E is not circular in that its
conclusion is not
one of its premises.

He is, however, mistaken in his view

that Descartes follows arguments

C

and D in an attempt to

become practically certain that God is not a deceiver.

We

have seen that Descartes must do more than that to remove
the hypothesis that God is one from its position as
a reason

for metaphysical doubt.
5«

I

have presented three attempts to answer my questions

correctly by following the line of interpretation initiated
by Gewirth.

Each of them

has been found to be unsuccessful.

It is now time to consider whether there is any chance those

questions can be correctly answered by following that line
of interpretation.

There is not.

In following that line of interpreta-

tion, we ascribe an important claim to Descartes.

This is

that to accomplish his task he does not become metaphysically

certain of some of his clear and distinct perceptions.

There

do not appear to be any passages that support the ascription
of this claim to Descartes,

strong evidence against it.

and a number of ones provide

Any attempt to answer my ques-

tions by following this line of interpretation, then, will
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be open to a fatal objection.

It will attribute an important

claim to Descartes when there is no
substantial textual support for doing so, and strong textual
evidence against doing
so

.

A close consideration of Descartes' works
reveals that

there is no substantial support for attributing
this claim
to him.

This is further witnessed by the fact that none
of

the commentators we have considered in the last two
chapters

provides any such support for his ascription of this claim
to Descartes.

Furthermore, a number of passages strongly suggest

Descartes does not maintain this claim.

Meditation

,

In the Fifth

he writes:

For is there anything more manifest than that there
is a God, that is to say, a supreme Being, to whose
essence alone existence pertains?
And although for a firm grasp of this truth
I have need of a strenuous application of mind, at
present I not only feel myself to be as assured of
it as of all that I hold most certain, but I also
remark that the certainty of all other things depends on it so absolutely, that without this knowledge it is impossible ever to know anything perfectly

Descartes makes two important claims here.
he is most certain that God exists.

He claims that

He thus regards himself

as being metaphysically certain of that fact.

He also claims

that he must have this metaphysical certainty to attain the
state he desires.

1

Ibid

.

,

I,

It is obvious that he regards himself
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as clearly and distinctly perceiving
that God exists.

In another passage, Descartes reviews
his argument from

the Third Meditation

.

And when I consider that I doubt, that is to
that I am an. incomplete and dependent being, say,
the
idea of a being that is complete and independent,
that is, of God, presents itself to my mind
with
so much distinctness and clearness --and
from the
fact alone that this idea is found in me, or
that
who possess this idea exist, I conclude so certainly that God exists, and that my existence depends entirely on Kim in every moment of my life-that I do not think that the human mind is capable of knowing anything with more evidence and
certitude
And it seems to me that I now have
before me a road which will lead us from the contemplation of the true God (in whom all the treasures of sciences and wisdom are contained) to
the knowledge of the other objects of the universe. 20
.

.

Descartes claims that he is as certain as he can be of the
existence of God.

Hence, he regards himself as being meta-

physically certain of it.

Most importantly, he claims that

his metaphysical certainty of God’s existence enables him
to attain the epistemic state he desires.

As already noted,

he obviously regards himself as clearly and distinctly per-

ceiving it.

Another piece of evidence is provided by one of Descartes'
statements in the Third Meditation

To accomplish his task

.

he presents a proof in that meditation of God's existence.

He states that:

19

.

.

.

Descartes adopts this proposition and we have seen
that he accepts the rule of adopting a proposition only if
he clearly and distinctly perceives it.
2Q

Ibid.

,

171-172.
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.the proof of God's existence is grounded in
the highest evidence. 21
.

.

For that proof to he grounded in the highest evidence,
its

premises must be metaphysically certain for him.

Hence, it

is reasonable to suppose that Descartes regards himself
as

becoming metaphysically certain of those premises in order
to accomplish his task.

He also claims that he clearly and

distinctly perceives them.

op

There is therefore a good deal of evidence against at-

tributing to Descartes the claim that he does not become

metaphysically certain of some of his clear and distinct
perceptions as a means of accomplishing his task.

This and

the fact that there is no substantial evidence for attribut-

ing that claim to him effectively rule out the possibility

that the line of interpretation before us can provide suc-

cessful answers to my questions.
However, my examination of that line of interpretation

suggests one that might provide correct answers.

I

have

shown that there is strong evidence for interpreting

Descartes as believing that in his initial position he is

metaphysically uncertain of some of his clear and distinct
perceptions.

I

have also shown that there is strong textual

support for interpreting him as attempting to accomplish his

21

22

Ibid

.

,

170.

Ibid

.

,

I63.
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task by becoming metaphysically certain
of some of his clear
and distinct perceptions.
There is good reason to suspect,
then, that I can successfully answer my
questions by in-

terpreting Descartes in both of these ways.
chapter,

I

shall try to do so.

In the next
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CHAPTER
In this chapter,

I

V

shall successfully answer my ques-

tions by developing the line of interpretation
suggested at
the end of the last one.

portion of Descartes

'

I

shall begin by presenting a large

epistemology

.

I

shall examine his

concepts of practical and metaphysical certainty, and
employ
them to explain those of deduction, clear and distinct
per-

ception and intuition, and the relationship between an individual

s

intuition of a proposition and his metaphysical

certainty of it.
1

.

The concepts of practical and metaphysical certainty

were examined in the last chapter.

The main results of that

examination were as follows.
For an individual to be practicality certain of a

proposition is for him to be epistemically -justified in believing it.

Practical certainty is no less a degree of

certainty than that required for ordinary knowledge, though
it is a lesser degree than that required for the perfect

knowledge that interests Descartes.

The concept of practical

certainty is also an epistemic, as opposed to a psychological,

concept.

An individual can be practically certain of

a proposition with or without feeling convinced of its

truth
In contrast, metaphysical certainty is the high degree
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of certainty required for the sort of perfect
knowledge that

interests Descartes.

An individual is metaphysically certain

of a proposition just when he is maximally
justified in be-

lieving it.
ing

i

o

Not only

is

he epistemically justified in believ-

he could not be more justified in believing
anything

,

than he is in believing it.

An individual's metaphysical

certainties are al_ practical ones, though some of his practical certainties may not be metaphysical ones.

Like practical

certainty, metaphysical certainty is an epistemic, rather

than a psychological, concept.

We can define a number of concepts in terms of practical
and metaphysical certainty.

In terms of practical certainty,

we have defined practical possibility, practical impossibil-

ity and practical uncertainty.

In terms of metaphysical

certainty, we have defined metaphysical possibility, meta-

physical impossibility and metaphysical uncertainty.
concept

of

Each

certainty falls into a square of opposition along

with those defined in terms of it.

Descartes also states a necessary and sufficient condition for metaphysical uncertainty.

He claims a proposition

is metaphysically uncertain for an individual just in case

some other proposition provides him with a reason to doubt
it.

However, he does not explain what it is for one proposi-

tion to provide him with a reason for doubting another one.

Stated roughly, Descartes' idea seems to be this.

An

individual's belief is metaphysically uncertain for him just
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m

case there is an hypothesis that (i) is
possible for him
in the sense that he is not certain that it
is false
and
,

(

11

)

is such that in being possible for him,

it detracts

from the strength of his justification for his
belief.

We have seen that Descartes' idea is not adequately

captured by:
p is a metaphysical uncertainty for S at t
if and only if there is a proposition,
q,
such that (i) q is a practical possibility
for S at t; and (ii) if q were a practical
certainty for S at t that would defeat
his practical certainty of p at t, thus
making p a practical uncertainty for S at t.

(50)

,

This principle says, among other things, that an hypothesis

provides an individual with a reason for metaphysical doubt
only if it is practically possible for him.

Meditation

,

In the First

however, Descartes regards the hypothesis that

he is in bed dreaming as providing him with a reason for

doubting the proposition that he is sitting in front of a
fire.

That hypothesis is practically impossible for him at

that point, though it is metaphysically possible for him.

This difficulty with (50) suggests:
(51) P is a metaphysical uncertainty for S at t
if and only if there is an hypothesis, q,
such that (i) q is a metaphysical possibility
for S at t; and (ii) if q were a practical
certainty for S at t, that would defeat his
practical certainty of p at t, thus making p a
practical uncertainty for S at t.

The only difference between (5°) and (51) is in condition (i).
To accommodate Descartes' First Mieditation doubt, the re-

quirement that

q be

practically possible has been replaced
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"by

the weaker one that it be metaphysically
possible.

Before accepting (51), however, we ought to
consider
its second condition carefully.
This condition requires that
q be such that if S were practically certain of it, he would

be practically uncertain of p, because his
practical cer-

tainty of q would epistemically defeat his practical
certainty of p.

In considering Feldman's interpretation, we

examined his brief explanation of this condition.

To say

that S's practical certainty of q would epistemically defeat
his practical certainty of p is

were practically certain of

q,

,

roughly, to say that if S

any evidence he in fact has

for p would be insufficient to justify him in believing p.

His practical certainty of q would "defeat" or "neutralize"
his justification for p.

To increase our understanding of this condition and
of (51)

in general, let us look at some examples.

Consider

an atheistic geometer whose only evidence for the theorem

that the angles of a triangle equal two right angles is that
he clearly and distinctly perceives it.

According to Descartes,

this theorem is rendered metaphysically uncertain for this

geometer by the hypothesis that God is a deceiver. 1
(

51

)

provides the following explanation of this case.

With regard to condition

(i)

of (51).

the hypothesis that

God is a deceiver is metaphysically possible for the atheist.

1

Haldane and Ross, II, 39-
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With regard to condition (ii), if the atheist were
practically
certain that God is a deceiver, he would not be
practically

certain of that theorem, and this is because his
practical
certainty that God is a deceiver would epistemically
defeat
his practical certainty of the theorem.

If he were practical-

ly certain that God is a deceiver, he would still
be clearly

and distinctly perceiving the theorem, but the fact
that he

was doing so would not justify him in adopting it.
As another example, assume p is the proposition that

Descartes is standing in front of the Sorbonne,
q is the

proposition that he is in bed dreaming, and r is the proposition that Descartes is at home sitting in front of a fire.

Suppose also that p is evidenced for Descartes by various
sense perceptions of himself and the Sorbonne which make him

practically, but not metaphysically, certain of
q and r are metaphysically possible for him.

p,

and that

On Descartes'

understanding of metaphysical doubt, in this situation q
casts doubt for him on p, but r does not do so.
(

51

)

provides the following explanation of this case.

With regard to the relationship between q and

p,

q is meta-

physically possible for Descartes; so it satisfies condition
(i).

It also satisfies condition (ii)

practically certain of

q,

.

If Descartes were

he would not be practically cer-

tain of p and this is because his practical certainty of q

would epistemically defeat his practical certainty of p.
If he were to become practically certain that he is dreaming,
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his sensory evidence for the proposition
that he is standing
in front of the Sorbonne would be
insufficient to justify

him in believing it.

With respect to the relationship between r and
is

p,

r

metaphysically possible for Descartes and so it too

satisfies condition (i).

However, r does not satisfy con-

dition (ii) with regard to p.

certain of

r,

If Descartes were practically

he would be practically uncertain of
p,

but

this is not because his practical certainty of r would

epistemically defeat his practical certainty of

p.

Let us

see why this is the case.

If Descartes were to become practically certain that
he is at home sitting in front of a fire,

he would do so

by having some sense perceptions of himself sitting in his

house.

As a result, he would cease having the sense per-

ceptions he is in fact having of himself and the Sorbonne
In the absence of those sense perceptions, he would no longer
be practically certain that he is standing in front of the

Sorbonne
Yet while Descartes' practical certainty of r would
result in his practical uncertainty of p, this is not because
his practical certainty of r would defeat his practical cer-

tainty of p.

His practical certainty of r would not place

him in a situation in which he still had the sensations that

provide him with his evidence for

p,

but in which those sen-

sations failed to make him practically certain of p.

Rather,
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his practical certainty of r would
result in his practical
uncertainty of p by placing him in a
situation in which he
was not even having the sensations
that provide him with his
evidence for p.

This example raises an interesting
question.

Descartes’

practical certainty of r would not epistemically
defeat his
practical certainty of p because it would change
"too much”
his psychological and epistemic state with
regard to p
in order to result in his practical
uncertainty of p. The
Ox

question arises of how we are to specify exactly what
"too
much” amounts to in cases such as this one.
The answer to this question escapes me

.

However,

I

think our intuitions on this matter are sufficiently clear
for us to handle the few cases of metaphysical uncertainty
I

will consider.
Besides helping us understand (51), these examples

show it correctly captures Descartes' idea.

The first one

shows it provides a plausible explanation of Descartes'

claim that the hypothesis that God is a deceiver prevents
an atheist from being metaphysically certain of some theorems

despite his clear and distinct perception of them.

The

second one shows (51) plausibly explains Descartes' claim
that the hypothesis that he is dreaming casts metaphysical

doubt on propositions evidenced solely by his senses. 2

2

Ibid

.

.

I,

145-146.
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With the ascription of (51) to Descartes,
my examination
of his concepts of practical
and metaphysical certainty is

complete.

shall now consider those of deduction,
clear

I

and distinct perception and intuition!
and the relationship

between an individual's intuition of a
proposition and his
metaphysical certainty of it.
2.

Descartes characterizes deduction as ”a process

that involves a sort of movement on the part
of the mind
when it infers one thing from another
."-"He also main.

.

.

tains that in performing a deduction an individual
clearly
and distinctly perceives its premises and its
conclusion.
He states that in performing a deduction the mind has
"a

clear vision of each step in the process."

Descartes denies,

though, that his deduction of a proposition implies his

metaphysical certainty of it.^
These considerations suggest:
deduces p at t =df. S clearly and distinctly perceives p at t and he comes to
do so by clearly and distinctly perceiving
the premises of an argument, A, that has p
as its conclusion and clearly and distinctly
perceiving that the conjunction of those
premises entails p.

(52)

S.

In writing of an individual's deduction of a proposition,

shall at times refer to the premises of his deduction.

3 Ibid

.

^ Ibid.

.

5 Ibid

.

,

33.

,

8

,

33-

.

I
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These are the premises of the
relevant argument A, their conjunction, and the proposition that
their conjunction entails
A's conclusion.

Definition (52) employs the concept
of clear and
distinct perception. Descartes’
definition of this concept
notoriously vague.
stand it

m

this way.

It is reasonable,

however, to under-

To perceive a proposition clearly

ana distinctly is to apprehend it in
a particular manner.
In accord with Descartes’ acceptance
of (19), whenever an

individual apprehends a proposition in this
way he is psychologically certain of it. However, some
propositions are
such that an individual can apprehend them
in this way and
yet not be metaphysically certain of them.
Descartes maintains,

for example, that an atheist can clearly and dis-

tictly perceive the theorem that the angles of a triangle
equal two right angles and yet not be metaphysically
certain
of it.

Moreover, although Descartes does not consider

this point, it seems an individual could clearly and distinctly perceive this theorem and yet not be practically certain
of it

Understanding clear and distinct perception along
these lines, we can consider Descartes' concept of intuition.
Some commentators regard Descartes as identifying his intuition

6
7

Ibid

.

,

Ibid

.

,

237
II,

.

33.

of a proposition with his clear
and distinct perception of
it, but we have seen that he
does not do so.
in the Rule s
In
he writes:

in. its

successively

.

totality at the same time and not

The second condition Descartes presents is
admittedly unclear.

Still,

the passage suggests he regards his clear
and dis-

tinct perception of a proposition as a necessary,
but not
a sufficient,

condition of his intuition of it.

Descartes also distinguishes between two kinds of
intuition
The upshot of the matter is that it is possible to
say. that those propositions indeed which are immediately deduced from first principles are known
now by intuition, now by deduction, i.e. in a way
that differs according to our point of view.
But, the. first principles are given by intuition
alone while, on the contrary, the remote conclusions are furnished only by deduction. 9
.

In the first sentence, Descartes claims that propositions im-

mediately deduced from first principles are known in a
rather special way

.

If we consider the way we know them

from one point of view, we see that we intuit them.

If

we consider it from another point of view, we see that we

deduce them.

6

9

Ibid

.

Descartes' point seems to be that we know

,

I,

Ibid., 8.

33.

13 ^

these propositions by intuiting them
in a way that involves
their being deduced.
In the next sentence, he claims
that
other propositions, those that are
first-principles, are
known in a way that involves their being
intuited, but not
tneir being deduced. His point seems
to be that we intuit
these propositions without deducing them.
I shall refer
to these two kinds of intuition as
deductive intuition and

direct intuition, respectively, and begin my
examination
of them with direct intuition.

Descartes maintains that he does not clearly and distinctly perceive just any proposition when he has a
direct
intuition.

Rather, he clearly and distinctly perceives one

xhat is a "primary and self-evident principle

." 10

He does

not fully explain this point, but it is reasonable to suppose his position is the following.

The propositions that

are directly intuitable by him are rather special ones.

Most propositions are such that to be justified in believing them, he first has to be justified in believing some

other ones that constitute his evidence for them.

But the

ones that are directly intuitable by him are not like that.
He can be justified in believing them even if he is not

justified in believing any others.
is

This is because each

such that whenever Descartes clearly and distinctly per-

ceives it, he is justified in believing it.

10

Ibid.

,

19

.

We can capture
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this requirement by the condition that
an individual

car.

directly intuit a proposition only if his
clear and distinct
perception of it entails his practical
certainty of it.
Descartes' concept of direct intuition is
thus definable in terms of those of clear and distinct
perception
and practical certainty.
d^rec bly intuits p at t = df
S clearly
and distinctly perceives p at t and
p is
epistemically basic for S at t

(53)

2

(5^)

p is epistemically basic for S at t =df.
it is possible that S clearly and distinctly perceives p at t and it is necessary that if S clearly and distinctly perceives p at t, then p is practically certain for S at t.

.

Two points should be observed here.

First, the state of

directly intuiting a proposition is not one in which an
individual's practical certainty of it depends upon there

being some proposition that provides him with his evidence.
Rather, his practical certainty results from his clear and

distinct perception of a proposition that is epistemically
basic for him.
Second, Descartes never states exactly which proposi-

tions are epistemically basic for him, but he presents what
he takes to be examples of such propositions.

These examples

include some necessary truths and some contingent ones.

claims that the necessary truth that things

He

identical to

a third thing are identical to each other is basic for him.

11

Ibid., 41.

11
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He denies though that the proposition
that four and three
equal seven is epistemically basic. 12
His reason for dis-

tinguishing between these two propositions
is that the former
has a- simpler structure than the latter. 13
He
also appears

to maintain that any necessary truth
basic for him is epis-

temically basic for anyone else.

He might,

such propositions are universally basic.

then,

say that

As examples of

contingent propositions epistemically basic for
him, Descartes
presents the one that he exists and the one that he
1^
thinks.

Once again, he does not clearly explain why these
contingent

propositions are basic for him.

However, he clearly does

not think that every contingent proposition basic for him
is basic for everyone else

.

He believes that the proposition

that he exists is basic for him, but obviously he denies
that this proposition is basic for Arnauld

Descartes claims that to intuit a proposition deductively he must satisfy two requirements:

He must deduce it from

premises he is directly intuiting, and he must intuit each
premise simultaneously with his clear and distinct perception
of the conclusion.

1 5

If he meets both of these requirements

with regard to a proposition, he is deductively intuiting it.

1

1

14
1

Ibid
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,

164 & 43

Ibid
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,
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Ibid

.

,

7.

15 Ibid., 19.

.
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Deductive intuition may be defined inductively:
(i)

(55)

(ii)

(HI)

If S is deducing p at t and S is directly intuiting each premise of his
deduction at t, then S is deductively
intuiting p at t
If S is deducing p at t and every premise of S's deduction is such that S is
either deductively intuiting it solely
on the basis of other premises of his
deduction at t or directly intuiting it
at t, then S is deductively intuiting
p at t
is deductively intuiting p at t only
if S satisfies the antecedent of (i)
or of (ii) with regard to p and t.

D

Clause (i) is the base case; as such it covers those instances
where S extends the scope of his intuition by deducing a

proposition from his direct intuitions.

Clause (ii) is

the inductive case and covers those instances where S ex-

tends his intuition even further by deducing propositions

from his direct and deductive intuitions.

Finally,

(iii)

asserts that the only cases of deductive intuition are those

satisfying (i) or (ii).
The next thing to consider is Descartes' claim that

whenever he directly or deductively intuits a proposition,
it is metaphysically certain for him.

That he makes this

claim is suggested by his statement that whenever he intuits
a

proposition it is "as sure as it can be

initions

I

.

.

.

The def-

have given of direct and deductive intuition and

principle (51) imply that it is correct.

Consider the case of direct intuition.

1

Ibid

.

,

20.

(51) implies

the premise:
(56)

p is a metaphysical certainty for
S at t
th6re lE n ° P-POsitio5
q,
suc^ha
is metaphysically possible
3
r ^ at i
and 11 ) if q were a practice]
certainty for S at t, that
would
practical of p at t, thus making defeat his
practiaotl
p a p
cal uncertainty for S at t.

fbf

forVatV

,

As a second premise
(5?)

,

(

we have

If S directly intuits
p at t, there is no
proposition, q, such that (i)
i s metaphysically possible for S at t;q and
(ii)
if q were a practical certainty
for S at
t
that would defeat his practical certainty of p at t, thus making
p a practical uncertainty for S at t
.

,

Inspection shows that these premises entail
the desired re
suit
(

5£

I-l
S directly intuits
p at
metaphysically certain for

The crucial premise is (57).

t,

then p is

S at t

(51) and the definition

of direct intuition provide Descartes with
a satisfactory

defense of it.
(57)>

that S

Suppose S directly intuits p.

To establish

it is sufficient to show that no proposition is
such
s

practical certainty of it would epistemically de-

feat his practical certainty of p.
To see that no proposition has this property, consider
an example.
fact,

Let r be a complex mathematical theorem.

In

let r be such that if S were to become practically

certain of it, he would do so by deducing it in a very involved deduction that did not have p as one of its premises.
His deduction of r would be so involved that it would completely occupy his attention and prevent him from apprehending
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any proposition not involved
in the deduction.

Since S is directly intuiting it.
p is either a very
simple necessary truth or a
proposition concerning his existence or intellectual state. As
a result, r does not provide
S with a reason to doubt
p. even if r is metaphysically possible for him.
r, rememDer, is a complex
theorem of mathematics.
Consequently, given (51), S's practical
certainty
of r would not epistemically defeat
his practical certainty
of p

The reason S's practical certainty of
r would not epis-

temically defeat his practical certainty of
p is not that
it would fail to make him practically
uncertain
of p.

practical certainty of r would in fact do so.

practically certain of

r,

S's

If S were

he would be deducing it in a de-

duction that completely occupied his attention.

As a result,

he would not be clearly and distinctly perceiving
p and,

hence,

he would be practically uncertain of it.

S's practical certainty of r would fail to defeat his

practical certainty of p because it would change "too much"
of his psychological and epistemic state with regard to p.

Instead of preventing his clear and distinct perception of
p from making him practically certain of p,

it would place

him in a situation in which he did not clearly and distinctly

perceive p at all.

Although such a situation would result

in S's practical uncertainty of p,

it would not bring about

an epistemic defeat of his practical certainty of p.
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On the basis
that,

since S is

this example, we may correctly
require

--

-ttly intuiting p, his practical
cer-

di;

tainty of an hy pot esis would epistemically
defeat his
practical certainty
P onl y if it would place him in a
situation where he -ontinued to perceive
p clearly and disim-

tinctly

,

but was pr actically uncertain of it.

requirement, we

~asil;y

car.

Given this

see that no proposition is such

that S's practical -ertainty of it would
epistemically defeat his practical -ertainty of p. Since S
is directly

intuiting

p,

it is sasic for him, and his clear and dis-

tinct perception cf

entails

his

practical certainty of it.

No proposition, the:ref ore, is such that S's
practical cer-

tainty of it would rlace him in a situation where he clearly
;

and distinctly perc Eived p but was practically uncertain of
p.

Hence, no props sition is such that S's practical cer-

tainty of it would epistemically defeat his practical certainty of p.

Assuming that

(

51

)

and the definition of direct in-

tuition are accepxa :le, we must accept this defense of (57)
as flawless.

Conse quently, we may allow that Descartes'

definition of direc

-

intuition and his statement of neces-

sary and sufficient conditions for metaphysical uncertainty

imply that his dire rb intuitions are always metaphysically

certain for him.

Descartes

'

cl:aim

that his deductive intuitions are

metaphysically certain for him is implied by (58) and:

I4l

v

59

If S deduces p at t and all the
premises
ol S^s deduction are metaphysically
certain
for S at t, then p is metaphysically
certain
for S at t.

This principle is suggested by Descartes'
statement that
"many things are known with certainty, though
by themselves evident, but

known principles.
a

H

.

.

[are]

." 1?
(

59 )

[they are]

not

only deduced from true and
is

also clearly correct.

the premises of ^'s deduction are metaphysically

certain for him, he is metaphysically certain of each premise of the relevant argument A, their conjunction, and the

proposition that their conjunction entails

p.

These meta-

physically certain propositions constitute his evidence for
p.

If he is metaphysically certain of all of them, he is

metaphysically certain of

p.

He has a reason to doubt p

only if he has a reason to doubt one of them.
The argument to show that (58) and (59) imply that

Descartes' deductive intuitions are metaphysically certain
is an inductive one

.

In the base case we show that if an

instance B of deductive intuition has no deductively in-

tuited premises, its conclusion is metaphysically certain.
This is easily shown.

If B has no deductively intuited pre-

mises, every premise is directly intuited.

By (58). then,

every premise is metaphysically certain and, by

conclusion is too.

17 Ibid.,

28.

(

59 ).

the
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For the inductive case, we adopt the
hypothesis that,
for an arbitrary n, if an instance B of
deductive intuition
has n or fewer deductively intuited premises,
the conclusion
of E is metaphysically certain.

We show that this hypothesis

implies that any instance of deductive intuition
having n

+

1

deductively intuited premises has a metaphysically
certain
conclusion.
ises.

Assume

C

has n

Every premise of

C

+

1

deductively intuited prem-

that is directly intuited is meta-

physically certain by (58).

Every premise of

C

that is de-

ductively intuited is deduced in a deduction containing n
or fewer deductively intuited premises,

has n +

such premises.

1

that,

by

(

itself only

C

is metaphysically

Given our assumption, we may therefore conclude

every premise of

59 ),

C

Our assumption implies, then, that

every deductively intuited premise of
certain.

since

C

is metaphysically certain and that,

its conclusion is metaphysically certain as well.

The base and inductive cases have yielded two con-

clusions.

The first is that any instance of deductive in-

tuition having no deductively intuited premises has a meta-

physically certain conclusion.

The second is that, for an

arbitrary n, if any instance of deductive intuition having
n or fewer deductively intuited premises has a metaphysically certain conclusion, any instance of deductive intuition

having n

+

conclusion.

1

such premises has a metaphysically certain

Taken together, these results imply that every

instance of deductive intuition has a metaphysically certain

conclusion.
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As

have presented it, Descartes'
epistemology provides him with two ways of becoming
metaphysically certain
of propositions.
If a proposition is epistemically
basic
for him, he can become metaphysically
certain
I

of it by

directly intuiting it.

He can become metaphysically cer-

tain of still more propositions by
deductively intuiting
them on the basis of his direct intuitions.
My next step is
to consider the task Descartes sets
for himself
in terms of

these features of his epistemology.
3
a.

-

In considering other interpretations,

have examined

I

number of Descartes' statements regarding his
task.

One

suggests an answer to my first question that is
based on
my examination of his epistemology.
S e c ond

Se_t

In replying to the

of Objections to the Meditations

.

Descartes

contrasts himself once he has completed his task with an
atheist who has not done so.
That an atheist can know clearly that the three
angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles,
I do not deny, I merely affirm that on the other
hand, such knowledge on his part cannot constitute
true science, because no knowledge that can be
rendered doubtful should be called science.

Descartes claims that, unlike himself, an atheist who has
not completed his task is unable to have the certainty of
the theorem that the angles of a triangle equal two right

angles that he requires for perfect knowledge of it.

Ac-

cording to Descartes, this certainty is metaphysical certainty.
l£

Descartes acknowledges, however, that the atheist
Ibid

.

,

II,

39.
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can clearly and distinctly perceive

the theorem.

This passage suggests a rough answer
to (1).
Descartes
wants to formulate a procedure hy
which he can become metapnysically certain of propositions of
a particular
sort.

An example of one of these propositions
is the theorem that
the angles of a triangle equal two
right angles. Prior to
completing his task, Descartes can perceive
these propositions clearly and distinctly, but his
clear and distinct
perception of them is insufficient to make him
metaphysically
certain of them. According to Descartes, the
procedure he

formulates is not available to an atheist.
This answer can be developed a bit further.
begins the Third keditat ion

,

As he

Descartes finds himself in the

following situation.

There are a number

can directly intuit.

There are also some that he can de-

of

propositions he

ductively intuit by deducing them from the epistemically
basic propositions of the sciences to which they belong.

However, there are true propositions he can clearly and dis-

tinctly perceive, but which he can neither directly intuit
nor deductively intuit by deducing them from the basic
truths of their sciences.

An example of such

a

proposition is the theorem that

the angles of a triangle equal two right angles.

Descartes

can clearly and distinctly perceive this theorem, but it is
too complicated for him to intuit it directly.

Nor,

can he

deductively intuit it by deducing it from basic mathematical
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trutns.

To do so,

he would have to intuit
some mathematical

truths directly and, while doing
so, deductively intuit
on
the basis of them a series of
propositions that ended in
thi_ theorem. He is unable to
accomplish such an intellectual feat. The required deduction
would contain more
steps than he could intuit simultaneously.
Moreover, although Descartes regards
his direct or
deductive intuition of a preposition
as implying his meta-

physical certainty of it, he does not
regard his mere clear
and distinct perception of one as doing
so.
The hypothesis
that uod deceives him is metaphysically
possible for him
and,

as a result,

it provides him with a reason to doubt

propositions he clearly and distinctly perceives but
does
not intuit.

What Descartes lacks in his initial position is a
procedure for becoming metaphysically certain of those propositions he can clearly and distinctly perceive, but which
he can neither directly intuit nor deductively intuit by

deducing them from the epistemically basic truths of the
sciences to which they belong.

His task is to formulate

such a procedure

There is further textual support for this answer.
the Rules

,

Descartes writes that:

The upshot of the matter is that it is possible
to say that those propositions indeed which are
immediately deduced from first principles are
known now by intuition, now by deduction, i.e.
in a way that differs according to our point

In
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°f view.

But,

the first principles are given
while, on the contrary, the
remote conclusions are furnished only bv deJ
duction. 19
cy intuition alone,

He acknowledges that some sciences contain
"remote” truths

which he can deduce

,

but which he can neither directly in-

tuit nor deductively intuit on the basis of their
epistemically basic truths.

My second question is how does Descartes attempt his
task.

It is clear that in doing so,

he presents an argument

the claim that all his clear and distinct perceptions

are true

However

.

it is not clear how this argument pro-

,

vides him with the sort of procedure he desires.
One way of interpreting Descartes' attempt is the fol-

lowing.

He tries to formulate a procedure by which he can

deductively intuit any proposition he can clearly and distinctly perceive.

He begins with propositions he believes

to be epistemically basic for him and on the basis of them

tries to construct an argument that will lead him to intuit

deductively that all his clear and distinct perceptions are
true.

With the aid of this argument, he formulates a pro-

cedure for deductively intuiting the propositions

terest him.

that in-

He deduces such a proposition in a line of

reasoning that consists of his deductive intuition that all
his clear and distinct perceptions are true, his direct

19 Ibid., I, 8.
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intuition that he is clearly and distinctly
perceiving the
proposition that interests him, and his
direct intuition
that the other premises of his deduction
entail that proposition.

In this way, he supposedly intuits
the proposition

that interests him and so becomes
metaphysically certain
of it

Perhaps this answer can he more easily
appreciated by
considering the theorem that the angles of a triangle
equal
two right angles. Descartes cannot directly
intuit this
theorem.

Nor can he deductively intuit it on the basis

of his intuition of epistemically basic mathematical
truths.

To become metaphysically certain of it, he presents two

arguments for it.

ematical theorems.

He first deduces it from some other math-

This deduction may make him practically

certain of the theorem, but it does not make him metaphysically certain of it.

The most important point is that it

leads him to perceive the theorem clearly and distinctly.
He employs this fact in an attempt to construct an argument

that will lead him to intuit the theorem deductively and
so become metaphysically certain of it.

He derives the

premise that all his clear and distinct perceptions are
true from some other ones, including the one that God exists

and is not a deceiver.

He derives the theorem itself from

the premise that all his clear and distinct perceptions are

true and the premise that he clearly and distinctly perceives
the theorem.

He believes that in following this argument he
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intuits every one of its premises simultaneously with
his
clear and distinct perception of its conclusion and so
deductively intuits the theorem.
This way of interpreting Descartes has a number of

benefits.

It explains why he thinks his procedure is un-

available to an atheist.

Employing that procedure involves

following an argument containing the premise that God exists.

An individual cannot employ that procedure and still remain
an atheist.

In doing so, he must clearly and distinctly per-

ceive the premise that God exists and so become convinced of
its truth.

This interpretation also provides a plausible way of

understanding Descartes' statement when he finishes his task
in the Principles

:

Whence it follows that the light of nature, or
the faculty of knowledge which God has given us,
can never disclose to us any object which is not
true inasmuch as it comprehends it, that is, inasmuch as it apprehends it clearly and distinctly.
Because we should have had reason to think God a
deceiver if He had given us this faculty perverted, or such that we should take the false for
And
the true (when using the faculty aright)
this should deliever us from the supreme doubt
which encompassed us when we did not know whether
our nature had been such that we had been deceived in things that seemed most clear. It
should also protect us against all the other
reasons already mentioned which we had for
doubting. The truths of mathematics should now
.

be above suspicion, for they are of the clearest.
And if we perceive anything by our senses, either
waking or sleeping, if it is clear and distinct,
and if we separate it from what is obscure and
confused, we shall^easily assure ourselves of
what is the truth.

20

Ibid.

,

231.
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Descartes deduces the principle that all his
clear and distinct perceptions are true and claims that
his doing so provides him with a way of becoming metaphysically
certain of

any proposition he clearly and distinctly
perceives.
to

(2)

tion.

My answer

provides a very plausible interpretation of his posiHe regards himself as having found a way of deductive-

ly intuiting the principle that all his clear and
distinct

perceptions are true, and believes that this principle provides him with a way of deductively intuiting, and so becoming metaphysically certain of, any proposition he clearly
and distinctly perceives.

My interpretation also provides a plausible way of

understanding Descartes' view in the Meditations that, having
completed his task, he can be metaphysically certain of any

proposition he clearly and distinctly perceives; for as he
says in the Rules

:

mankind has no road towards certain knowledge
open to it, save those of self-evident intuition
and necessary deduction ... .22
His position is that direct and deductive intuition constitute his only way of attaining metaphysical certainty and

that after completing his task he can directly or deductively

21

The principle that all his clear and distinct perceptions are true plays another very important role for
It implies that any proposition he directly or
Descartes
deductively intuits is true.
.

22

Ibid

.

,

45.
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intuit any proposition he clearly and
distinctly perceives.
This brings me to the question of whether
Descartes
attempt is successful. The main point to consider
is whether
his attempt is open to Arnauld's objection.

Arnauld

'

objection, we may recall, is stated this way:

s

The only remaining scruple I have is an uncertainty
as to how a circular reasoning is to be avoided
in saying:
The only secure reason we have for
believing that what we clearly and distinctly
perceive is xrue is the fact that God exists.
But we can say that God exists only because we
clearly and distinctly perceive that; therefore, prior to being certain that God exists,
we should be certain that whatever we clearly
and distinctly perceive is true. 2 3
.

,

Most of the commentators we have considered understand

Arnauld's objection in the same way.
follows:

They interpret it as

Descartes maintains that until he accomplishes

his task, he is metaphysically uncertain of any proposition
he clearly and distinctly perceives,

but that to accomplish

his task he becomes metaphysically certain of some of his

clear and distinct perceptions.

His attempt is, therefore,

open to the objection that on his own position it can be

successful only if he has already accomplished his task when
he undertakes it.

On my interpretation, this objection is based on a

misunderstanding.

Descartes does not maintain that until

he accomplishes his task he is metaphysically uncertain of

any proposition he clearly and distinctly perceives.
23 Ibid., II, 92.

He
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claims that prior to completing his task,
he is metaphysically certain of any such proposition provided
that he directly or deductively intuits

it— these being

clear and distinct perception.

special cases of

While he maintains that to

accomplish his task he becomes metaphysically
certain of
some of his clear and distinct perceptions,
these perceptions
are all cases of direct or deductive intuition.

Arnauld

s

objection might be interpreted as affirming

that a circular argument is involved in Descartes' procedure

for deductively intuiting any proposition he can clearly and

distinctly perceive.

According to Arnauld, that procedure

involves the following argument:

Argument A
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(

5

)

Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive is true.
I clearly and distinctly perceive that God exists.
Goa exists.
If God exists, then whatever
tinctly perceive is true.

Therefore, whatever
ceive is true.

I

I

clearly and dis-

clearly and distinct per-

This argument seeks to show that all Descartes' clear and

distinct perceptions are true and it is circular.
But Descartes' procedure does not involve A.

His argu-

ment for the principle that all his clear and distinct perceptions are true is given in a condensed form by:

Argument B
(1)
(2)

have an idea of God.
If (1), there is something that causes my idea
of God and has as much formal reality as my
idea has objective reality.

I
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There is something that causes my idea
of God
and has as much formal reality as my
idea has
objective reality.
If
3 ), God exists.
God exists.
God is a deceiver only if He is defective.
God is not defective.
God is not a deceiver.
If (5) and 8 ), all my clear and distinct
perceptions are true

(3)

(4)
(5)
( 6 )
[?)
( 8 )
(9)

(

(

Therefore

("l"^

are true

,

all my clear and distinct perceptions

This argument is not circular.

Descartes does, of course,

maintain that in following B he intuits, and so clearly
^^d distinctly perceives

,

each one of its premise s

.

However

he does not try to derive any of those premises from the fact

that he clearly and distinctly perceives it and the principle that all his clear and distinct perceptions are true.
I

have considered the two most plausible statements

of Arnauld s objection.
'

either of them,

I

Since Descartes is not cpen to

conclude that my interpretation provides

him with an adequate response to Arnauld.
I

have presented a large portion of Descartes' epistem-

ology in a way that correctly answers my questions along
the lines suggested at the end of the last chapter.

It re-

mains for me to strengthen my case for these answers by

responding to some objections that might be brought against
them,

and to consider some of the points that remain to be

examined even if my answers are correct.
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CHAPTER

VI

By way of closing my discussion,

I

shall consider three

objections to my interpretation, and note some of the points
that remain to be examined even if my answers are correct
1

.

The first objection is directed against my answer to

(1

)

That answer attributes to Descartes the claim that his
direct intuitions are always metaphysically certain for him.
It does so on the basis of textual evidence from the Rules.

Question (1), however, concerns Descartes' task in the Meditations, and passages from that work suggest that he regards his direct intuitions as being metaphysically uncer-

tain in his initial position.
by passages from the Principles

That suggestion is strengthened
.

where Descartes repeats

his task.

An important passage from the Latin edition of the
Meditations is correctly translated as:
But when I took anything very simple and easy in
the sphere of arithmetic or geometry into consideration, e.g. that two and three together made
five, and other things of that sort, were not
these present to my mind so clearly as to enable
me to affirm that they were true? Certainly if
I judged that since such matters could be doubted,
this would not have been so for any other reason
than that it came into my mind that perhaps a
God might have endowed me with such a nature that
I may have been deceived even concerning things
which s-eemed to me most manifest. But every time
that this preconceived opinion of the sovereign
power of a God presents itself to my thought,
I am constrained to confess that it is easy to

1
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Him, if He wishes it, to cause me to err,
even
matters which I regard myself as intuiting in in
the
most evident manner.

Descartes claims the hypothesis that God is

a

deceiver pro-

vides him with a reason for doubting propositions
of a particular sort, even when he clearly and distinctly
perceives
them.

He states that these propositions include very
simple

ones.

This suggests that he regards them as including epis-

temically basic ones that he directly intuits upon clearly
and distinctly perceiving them.

In the Rule

he character-

izes epistemically basic propositions as being ones that
are simple rather than complex.

This suggestion is rein-

forced by the last sentence of the passage.

Descartes ex-

plicitly claims there that the hypothesis that God is a
deceiver provides him with a reason for doubting propositions
despite his intuition of them.

Shortly after this passage, Descartes describes his
initial position.

And certainly, since I have no reason to believe
that there is a God who is a deceiver, and as I
have not yet satisfied myself that there is a
God at all, the reason for doubt which depends on
this opinion alone is very slight, and so to
speak, metaphysical.
But in order to be able
to altogether remove it, I must inquire whether
there is a God as soon as the occasion presents
itself; and if

I

find that there is a God,

Adam and Tannery, VII, 36.
the passage in Adam and Tannery.
2

Haldane and Ross,

I,

J>6

I

must

This is my translation of
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also inquire whether He may be a deceiver;
without a knowledge of these two truths I dofor
see that I can ever be certain of anything. not

Descartes claims that so long as he is in his
initial position, no proposition is metaphysically certain
for him.

This includes any he directly intuits.
In the Fifth Meditation

.

Descartes repeats this claim.

And so I clearly recognize that the certainty and
truth of all knowledge depends alone on the knowledge of the true God, in so much that, before I
knew Him, I could not have a perfect knowledge
of any other thing.
He claims that,

in his initial position, he is not certain of

any proposition in a way required for perfect knowledge.

Since he regards metaphysical certainty as being all the

certainty required for perfect knowledge, he is claiming
that no proposition is metaphysically certain for him in his

initial position.

Descartes also makes this claim in the Principles

.

He

writes that the mind
can have no certain knowledge until it is acquainted
with its creator.
It is reasonable to assume he has metaphysical certainty in

mind, and is claiming that in his initial position no prop-

osition is metaphysically certain for him including any he

directly intuits.

Another important passage from the Principles is:
3 Ibid

.

,
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Ibid

.

,

185.

3 Ibid

.

,

224.

^
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We shall also doubt of all things which
have former iy
seemed to us quite certain, even of the demonstrations of mathematics and of its principles
which
we formerly thought quite self-evident.
One reason
is that those who have fallen into error in
reasoning on such matters have held as perfectly
certain
and self-evident what we see to be false, but
a
yet more important reason is that we have been told
that God who created us can do all that He desires.
For we are still ignorant of whether He may not
have desired to create us in such a way that we
shall always be deceived, even in the things that
we believe ourselves to know best; ... .6

Descartes is again considering the extent of his metaphysical

uncertainty in his initial position.

He states that it in-

cludes mathematical theorems that are epistemically basic
for him.

Since he elsewhere regards these theorems as

objects of his direct intuition,

this strongly suggests that

he believes his direct intuitions are metaphysically uncer-

tain in his initial position.
This is an impressive objection.

strong as it might appear.

Yet,

it is not as

The evidence provided by these

passages is effectively counter-balanced by a number of con-

siderations

.

Consider the first passage.

It admits of a very plau-

sible interpretation on which it is in accord with my answer
to (1).

While Descartes claims there that the hypothesis

that God is a deceiver casts metaphysical doubt on simple

propositions he clearly and distinctly perceives, it is
doubtful that he has epistemically basic ones in mind.

He

cites the theorem that two and three equal five as an example
6
7

Ibid

.,

220.

Ibid

.

8

,
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of a sample proposition.

In the Rules

.

where he character-

izes basic propositions in terms of their
simplicity, that
theorem is classified as a complex proposition
.

Although in the Latin edition of the Meditations

.

Descartes claims in the last sentence of this passage
that
the hypothesis that God is a deceiver casts doubt
on his

intuitions, in the French edition he does not do so.

As it

occurs in that edition, that sentence is correctly translated
as

:

But every time that this preconceived opinion of
the sovereign power of a God presents itself to
my thought, I am constrained to confess that it
is easy to Him, if He wishes it, to cause me to
err, even in the things which I believe myself
to know with very great evidence.
The reference to objects of intuition has been replaced by
one to things for which there is very great evidence.

It is

reasonable to interpret this new reference as one to propositions that are clearly and distinctly perceived, but not
intuited.

Since the French edition is later than the

Latin one, it is also reasonable to regard it as representing Descartes' considered opinion on this matter.
The remaining passages are a little more difficult to

handle.

They cannot be plausibly understood so that they

do not suggest that Descartes regards his direct intuitions
8 Ibid

.

,

43.

^Adam and Tannery, IX, 28.
in Adam and Tannery.
passage
the

This is my translation of

10

This point was brought to my attention by John Morris
in his paper: "A Flea for the French Descartes,” Dialogue
6 (1967), 236-239.
,
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as being metaphysically uncertain
in his initial position.
Yet, tne re is textual evidence that
supports us in ignoring

these passages on the grounds that they
fail to represent
Descarces' considered opinion.

Both the Meditations and the Principles
contain passages
in wh -cn Descartes claims to be metaphysically
certain of the
propoi _ .ion that he thinks and, therefore, exists.

^

One

such passage from the Principles is:
pple
thus reject all that of which we can possibly doubt, and feign that it is false, it is
sasy to suppose that there is no God, nor heaven,
nor bodies, and that we possess neither hands,
r.cr feet
nor indeed any body; but we cannot in
the same way conceive that we who doubt these
things are not; for there is a contradiction in
conceiving that what thinks does not, at the same
-ime as it thinks, exist.
And hence this conclusion I think therefore I am, is the first and
most certain of all that occurs to one who philosophises in an orderly way.^^
w

,

,

Descartes is in his initial position at this point, and he
claims the proposition that he thinks ana, therefore, exists
is the first and most certain conclusion that occurs to him.

This suggests that he believes it is metaphysically certain
for him.

Elsewhere, he traces his metaphysical certainty of this

proposition in his initial position to his direct intuition
of it

‘"Haldane and Ross,
lfa

Ibid.

,

221.

I,

150> 158 & 221.
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admi
that our intuitions are slightlv
obscured by being mixed up with the body
but"
still the knowledge they give us is
primary,
unacquired and certain, and we touch
mind with more confidence than we giveupon the
to the
evidence of our eyes. You will surely
admit
that you are less assured of the presence
of
the objects you see than of the truth of
the
proposition:
I experience
therefore I am ?
Now, this knowledge is no product of yourreasoning, no lesson that your masters have
taught
you; it is something that your mind sees,
feels,
handles;
it is a proof of the soul's
capacity for receiving from God an intuitive
kind of knowledge 13
*

*

’

51

~t

;

.

.

.

.

.

Given Descartes

claim to be metaphysically certain in his

initial position of the proposition that he thinks and,
therefore, exists, we may interpret this passage as suggest5ng that he regards his direct intuitions as being metaphysic-

ally certain for him at that point.
In replying to the Second Objections Descartes recon-

siders the extent of his metaphysical uncertainty in his

initial position.
Thirdly, when I said that we could know nothing
with certainty unless we were first aware that
God existed I announced in express terms that
I referred only to the science apprehending such
conclusions as can recur in memory without attend ing further to the proofs which led me to make
them
Further, knowledge of first principles is
not usually called science by dialecticians. But,
when we become aware that we are thinking beings,
this is a primative act of knowledge derived
from no syllogistic reasoning. He who says, 'I_
think hence I am or exist
does not deduce existence from thought by a syllogism, but by a simple
,

.

,

,

11
hAdam and Tannery, V, 137* This is my translation
of the passage in Adam and Tannery.
.
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act of mental vision, recognizes it
as if it
were a thing that is known per se.i^

Descartes maintains that in his initial
position he is metaphysically certain of those propositions that
are first

principles, when he perceives them in an act of
mental vision
by which he knows them per se. He is evidently
claiming
that in his initial position he is metaphysically
certain
of his direct intuitions.

In the Rules he claims he becomes

metaphysically certain of first principles by directly intuiting them, and he describes his direct intuition of
such
a

proposition as a mental action in which he knows it per

se.!5
On the basis of these three passages, we may justifi-

ably ignore the last four passages cited in the objection.

Since the first passage cited is plausibly interpreted so
that it is in accord with our answer to (1), we need not

worry about it either.
The second objection is also directed against my answer
to

On that answer,

(1).

clear and distinct perception is

characterized as a way of apprehending a proposition that
implies psychological certainty, but does not imply meta-

physical certainty.
incorrect.

i

Yet this way of understanding it is

If we understand clear and distinct perception

ij,

Haldane and Ross, II, 38
1

^Ibid

.

,

1

,

8

,

1

6 & 42

•
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in this way, Descartes lacks a plausible
defense for his

claim that his clear and distinct perceptions
are always
true.

It amounts to the claim that whenever
he apprehends

a proposition in such a way that it is
psychologically cer-

tain for him, it is true, and it is obvious that
this is

not the case
This objection is based on a misunderstanding.

have

I

characterized clear and distinct perception in the way just
noted, and

I

have cited textual support for doing so.

But

that characterization is only a partial explanation of

Descartes' concept.

I

have not claimed that clearly and

distinctly perceiving a proposition is the same as ap-

prehending it in such a way that it is psychologically certain.

There may be much more involved in clearly and dis-

tinctly perceiving a proposition.

For this reason, my

characterization does not imply the Descartes' claim that
his clear and distinct perceptions are always true amounts
to the claim that whenever he apprehends a proposition in

such a way that it is psychologically certain for him, it
is true.

If there is more to Descartes' concept of clear

and distinct perception, there may be more to his claim.
Once his notion of clear and distinct perception is fully

explained, it may turn out that he has a plausible argument
for his claim.

Furthermore, even if Descartes were to lack such an

argument on my understanding of clear and distinct perception,
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that alone would not show that

concept.

It would,

of course,

I

had misunderstood that

be agreeable to interpret

clear and distinct perception in such a
way that Descartes
has a plausible argument for his claim.
Any such inter-

pretation would go far beyond what Descartes
himself provides,
however. His own argument is given in this
passage.

every clear and distinct perception is without
douot something, and hence cannot derive its
origin from what is nought, but must of necessity have God as its author God, I say, who
being supremely perfect, cannot be the cause of
any error; and consequently we must consider that
such a conception (or such a judgement) is true.^6

—

This argumen t is

"too

obscure to merit serious consideration.

Moreover, the fact that Descartes fails to present a

plausible argument for his claim suggests that his concept
of clear and distinct perception does not provide him with

the makings of one.

Hence, a correct interpretation of

that notion might well be one that brings out this defect
in Descartes' position and helps us understand it.

The third objection is directed against my answer to
(2).

According to that answer, Descartes formulates a pro-

cedure for deductively intuiting any proposition he clearly
and distinctly perceives.

That procedure involves his

deductively intuiting that all his clear and distinct perceptions are true, and directly intuiting that he is clearly

16

Ibid.

,

176.
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and distinctly perceiving a particular
proposition.

Yet

Descartes denies that he can directly intuit
that he is
clearly and distinctly perceiving a
particular proposition.
In the Discourse on Method, he writes

j

I came to the conclusion that
I might assume, as
a general rule, that the things which we
conceive
yery clearly and distinctly are true --remembering,
however, that there is some difficulty in
ascertaining which are those that we distinctly con1

ceive.

'

In replying to the Seventh Objections

.

he states:

This is for the reason that nothing whatsoever
can be clearly and distinctly perceived, whoever be the person perceiving it, that it is
not perceived to be such as it is, i.e. which
is not true.
But because it is the wise alone
who know how to distinguish rightly between
what is so perceived, and what merely seems or
appears to be clear and distinct, I am not
surprised that our good friend mistakes the
one for the other. 1 ®
In each passage, Descartes claims that it is often difficult

for us to determine whether we are perceiving a particular

proposition clearly and distinctly.

He also states that

an individual can be mistaken in his belief that he is doing
so.

This suggests Descartes does not regard the proposition

that he is clearly and distinctly perceiving a particular

proposition as an epistemically basic one he can directly
intuit
It suffices to note that these paragraphs do not contain

17 Ibid
1

Ibid

.

,

102.

.

,

II,

267.
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>this suggestion.

Descartes' claim in them that it is often

difficult for us to determine whether we
are clearly and
distinctly perceiving a particular proposition
is consistent
with the claim that we can directly intuit the
fact
that

we are doing so.

It only points out that for Descartes
it

is often difficult for us to have such a direct
intuition.

Having one amounts to clearly and distinctly perceiving
that
we are having a particular clear and distinct
perception.

According to Descartes, it is not easy to do this.
Quires an expertise in
obscure and confused

.

It re-

distinguishing the clear from the
.

.

.

A strong motive for accepting my answer to (2) should

also be noted.

The only other plausible way of answering

that question, given my examination of Descartes' epistemology,
is inadequate in the very respect that distinguishes it from

my answer.

This alternative response is the following.

Descartes'

task is to trade his initial position for one in which he is

metaphysically certain of any proposition he clearly and
distinctly perceives.

He believes that in his initial posi-

tion only two hypotheses cast doubt on a proposition that
is evidenced solely by his clear and distinct perception of

it.

These are that God is a deceiver and that his clear and

19 Ibid

.

,

214.
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distinct perce::nons are sometimes
false.
this belief,

h:-

On the basis of

attempts to attain the state he
desires

by deductively -ntuiting, and so
becoming metaphysically
certain of, ti.z ne gations of these
hypotheses. By becoming
'

metaphysically certain of their negations,
he deprives these
hypotheses of :neir status as reasons for doubt.
-

He believes

that once he

rjis

done this, he is metaphysically certain
of

any propositic: he clearly and distinctly
perceives, on the
evidence thax
clearly and distinctly perceives
.

•

it.

Interpre'red in this way, Descartes' attempt does
not

involve his

in'ruiting

and becoming metaphysically certain

that he is cle:— ly and distinctly perceiving a particular

proposition.

we interpret Descartes in this way, however,

:

we attribute a

that in his

obviously incorrect claim to him.

in:.rial

This is

position the only hypotheses that cast

doubt on a bel:_ef that is evidenced solely by his clear and

distinct perce::Tion of it are that God is a deceiver and
that his clear and distinct perceptions are sometimes false

Another hypo t hizsis provides him with a reason to doubt such
a belief at th=it point, namely the hypothesis that he is

not clearly

an:i

distinctly perceiving his belief.

This

hypothesis is retaphysically possible for him in his initial
:

position, and ris practical certainty of it would epistemic*

ally defeat hi

z

practical certainty of his belief.

To inter :ret Descartes

'

attempt in such a way that it

is not open tc This objection, we have to understand it as
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involving his attaining an epistemic state
in which he is
metaphysically certain that he is clearly and
distinctly
perceiving his belief. Yet when we understand
Descartes'

attempt in this way
(

2

,

have what amounts to my answer to

v/e

2 ).
*

Even

I

have successfully answered our questions,

only partially examined Descartes' epistemology.

I

I

have

shall,

therefore, note some points that merit further
consideration.

Deviously, the notion of clear and distinct perception

needs to be explained more fully.

We have seen that Descartes

wants clear and distinct perception to occupy an interesting
place in his epistemology.

He wants it to fail to imply

metaphysical certainty, and so be weaker than intuition.
However

,

he also wants it to imply truth and so be stronger

than mere apprehension.

Nothing

I

have said in this dis-

sertation fully explains clear and distinct perception, so
it remains to be seen whether it can be correctly placed

in this position.

Descartes' statement of necessary and sufficient conditions for metaphysical uncertainty and his definitions of
direct and deductive intuition also merit further attention.

They imply that his intuitions are always metaphysically
certain.

I

have not, however, considered what sort of argu-

ment Descartes might give for his criterion of metaphysical
uncertainty.

Nor have

I

considered what factors he might

cite to show that a particular proposition is within the

16 ?

range of his intuition.
These points are of particular
interest in connection
with Descartes' claim in the Second
Meditation that he is

metaphysically certain of his existence.

In some passages,

he argues for that claim on the
grounds that he directly

intuits that he exists at that point and
that his intuitions
are always metaphysically certain for him. 20
in its present
stage, my interpretation provides a basis
for understanding
and evaluating Descartes' position, hut it
does not fully

evaluate his argument for the metaphysical certainty
of his
intuitions, or indicate how he might defend his claim
that
he directly intuits that he exists.

Descartes' approach to his task also needs to be examined further.
First,

At least two questions remain to be considered.

is Descartes' procedure for deductively intuiting any

proposition he can clearly and distinctly perceive a success?
I

have not evaluated his attempt to deductively intuit

that all his clear and distinct perceptions are true, or his

claim that whenever he clearly and distinctly perceives a

proposition he can directly intuit that he is doing so.
have

I

Nor

considered whether his procedure is brief enough for

him to intuit all its premises at once
Second, assuming Descartes successfully completes his
task, what does he gain?

20

Ibid

.

,

38

Obviously, he finds a way of
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becoming metaphysically certain of any proposition
he can
clearly and distinctly perceive. However, Descartes
does

not fully explain what propositions he can clearly
and

distinctly perceive.

It is not clear,

for example, whether

some very complex scientific truths are beyond the
range of
his clear and distinct perception.

Nor is it clear whether

he can clearly and distinctly perceive those propositions

that are normally evidenced for him by his senses, such as
the one that he is sitting in front of a fire

Furthermore, even if Descartes completes his task
successfully, it is not clear that he thereby gains a way
of coming to know any proposition he can clearly and dis-

tinctly perceive with metaphysical certainty.

Nothing in

his notions of intuition and metaphysical certainty seems
to guarantee that whenever a proposition is intuited by

him or is metaphysically certain for him, it is true.
all

I

For

have said about Descartes' epistemology, it may be

that in completing his task he intuits and even becomes

metaphysically certain of some false propositions, including the principle that all his clear and distinct perceptions
are true.

If this is so,

some of his clear and distinct

perceptions are false, and, although Descartes has a way
of becoming metaphysically certain of them, he does not

have a way of coming to know them with metaphysical cer-

tainty.

He cannot know a false proposition.
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Even assuming that

I

have successfully answered my

three questions, a good deal of work
remains to be done on
Descartes' epistemology. I hope, however,
that in my
answers I have isolated a correct basis from
which to do

that work

1?0

APPENDIX
Doney's answer to

(2)

is not open to one objection that

has been made to it in the literature

.

Harry Frankfurt claims

that the following statement by Descartes provides
textual

evidence against Doney's answer:
But after I have perceived that there is a
God
and from that have concluded that all
those things that I perceive clearuy and distinctly are necessarily true, then, even if I
attend no further to the reasons for which I
have judged that this was true, just as long
as I recall that I did perceive clearly and
distinctly, no contrary reason can be brought
forward that could drive me to doubt; rather
I have a true and certain knowledge of it. 2
.

.

.

With regard to this passage, Frankfurt states:
Descartes insists, then, that it is sufficient
simply to recollect that God's existence and
veracity have been demonstrated. Accordingly
if the memory thesis is accepted, he is easily
convicted of the blunder of relying upon recollection to provide evidence for the reliability
of recollection. 2

Frankfurt's objection seems to be the following.

Doney's in-

terpretation cannot adequately account for this passage.
Descartes claims here that he accomplishes his task by

becoming metaphysically certain that God exists and that
all his clear and distinct perceptions are true.

VII, 170.

''Adam and Tannery,

This is Frankfurt's

translation of the passage in Adam and Tannery.
Frankfurt, Demons

,

160.

He also
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claims that he becomes metaphysically
certain of these propositions on the evidence that he recollects
clearly and distinctly perceiving them. These claims
are inconsistent with
the ones that Doney attributes to
him.
On Doney's interpretation, Descartes maintains that until
he accomplishes
his task he cannot be metaphysically certain
of any prop-

ositions solely on the basis of his recollection
of clearly
and distinctly perceiving them. This commits
him to the

position that, contrary to his claim in the above
passage,
he cannot accomplish his task by becoming metaphysically

certain of the propositions that God exists and that all
his clear and distinct perceptions are true solely on
the

evidence that he recollects clearly and distinctly perceiving
them
However, Frankfurt has misread the passage at hand.

Descartes does not claim that he becomes metaphysically
certain of the propositions that God exists and that all
his clear and distinct perceptions are true on the sole

evidence that he recollects clearly and distinctly perceiving them.

Frankfurt is led to interpret this passage in

the way he does because he understands Descartes to be re-

ferring to the propositions that God exists and that all
his clear and distinct perceptions are true when he states,
.

.1

have judged this to be true.

..."

Yet, when

this passage is read in context, it is clear that Descartes
is not referring to these propositions in that statement.
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Rather, he is referring to the
proposition that the angles
of a triangle equal two right
angles.

When we consider the translation that
Haldane and Ross
give of this passage and of the
last half of the paragraph
which precedes it, we find Descartes
stating
that:

Thus, for example when I consider the
nature of
a
rectilinear triangle, I who have some little
knowledge of the principles of geometry
recognize
quite clearly that the angles of a triangle
are
equa- to two right angles, and it is not
possible
for me not to believe this so long as I
apply my
mind iO its demonstration but as soon as
I
from attending to the proof, although I stillabstain
collect having clearly comprehended it, it may reeasily occur that I come to doubt its truth, if
I am ignorant of there being a God.
For I can
persuade myself of having been so constructed
by nature that I can easily deceive myself in
those
matters which I believe myself to apprehend with
the greatest evidence and certainty, especially
when i recollect that I have frequently judged
matters to be true and certain which other reasons have afterwards impelled me to judge to be
altogether false.
But, after I have recognized that there is a
God because at the same time I have also recognized
that ai- things depend on Him, and that He is not
a deceiver, and from that have inferred that what
I perceive clearly and distinctly cannot fail to
be true--although I no longer pay any attention
to the reasons for which I have judged this [that
the angles of a triangle equal two right angle|
to be true, provided that I recollect having clearly and distinctly perceived it no contrary reason
can be brought forward which could ever cause me
to doubt its truth; and thus I have a true and
certain knowledge of it.
.

,

.

;

The parenthetical remark in the second paragraph has been

added to highlight the line of argument that runs through

3 Haldane

and Ross, I, 184.
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it from the preceding one.

Descartes is contrasting an

epistemic state in which he is not metaphysically
certain
of the proposition that the angles of a
triangle equal two

right angles with one in which he is metaphysically
certain
of it.

In the second paragraph, he claims that he
can get

from the former state to the latter by establishing
that
God exists and that all his clear and distinct perceptions
are true.

We have, of course, yet to discover exactly how

we are to understand the difference between these two states

and Descartes

'

attempt to get from one to the other.

However,

it is evident that the second paragraph does not contain

the claim Frankfurt finds in it.
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